the spirit of laws-第22节

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en　in　the　state　who　might　be　said　to　be　great　of　themselves；　a　thing　directly　opposite　to　the　nature　of　this　government。

Were　the　governor　of　a　town　independent　of　the　pasha；　expedients　would　be　daily　necessary　to　make　them　agree；　which　is　highly　absurd　in　a　despotic　state。　Besides；　if　a　particular　governor　should　refuse　to　obey；　how　could　the　other　answer　for　his　province　with　his　head？

In　this　kind　of　government；　authority　must　ever　be　wavering；　nor　is　that　of　the　lowest　magistrate　more　steady　than　that　of　the　despotic　prince。　Under　moderate　governments；　the　law　is　prudent　in　all　its　parts；　and　perfectly　well　known；　so　that　even　the　pettiest　magistrates　are　capable　of　following　it。　But　in　a　despotic　state；　where　the　prince's　will　is　the　law；　though　the　prince　were　wise；　yet　how　could　the　magistrate　follow　a　will　he　does　not　know？　He　must　certainly　follow　his　own。

Again；　as　the　law　is　only　the　prince's　will；　and　as　the　prince　can　only　will　what　he　knows；　the　consequence　is　that　there　are　an　infinite　number　of　people　who　must　will　for　him；　and　make　their　wills　keep　pace　with　his。　In　fine；　as　the　law　is　the　momentary　will　of　the　prince；　it　is　necessary　that　those　who　will　for　him　should　follow　his　sudden　manner　of　willing。

17。　Of　Presents。　It　is　a　received　custom　in　despotic　countries　never　to　address　any　superior　whomsoever；　not　excepting　their　kings；　without　making　them　a　present。　The　Mogul＇51＇　never　receives　the　petitions　of　his　subjects　if　they　come　with　empty　hands。　These　princes　spoil　even　their　own　favours。

But　thus　it　must　ever　be　in　a　government　where　no　man　is　a　citizen；　where　they　have　all　a　notion　that　a　superior　is　under　no　obligation　to　an　inferior；　where　men　imagine　themselves　bound　by　no　other　tie　than　the　chastisements　inflicted　by　one　party　upon　another；　where；　in　fine；　there　is　very　little　to　do；　and　where　the　people　have　seldom　an　occasion　of　presenting　themselves　before　the　great；　of　offering　their　petitions；　and　much　less　their　complaints。

In　a　republic；　presents　are　odious；　because　virtue　stands　in　no　need　of　them。　In　monarchies；　honour　is　a　much　stronger　incentive　than　presents。　But　in　a　despotic　government；　where　there　is　neither　honour　nor　virtue；　people　cannot　be　determined　to　act　but　through　hope　of　the　conveniences　of　life。

It　is　in　conformity　with　republican　ideas　that　Plato＇52＇　ordered　those　who　received　presents　for　doing　their　duty　to　be　punished　with　death。　〃They　must　not　take　presents；〃　says　he；　〃neither　for　good　nor　for　evil　actions。〃

A　very　bad　law　was　that　among　the　Romans＇53＇　which　gave　the　magistrates　leave　to　accept　small　presents＇＇54＇　provided　they　did　not　exceed　one　hundred　crowns　in　the　whole　year。　They　who　receive　nothing　expect　nothing；　they　who　receive　a　little　soon　covet　more；　till　at　length　their　desires　swell　to　an　exorbitant　height。

Besides；　it　is　much　easier　to　convict　a　man　who　knows　himself　obliged　to　accept　no　present　at　all；　and　yet　will　accept　something；　than　a　person　who　takes　more　when　he　ought　to　take　less；　and　who　always　finds　pretexts；　excuses；　and　plausible　reasons　in　justification　of　his　conduct。

18。　Of　Rewards　conferred　by　the　Sovereign。　In　despotic　governments；　where；　as　we　have　already　observed；　the　principal　motive　of　action　is　the　hope　of　the　conveniences　of　life；　the　prince　who　confers　rewards　has　nothing　to　bestow　but　money。　In　monarchies；　where　honour　alone　predominates；　the　prince's　rewards　would　consist　only　of　marks　of　distinction；　if　the　distinctions　established　by　honour　were　not　attended　with　luxury；　which　necessarily　brings　on　its　wants：　the　prince　therefore　is　obliged　to　confer　such　honours　as　lead　to　wealth。　But　in　a　republic　where　virtue　reigns　　a　motive　self…sufficient；　and　which　excludes　all　others　　the　recompenses　of　the　state　consist　only　of　public　attestations　of　this　virtue。

It　is　a　general　rule　that　great　rewards　in　monarchies　and　republics　are　a　sign　of　their　decline；　because　they　are　a　proof　of　their　principles　being　corrupted；　and　that　the　idea　of　honour　has　no　longer　the　same　force　in　a　monarchy；　nor　the　title　of　citizen　the　same　weight　in　a　republic。

The　very　worst　Roman　emperors　were　those　who　were　most　profuse　in　their　largesses；　for　example；　Caligula；　Claudius；　Nero；　Otho；　Vitellius；　Commodus；　Heliogabalus；　and　Caracalla。　The　best；　as　Augustus；　Vespasian；　Antoninus　Pius；　Marcus　Aurelius；　and　Pertinax；　were　economists。　Under　good　emperors　the　state　resumed　its　principles；　all　other　treasures　were　supplied　by　that　of　honour。

19。　New　Consequences　of　the　Principles　of　the　three　Governments。　I　cannot　conclude　this　book　without　making　some　applications　of　my　three　principles。

