the spirit of laws-第21节

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this　law；　they　are　obliged　to　marry　their　children　at　eight；　nine；　or　ten　years　of　age；　and　sometimes　younger；　to　the　end　that　they　may　not　be　a　wretched　part　of　the　father's　succession。

In　countries　where　there　are　no　fundamental　laws；　the　succession　to　the　empire　cannot　be　fixed。　The　crown　is　then　elective；　and　the　right　of　electing　is　in　the　prince；　who　names　a　successor　either　of　his　own　or　of　some　other　family。　In　vain　would　it　be　to　establish　here　the　succession　of　the　eldest　son；　the　prince　might　always　choose　another。　The　successor　is　declared　by　the　prince　himself；　or　by　a　civil　war。　Hence　a　despotic　state　is；　upon　another　account；　more　liable　than　a　monarchical　government　to　dissolution。

As　every　prince　of　the　royal　family　is　held　equally　capable　of　being　chosen；　hence　it　follows　that　the　prince　who　ascends　the　throne　immediately　strangles　his　brothers；　as　in　Turkey；　or　puts　out　their　eyes；　as　in　Persia；　or　bereaves　them　of　their　understanding；　as　in　the　Mogul's　country；　or　if　these　precautions　are　not　used；　as　in　Morocco；　the　vacancy　of　the　throne　is　always　attended　with　the　horrors　of　a　civil　war。

By　the　constitution　of　Russia＇41＇　the　Czar　may　choose　whom　he　has　a　mind　for　his　successor；　whether　of　his　own　or　of　a　strange　family。　Such　a　settlement　produces　a　thousand　revolutions；　and　renders　the　throne　as　tottering　as　the　succession　is　arbitrary。　The　right　of　succession　being　one　of　those　things　which　are　of　most　importance　to　the　people　to　know；　the　best　is　that　which　most　sensibly　strikes　them。　Such　as　a　certain　order　of　birth。　A　settlement　of　this　kind　puts　a　stop　to　intrigues；　and　stifles　ambition；　the　mind　of　a　weak　prince　is　no　longer　enslaved；　nor　is　he　made　to　speak　his　will　as　he　is　just　expiring。

When　the　succession　is　established　by　a　fundamental　law；　only　one　prince　is　the　successor；　and　his　brothers　have　neither　a　real　nor　apparent　right　to　dispute　the　crown　with　him。　They　can　neither　pretend　to　nor　take　any　advantage　of　the　will　of　a　father。　There　is　then　no　more　occasion　to　confine　or　kill　the　king's　brother　than　any　other　subject。

But　in　despotic　governments；　where　the　prince's　brothers　are　equally　his　slaves　and　his　rivals；　prudence　requires　that　their　persons　be　secured；　especially　in　Mahomedan　countries；　where　religion　considers　victory　or　success　as　a　divine　decision　in　their　favour；　so　that　they　have　no　such　thing　as　a　monarch　de　jure；　but　only　de　facto。

There　is　a　far　greater　incentive　to　ambition　in　countries　where　the　princes　of　the　blood　are　sensible　that　if　they　do　not　ascend　the　throne　they　must　be　either　imprisoned　or　put　to　death；　than　among　us；　where　they　are　placed　in　such　a　station　as　may　satisfy；　if　not　their　ambition；　at　least　their　moderate　desires。

The　princes　of　despotic　governments　have　ever　perverted　the　use　of　marriage。　They　generally　take　a　great　many　wives；　especially　in　that　part　of　the　world　where　absolute　power　is　in　some　measure　naturalised；　namely；　Asia。　Hence　they　come　to　have　such　a　multitude　of　children　that　they　can　hardly　have　any　great　affection　for　them；　nor　the　children　for　one　another。

The　reigning　family　resembles　the　state；　it　is　too　weak　itself；　and　its　head　too　powerful；　it　seems　very　numerous　and　extensive；　and　yet　is　suddenly　extinct。　Artaxerxes＇42＇　put　all　his　children　to　death　for　conspiring　against　him。

It　is　not　at　all　probable　that　fifty　children　would　conspire　against　their　father；　and　much　less　that　this　conspiracy　would　be　owing　to　his　having　refused　to　resign　his　concubine　to　his　eldest　son。　It　is　more　natural　to　believe　that　the　whole　was　an　intrigue　of　those　oriental　seraglios；　where　fraud；　treachery；　and　deceit　reign　in　silence　and　darkness；　and　where　an　old　prince；　grown　every　day　more　infirm；　is　the　first　prisoner　of　the　palace。

After　what　has　been　said；　one　would　imagine　that　human　nature　should　perpetually　rise　up　against　despotism。　But　notwithstanding　the　love　of　liberty；　so　natural　to　mankind；　notwithstanding　their　innate　detestation　of　force　and　violence；　most　nations　are　subject　to　this　very　government。　This　is　easily　accounted　for。　To　form　a　moderate　government；　it　is　necessary　to　combine　the　several　powers；　to　regulate；　temper；　and　set　them　in　motion；　to　give；　as　it　were；　ballast　to　one；　in　order　to　enable　it　to　counterpoise　the　other。　This　is　a　masterpiece　of　legislation；　rarely　produced　by　hazard；　and　seldom　attained　by　prudence。　On　the　contrary；　a　despotic　government　offers　itself；　as　it　were；　at　first　sight；　it　is　uniform　throughout；　and　as　passions　only　are　requisite　to　establish　it；　this　is　what　every　capacity　may　reach。

