the spirit of laws-第20节

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Accordingly　it　is　observable　that　in　the　commotions　of　a　despotic　government；　the　people；　hurried　away　by　their　passions；　are　apt　to　push　things　as　far　as　they　can　go。　The　disorders　they　commit　are　all　extreme；　whereas　in　monarchies　matters　are　seldom　carried　to　excess。　The　chiefs　are　apprehensive　on　their　own　account；　they　are　afraid　of　being　abandoned；　and　the　intermediate　dependent　powers　do　not　choose　that　the　populace　should　have　too　much　the　upper　hand。　It　rarely　happens　that　the　states　of　the　kingdom　are　entirely　corrupted：　the　prince　adheres　to　these；　and　the　seditious；　who　have　neither　will　nor　hopes　to　subvert　the　government；　have　neither　power　nor　will　to　dethrone　the　prince。

In　these　circumstances　men　of　prudence　and　authority　interfere；　moderate　measures　are　first　proposed；　then　complied　with；　and　things　at　length　are　redressed；　the　laws　resume　their　vigour；　and　command　submission。

Thus　all　our　histories　are　full　of　civil　wars　without　revolutions；　while　the　histories　of　despotic　governments　abound　with　revolutions　without　civil　wars。

The　writers　of　the　history　of　the　civil　wars　of　some　countries；　even　those　who　fomented　them；　sufficiently　demonstrate　the　little　foundation　princes　have　to　suspect　the　authority　with　which　they　invest　particular　bodies　of　men；　since；　even　under　the　unhappy　circumstance　of　their　errors；　they　sighed　only　after　the　laws　and　their　duty；　and　restrained；　more　than　they　were　capable　of　inflaming；　the　impetuosity　of　the　revolted。＇33＇　Cardinal　Richelieu；　reflecting　perhaps　that　he　had　too　much　reduced　the　states　of　the　kingdom；　has　recourse　to　the　virtues　of　the　prince　and　of　his　ministers　for　the　support＇34＇　of　government：　but　he　requires　so　many　things；　that　indeed　there　is　none　but　an　angel　capable　of　such　attention；　such　resolution　and　knowledge；　and　scarcely　can　we　flatter　ourselves　that　we　shall　ever　see　such　a　prince　and　ministers　while　monarchy　subsists。

As　people　who　live　under　a　good　government　are　happier　than　those　who　without　rule　or　leaders　wander　about　the　forests；　so　monarchs　who　live　under　the　fundamental　laws　of　their　country　are　far　happier　than　despotic　princes　who　have　nothing　to　regulate；　neither　their　own　passions　nor　those　of　their　subjects。

12。　The　same　Subject　continued。　Let　us　not　look　for　magnanimity　in　despotic　governments；　the　prince　cannot　impart　a　greatness　which　he　has　not　himself；　with　him　there　is　no　such　thing　as　glory。

It　is　in　monarchies　that　we　behold　the　subjects　encircling　the　throne；　and　cheered　by　the　irradiancy　of　the　sovereign；　there　it　is　that　each　person　filling；　as　it　were；　a　larger　space；　is　capable　of　exercising　those　virtues　which　adorn　the　soul；　not　with　independence；　but　with　true　dignity　and　greatness。

13。　An　Idea　of　Despotic　Power。　When　the　savages　of　Louisiana　are　desirous　of　fruit；　they　cut　the　tree　to　the　root；　and　gather　the　fruit。＇35＇　This　is　an　emblem　of　despotic　government。

14。　In　what　Manner　the　Laws　are　in　relation　to　the　Principles　of　Despotic　Government。　The　principle　of　despotic　government　is　fear；　but　a　timid；　ignorant；　and　faint…spirited　people　have　no　occasion　for　a　great　number　of　laws。

Everything　ought　to　depend　here　on　two　or　three　ideas；　hence　there　is　no　necessity　that　any　new　notions　should　be　added。　When　we　want　to　break　a　horse；　we　take　care　not　to　let　him　change　his　master；　his　lesson；　or　his　pace。　Thus　an　impression　is　made　on　his　brain　by　two　or　three　motions；　and　no　more。

If　a　prince　is　shut　up　in　a　seraglio；　he　cannot　leave　his　voluptuous　abode　without　alarming　those　who　keep　him　confined。　Thev　will　not　bear　that　his　person　and　power　should　pass　into　other　hands。　He　seldom　therefore　wages　war　in　person；　and　hardly　ventures　to　entrust　the　command　to　his　generals。

A　prince　of　this　stamp；　unaccustomed　to　resistance　in　his　palace；　is　enraged　to　see　his　will　opposed　by　armed　force；　hence　he　is　generally　governed　by　wrath　or　vengeance。　Besides；　he　can　have　no　notion　of　true　glory。　War　therefore　is　carried　on　under　such　a　government　in　its　full　natural　fury；　and　less　extent　is　given　to　the　law　of　nations　than　in　other　states。

Such　a　prince　has　so　many　imperfections　that　they　are　afraid　to　expose　his　natural　stupidity　to　public　view。　He　is　concealed　in　his　palace；　and　the　people　are　ignorant　of　his　situation。　It　is　lucky　for　him　that　the　inhabitants　of　those　countries　need　only　the　name　of　a　prince　to　govern　them。

When　Charles　XII　was　at　Bender；　he　met　with　some　opposition　from　the　senate　of　Sweden；　upon　which　he　wrote　word　home　that　he　would　send　one　of　his　boots　to　command　them。　This　boot　would　have　governed　like　a　despotic　prince。