1st　Question。＇　It　is　a　question　whether　the　laws　ought　to　oblige　a　subject　to　accept　a　public　employment。　My　opinion　is　that　they　ought　in　a　republic；　but　not　in　a　monarchical　government。　In　the　former；　public　employments　are　attestations　of　virtue；　depositions　with　which　a　citizen　is　entrusted　by　his　country；　for　whose　sake　alone　he　ought　to　live；　to　act；　and　to　think；　consequently　lie　cannot　refuse　them。＇55＇　In　the　latter；　public　offices　are　testimonials　of　honour；　now　such　is　the　capriciousness　of　honour　that　it　chooses　to　accept　none　of　these　testimonies　but　when　and　in　what　manner　it　pleases。

The　late　King　of　Sardinia＇56＇　inflicted　punishments　on　his　subjects　who　refused　the　dignities　and　public　offices　of　the　state。　In　this　he　unknowingly　followed　republican　ideas：　but　his　method　of　governing　in　other　respects　sufficiently　proves　that　this　was　not　his　intention。

2nd　Question。＇　Secondly；　it　is　questioned　whether　a　subject　should　be　obliged　to　accept　a　post　in　the　army　inferior　to　that　which　he　held　before。　Among　the　Romans　it　was　usual　to　see　a　captain　serve　the　next　year　under　his　lieutenant。＇57＇　This　is　because　virtue　in　republics　requires　a　continual　sacrifice　of　our　persons　and　of　our　repugnances　for　the　good　of　the　state。　But　in　monarchies；　honour；　true　or　false；　will　never　bear　with　what　it　calls　degrading　itself。

In　despotic　governments；　where　honour；　posts；　and　ranks　are　equally　abused；　they　indiscriminately　make　a　prince　a　scullion；　and　a　scullion　a　prince。

3rd　Question。＇　Thirdly；　it　may　be　inquired；　whether　civil　and　military　employments　should　be　conferred　on　the　same　person。　In　republics　I　think　they　should　be　joined；　but　in　monarchies　separated。　In　the　former　it　would　be　extremely　dangerous　to　make　the　profession　of　arms　a　particular　state；　distinct　from　that　of　civil　functions；　and　in　the　latter；　no　less　dangerous　would　it　be　to　confer　these　two　employments　on　the　same　person。

In　republics　a　person　takes　up　arms　only　with　a　view　to　defend　his　country　and　its　laws；　it　is　because　he　is　a　citizen　he　makes　himself　for　a　while　a　soldier。　Were　these　two　distinct　states；　the　person　who　under　arms　thinks　himself　a　citizen　would　soon　be　made　sensible　he　is　only　a　soldier。

In　monarchies；　they　whose　condition　engages　them　in　the　profession　of　arms　have　nothing　but　glory；　or　at　least　honour　or　fortune；　in　view。　To　men；　therefore；　like　these；　the　prince　should　never　give　any　civil　employments；　on　the　contrary；　they　ought　to　be　checked　by　the　civil　magistrate；　that　the　same　persons　may　not　have　at　the　same　time　the　confidence　of　the　people　and　the　power　to　abuse　it。＇58＇

We　have　only　to　cast　an　eye　on　a　nation　that　may　be　justly　called　a　republic；　disguised　under　the　form　of　monarchy；　and　we　shall　see　how　jealous　they　are　of　making　a　separate　order　of　the　profession　of　arms；　and　how　the　military　state　is　constantly　allied　with　that　of　the　citizen；　and　even　sometimes　of　the　magistrate；　to　the　end　that　these　qualities　may　be　a　pledge　for　their　country；　which　should　never　be　forgotten。

The　division　of　civil　and　military　employments；　made　by　the　Romans　after　the　extinction　of　the　republic；　was　not　an　arbitrary　thing。　It　was　a　consequence　of　the　change　which　happened　in　the　constitution　of　Rome；　it　was　natural　to　a　monarchical　government；　and　what　was　only　commenced　under　Augustus＇59＇　succeeding　emperors＇60＇　were　obliged　to　finish；　in　order　to　temper　the　military　government。

Procopius；　therefore；　the　competitor　of　Valens　the　emperor；　was　very　much　to　blame　when；　conferring　the　pro…consular　dignity＇61＇　upon　Hormisdas；　a　prince　of　the　blood　royal　of　Persia；　he　restored　to　this　magistracy　the　military　command　of　which　it　had　been　formerly　possessed；　unless　indeed　he　had　very　particular　reasons　for　so　doing。　A　person　that　aspires　to　the　sovereignty　concerns　himself　less　about　what　is　serviceable　to　the　state　than　what　is　likely　to　promote　his　own　interest。

4th　Question。＇　Fourthly；　it　is　a　question　whether　public　employments　should　be　sold。　They　ought　not；　I　think；　in　despotic　governments；　where　the　subjects　must　be　instantaneously　placed　or　displaced　by　the　prince。

But　in　monarchies　this　custom　is　not　at　all　improper；　by　reason　it　is　an　inducement　to　engage　in　that　as　a　family　employment　which　would　not　be　undertaken　through　a　motive　of　virtue；　it　fixes　likewise　every　one　in　his　duty；　and　renders　the　several　orders　of　the　kingdom　more　permanent。　Suidas　very　justly　observes　that　Anastasius　had　changed　the　empire　into　a　kind　of　aristocracy；　by　selling　all　public　employments。

Plato＇62＇　cannot　bear　with　this　pr