15。　The　same　Subject　continued。　In　warm　climates；　where　despotic　power　generally　prevails；　the　passions　disclose　themselves　earlier；　and　are　sooner　extinguished；＇43＇　the　understanding　is　sooner　ripened；　they　are　less　in　danger　of　squandering　their　fortunes；　there　is　less　facility　of　distinguishing　themselves　in　the　world；　less　communication　between　young　people；　who　are　confined　at　home；　they　marry　much　earlier；　and　consequently　may　be　sooner　of　age　than　in　our　European　climates。　In　Turkey　they　are　of　age　at　fifteen。＇44＇

They　have　no　such　thing　as　a　cession　of　goods；　in　a　government　where　there　is　no　fixed　property；　people　depend　rather　on　the　person　than　on　his　estate。

The　cession　of　goods　is　naturally　admitted　in　moderate　governments；＇45＇　but　especially　in　republics；　because　of　the　greater　confidence　usually　placed　in　the　probity　of　the　citizens；　and　the　lenity　and　moderation　arising　from　a　form　of　government　which　every　subject　seems　to　nave　preferred　to　all　others。

Had　the　legislators　of　the　Roman　republic　established　the　cession　of　goods；＇46＇　they　never　would　have　been　exposed　to　so　many　seditions　and　civil　discords；　neither　would　they　have　experienced　the　danger　of　the　evils；　nor　the　inconvenience　of　the　remedies。

Poverty　and　the　precariousness　of　property　in　a　despotic　state　render　usury　natural；　each　person　raising　the　value　of　his　money　in　proportion　to　the　danger　he　sees　in　lending　it。　Misery　therefore　pours　from　all　parts　into　those　unhappy　countries；　they　are　bereft　of　everything；　even　of　the　resource　of　borrowing。

Hence　it　is　that　a　merchant　under　this　government　is　unable　to　carry　on　an　extensive　commerce；　he　lives　from　hand　to　mouth；　and　were　he　to　encumber　himself　with　a　large　quantity　of　merchandise；　he　would　lose　more　by　the　exorbitant　interest　he　must　give　for　money　than　he　could　possibly　get　by　the　goods。　Hence　they　have　no　laws　here　relating　to　commerce；　they　are　all　reduced　to　what　is　called　the　bare　police。

A　government　cannot　be　unjust　without　having　hands　to　exercise　its　injustice。　Now；　it　is　impossible　but　that　these　hands　will　be　grasping　for　themselves。　The　embezzling　of　the　public　money　is　therefore　natural　in　despotic　states。

As　this　is　a　common　crime　under　such　a　government；　confiscations　are　very　useful。　By　these　the　people　are　eased；　the　money　drawn　by　this　method　being　a　considerable　tribute　which　could　hardly　be　raised　on　the　exhausted　subject：　neither　is　there　in　those　countries　any　one　family　which　the　prince　would　be　glad　to　preserve。

In　moderate　governments　it　is　quite　a　different　thing。　Confiscations　would　render　property　uncertain；　would　strip　innocent　children；　would　destroy　a　whole　family；　instead　of　punishing　a　single　criminal。　In　republics　they　would　be　attended　with　the　mischief　of　subverting　equality；　which　is　the　very　soul　of　this　government；　by　depriving　a　citizen　of　his　necessary　subsistence。＇47＇

There　is　a　Roman　law＇48＇　against　confiscations；　except　in　the　case　of　crimen　majestatis；　or　high　treason　of　the　most　heinous　nature。　It　would　be　a　prudent　thing　to　follow　the　spirit　of　this　law；　and　to　limit　confiscations　to　particular　crimes。　In　countries　where　a　local　custom　has　rendered　real　estates　alienable；　Bodin　very　justly　observes　that　confiscations　should　extend　only　to　such　as　are　purchased　or　acquired。＇49＇

16。　Of　the　Communication　of　Power。　In　a　despotic　government　the　power　is　communicated　entire　to　the　person　entrusted　with　it。　The　vizir　himself　is　the　despotic　prince；　and　each　particular　officer　is　the　vizir。　In　monarchies　the　power　is　less　immediately　applied；　being　tempered　by　the　monarch　as　he　gives　it。＇50＇　He　makes　such　a　distribution　of　his　authority　as　never　to　communicate　a　part　of　it　without　reserving　a　greater　share　to　himself。

Hence　in　monarchies　the　governors　of　towns　are　not　so　dependent　on　the　governor　of　the　province　as　not　to　be　still　more　so　on　the　prince；　and　the　private　officers　or　military　bodies　are　not　so　far　subject　to　their　general　as　not　to　owe　still　a　greater　subjection　to　their　sovereign。

In　most　monarchies　it　has　been　wisely　regulated　that　those　who　have　an　extensive　command　should　not　belong　to　any　military　corps；　so　that　as　they　have　no　authority　but　through　the　prince's　pleasure；　and　as　they　may　be　employed　or　not；　they　are　in　some　measure　in　the　service；　and　in　some　measure　out　of　it。

This　is　incompatible　with　a　despotic　government。　For　if　those　who　are　not　actually　employed　were　still　invested　with　privileges　and　titles；　the　consequence　must　be　that　there　would　be　men　in　the　state　who　might　be　said　to　be　great　of　themselves；　a　thing　directly　opposite　to　the　nature