protagoras-第14节

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power　of　appearance？　Is　not　the　latter　that　deceiving　art　which



makes　us　wander　up　and　down　and　take　the　things　at　one　time　of　which



we　repent　at　another；　both　in　our　actions　and　in　our　choice　of



things　great　and　small？　But　the　art　of　measurement　would　do　away



with　the　effect　of　appearances；　and；　showing　the　truth；　would　fain



teach　the　soul　at　last　to　find　rest　in　the　truth；　and　would　thus



save　our　life。　Would　not　mankind　generally　acknowledge　that　the　art



which　accomplishes　this　result　is　the　art　of　measurement？



　　Yes；　he　said；　the　art　of　measurement。



　　Suppose；　again；　the　salvation　of　human　life　to　depend　on　the



choice　of　odd　and　even；　and　on　the　knowledge　of　when　a　man　ought　to



choose　the　greater　or　less；　either　in　reference　to　themselves　or　to



each　other；　and　whether　near　or　at　a　distance；　what　would　be　the



saving　principle　of　our　lives？　Would　not　knowledge？…a　knowledge　of



measuring；　when　the　question　is　one　of　excess　and　defect；　and　a



knowledge　of　number；　when　the　question　is　of　odd　and　even？　The　world



will　assent；　will　they　not？



　　Protagoras　himself　thought　that　they　would。



　　Well　then；　my　friends；　I　say　to　them；　seeing　that　the　salvation　of



human　life　has　been　found　to　consist　in　the　right　choice　of



pleasures　and　pains；…in　the　choice　of　the　more　and　the　fewer；　and



the　greater　and　the　less；　and　the　nearer　and　remoter；　must　not　this



measuring　be　a　consideration　of　their　excess　and　defect　and　equality



in　relation　to　each　other？



　　This　is　undeniably　true。



　　And　this；　as　possessing　measure；　must　undeniably　also　be　an　art



and　science？



　　They　will　agree；　he　said。



　　The　nature　of　that　art　or　science　will　be　a　matter　of　future



consideration；　but　the　existence　of　such　a　science　furnishes　a



demonstrative　answer　to　the　question　which　you　asked　of　me　and



Protagoras。　At　the　time　when　you　asked　the　question；　if　you



remember；　both　of　us　were　agreeing　that　there　was　nothing　mightier



than　knowledge；　and　that　knowledge；　in　whatever　existing；　must　have



the　advantage　over　pleasure　and　all　other　things；　and　then　you　said



that　pleasure　often　got　the　advantage　even　over　a　man　who　has



knowledge；　and　we　refused　to　allow　this；　and　you　rejoined：　O



Protagoras　and　Socrates；　what　is　the　meaning　of　being　overcome　by



pleasure　if　not　this？…tell　us　what　you　call　such　a　state：…if　we　had



immediately　and　at　the　time　answered　〃Ignorance；〃　you　would　have



laughed　at　us。　But　now；　in　laughing　at　us；　you　will　be　laughing　at



yourselves：　for　you　also　admitted　that　men　err　in　their　choice　of



pleasures　and　pains；　that　is；　in　their　choice　of　good　and　evil；　from



defect　of　knowledge；　and　you　admitted　further；　that　they　err；　not　only



from　defect　of　knowledge　in　general；　but　of　that　particular



knowledge　which　is　called　measuring。　And　you　are　also　aware　that　the



erring　act　which　is　done　without　knowledge　is　done　in　ignorance。　This；



therefore；　is　the　meaning　of　being　overcome　by　pleasure；…ignorance；



and　that　the　greatest。　And　our　friends　Protagoras　and　Prodicus　and



Hippias　declare　that　they　are　the　physicians　of　ignorance；　but　you；



who　are　under　the　mistaken　impression　that　ignorance　is　not　the　cause；



and　that　the　art　of　which　I　am　speaking　cannot　be　taught；　neither　go



yourselves；　nor　send　your　children；　to　the　Sophists；　who　are　the



teachers　of　these　things…you　take　care　of　your　money　and　give　them



none；　and　the　result　is；　that　you　are　the　worse　off　both　in　public　and



private　life：…Let　us　suppose　this　to　be　our　answer　to　the　world　in



general：　And　now　I　should　like　to　ask　you；　Hippias；　and　you；　Prodicus；



as　well　as　Protagoras　（for　the　argument　is　to　be　yours　as　well　as



ours）；　whether　you　think　that　I　am　speaking　the　truth　or　not？



　　They　all　thought　that　what　I　said　was　entirely　true。



　　Then　you　agree；　I　said；　that　the　pleasant　is　the　good；　and　the



painful　evil。　And　here　I　would　beg　my　friend　Prodicus　not　to　introduce



his　distinction　of　names；　whether　he　is　disposed　to　say　pleasurable；



delightful；　joyful。　However；　by　whatever　name　he　prefers　to　call　them；



I　will　ask　you；　most　excellent　Prodicus；　to　answer　in　my　sense　of



the　words。



　　Prodicus　laughed　and　assented；　as　did　the　others。



　　Then；　my　friends；　what　do　you　say　to　this？　Are　not　all　actions



honourable　and　useful；　of　which　the　tendency　is　to　make　life