If　the　prince　is　a　prisoner；　he　is　supposed　to　be　dead；　and　another　mounts　the　throne。　The　treaties　made　by　the　prisoner　are　void；　his　successor　will　not　ratify　them；　and　indeed；　as　he　is　the　law；　the　state；　and　the　prince：　when　he　is　no　longer　a　prince；　he　is　nothing：　were　he　not　therefore　deemed　to　be　deceased；　the　state　would　be　subverted。

One　thing　which　chiefly　determined　the　Turks　to　conclude　a　separate　peace　with　Peter　I　was　the　Muscovites　telling　the　Vizir　that　in　Sweden　another　prince　had　been　placed　upon　the　throne。＇36＇

The　preservation　of　the　state　is　only　the　preservation　of　the　prince；　or　rather　of　the　palace　where　he　is　confined。　Whatever　does　not　directly　menace　this　palace　or　the　capital　makes　no　impression　on　ignorant；　proud；　and　prejudiced　minds；　and　as　for　the　concatenation　of　events；　they　are　unable　to　trace；　to　foresee；　or　even　to　conceive　it。　Politics；　with　its　several　springs　and　laws；　must　here　be　very　much　limited；　the　political　government　is　as　simple　as　the　civil。＇37＇

The　whole　is　reduced　to　reconciling　the　political　and　civil　administration　to　the　domestic　government；　the　officers　of　state　to　those　of　the　seraglio。

Such　a　state　is　happiest　when　it　can　look　upon　itself　as　the　only　one　in　the　world；　when　it　is　environed　with　deserts；　and　separated　from　those　people　whom　they　call　Barbarians。　Since　it　cannot　depend　on　the　militia；　it　is　proper　it　should　destroy　a　part　of　itself。

As　fear　is　the　principle　of　despotic　government；　its　end　is　tranquillity；　but　this　tranquillity　cannot　be　called　a　peace：　no；　it　is　only　the　silence　of　those　towns　which　the　enemy　is　ready　to　invade。

Since　strength　does　not　lie　in　the　state；　but　in　the　army　that　founded　it；　in　order　to　defend　the　state　the　army　must　be　preserved；　how　formidable　soever　to　the　prince。　How；　then；　can　we　reconcile　the　security　of　the　government　to　that　of　the　prince's　person？

Observe　how　industriously　the　Russian　government　endeavours　to　temper　its　arbitrary　power；　which　it　finds　more　burdensome　than　the　people　themselves。　They　have　broken　their　numerous　guards；　mitigated　criminal　punishments；　erected　tribunals；　entered　into　a　knowledge　of　the　laws；　and　instructed　the　people。　But　there　are　particular　causes　that　will　probably　once　more　involve　them　in　the　very　misery　which　they　now　endeavour　to　avoid。

In　those　states　religion　has　more　influence　than　anywhere　else；　it　is　fear　added　to　fear。　In　Mahomedan　countries；　it　is　partly　from　their　religion　that　the　people　derive　the　surprising　veneration　they　have　for　their　prince。

It　is　religion　that　amends　in　some　measure　the　Turkish　constitution。　The　subjects；　who　have　no　attachment　of　honour　to　the　glory　and　grandeur　of　the　state；　are　connected　with　it　by　the　force　and　principle　of　religion。

Of　all　despotic　governments　there　is　none　that　labours　more　under　its　own　weight　than　that　wherein　the　prince　declares　himself　proprietor　of　all　the　lands；　and　heir　to　all　his　subjects。　Hence　the　neglect　of　agriculture　arises；　and　if　the　prince　intermeddles　likewise　in　trade；　all　manner　of　industry　is　ruined。

Under　this　sort　of　government；　nothing　is　repaired　or　improved。＇38＇　Houses　are　built　only　for　the　necessity　of　habitation；　there　is　no　digging　of　ditches　or　planting　of　trees；　everything　is　drawn　from；　but　nothing　restored　to；　the　earth；　the　ground　lies　untilled；　and　the　whole　country　becomes　a　desert。

Is　it　to　be　imagined　that　the　laws　which　abolish　the　property　of　land　and　the　succession　of　estates　will　diminish　the　avarice　and　cupidity　of　the　great？　By　no　means。　They　will　rather　stimulate　this　cupidity　and　avarice。　The　great　men　will　be　prompted　to　use　a　thousand　oppressive　methods；　imagining　they　have　no　other　property　than　the　gold　and　silver　which　they　are　able　to　seize　upon　by　violence；　or　to　conceal。

To　prevent；　therefore；　the　utter　ruin　of　the　state；　the　avidity　of　the　prince　ought　to　be　moderated　by　some　established　custom。　Thus；　in　Turkey；　the　sovereign　is　satisfied　with　the　right　of　three　per　cent　on　the　value　of　inheritances。＇39＇　But　as　he　gives　the　greatest　part　of　the　lands　to　his　soldiery；　and　disposes　of　them　as　he　pleases；　as　he　seizes　on　all　the　inheritances　of　the　officers　of　the　empire　at　their　decease；　as　he　has　the　property　of　the　possessions　of　those　who　die　without　issue；　and　the　daughters　have　only　the　usufruct；　it　thence　follows　that　the　greatest　part　of　the　estates　of　the　country　are　held　in　a　precarious　manner。

By　the　laws　of　Bantam；＇40＇　the　king　seizes　on　the　whole　inheritance；　even　wife；　children；　and　habitation。　In　order　to　elude　the　cruelest　part　of　this　law；　they　are　ob