painless　and　pleasant？　The　honourable　work　is　also　useful　and　good？



　　This　was　admitted。



　　Then；　I　said；　if　the　pleasant　is　the　good；　nobody　does　anything



under　the　idea　or　conviction　that　some　other　thing　would　be　better　and



is　also　attainable；　when　he　might　do　the　better。　And　this



inferiority　of　a　man　to　himself　is　merely　ignorance；　as　the



superiority　of　a　man　to　himself　is　wisdom。



　　They　all　assented。



　　And　is　not　ignorance　the　having　a　false　opinion　and　being　deceived



about　important　matters？



　　To　this　also　they　unanimously　assented。



　　Then；　I　said；　no　man　voluntarily　pursues　evil；　or　that　which　he



thinks　to　be　evil。　To　prefer　evil　to　good　is　not　in　human　nature；



and　when　a　man　is　compelled　to　choose　one　of　two　evils；　no　one　will



choose　the　greater　when　he　may　have　the　less。



　　All　of　us　agreed　to　every　word　of　this。



　　Well；　I　said；　there　is　a　certain　thing　called　fear　or　terror；　and



here；　Prodicus；　I　should　particularly　like　to　know　whether　you　would



agree　with　me　in　defining　this　fear　or　terror　as　expectation　of　evil。



　　Protagoras　and　Hippias　agreed；　but　Prodicus　said　that　this　was



fear　and　not　terror。



　　Never　mind；　Prodicus；　I　said；　but　let　me　ask　whether；　if　our



former　assertions　are　true；　a　man　will　pursue　that　which　he　fears　when



he　is　not　compelled？　Would　not　this　be　in　flat　contradiction　to　the



admission　which　has　been　already　made；　that　he　thinks　the　things　which



he　fears　to　be　evil；　and　no　one　will　pursue　or　voluntarily　accept　that



which　he　thinks　to　be　evil？



　　That　also　was　universally　admitted。



　　Then；　I　said；　these；　Hippias　and　Prodicus；　are　our　premisses；　and



I　would　beg　Protagoras　to　explain　to　us　how　he　can　be　right　in　what　he



said　at　first。　I　do　not　mean　in　what　he　said　quite　at　first；　for　his



first　statement；　as　you　may　remember；　was　that　whereas　there　were　five



parts　of　virtue　none　of　them　was　like　any　other　of　them；　each　of



them　had　a　separate　function。　To　this；　however；　I　am　not　referring；



but　to　the　assertion　which　he　afterwards　made　that　of　the　five　virtues



four　were　nearly　akin　to　each　other；　but　that　the　fifth；　which　was



courage；　differed　greatly　from　the　others。　And　of　this　he　gave　me



the　following　proof。　He　said：　You　will　find；　Socrates；　that　some　of



the　most　impious；　and　unrighteous；　and　intemperate；　and　ignorant　of



men　are　among　the　most　courageous；　which　proves　that　courage　is　very



different　from　the　other　parts　of　virtue。　I　was　surprised　at　his



saying　this　at　the　time；　and　I　am　still　more　surprised　now　that　I　have



discussed　the　matter　with　you。　So　I　asked　him　whether　by　the　brave



he　meant　the　confident。　Yes；　he　replied；　and　the　impetuous　or　goers。



（You　may　remember；　Protagoras；　that　this　was　your　answer。）



　　He　assented。



　　Well　then；　I　said；　tell　us　against　what　are　the　courageous　ready



to　go…against　the　same　dangers　as　the　cowards？



　　No；　he　answered。



　　Then　against　something　different？



　　Yes；　he　said。



　　Then　do　cowards　go　where　there　is　safety；　and　the　courageous　where



there　is　danger？



　　Yes；　Socrates；　so　men　say。



　　Very　true；　I　said。　But　I　want　to　know　against　what　do　you　say　that



the　courageous　are　ready　to　go…against　dangers；　believing　them　to　be



dangers；　or　not　against　dangers？



　　No；　said　he；　the　former　case　has　been　proved　by　you　in　the



previous　argument　to　be　impossible。



　　That；　again；　I　replied；　is　quite　true。　And　if　this　has　been



rightly　proven；　then　no　one　goes　to　meet　what　he　thinks　to　be　dangers；



since　the　want　of　self…control；　which　makes　men　rush　into　dangers；　has



been　shown　to　be　ignorance。



　　He　assented。



　　And　yet　the　courageous　man　and　the　coward　alike　go　to　meet　that



about　which　they　are　confident；　so　that；　in　this　point　of　view；　the



cowardly　and　the　courageous　go　to　meet　the　same　things。



　　And　yet；　Socrates；　said　Protagoras；　that　to　which　the　coward　goes　is



the　opposite　of　that　to　which　the　courageous　goes；　the　one；　for



example；　is　ready　to　go　to　battle；　and　the　other　is　not　ready。



　　And　is　going　to　battle　honourable　or　disgraceful？　I　said。



　　Honourable；　he　replied。



　　And　if　honourable；　then　already　admitted　by　us　to　be　good；　for　all



honourable　actions　we　have　admitted　to　be　good。



　　That　is　true；　and　to　that　opinion　I　shall　always　adhere。



　　True；　I　said。　But　which　of　the　two　are　they　who；　as　you　say；　are



unwilling　to　go　to　war；　which　is　a　good　and　honourable　thing？



　　The　cowards；　he　replied。



　　And　what　is　good　a