the spirit of laws-第9节

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


aws　will　soon　appear　to　flow　thence　as　from　their　source。　I　shall　proceed　afterwards　to　other　and　more　particular　relations。

______

1。　〃Law；〃　says　Plutarch；　〃is　the　king　of　mortal　and　immortal　beings。〃　See　his　treatise；　A　Discourse　to　an　Unlearned　Prince。

2。　Witness　the　savage　found　in　the　forests　of　Hanover；　who　was　carried　over　to　England　during　the　reign　of　George　I。

3。　In　pref。；　De　cive。

4。　Italian　poet　and　jurist；　1664…1718。　





Book　II。　Of　Laws　Directly　Derived　from　the　Nature　of　Government

1。　Of　the　Nature　of　the　three　different　Governments。　There　are　three　species　of　government：　republican；　monarchical；　and　despotic。　In　order　to　discover　their　nature；　it　is　sufficient　to　recollect　the　common　notion；　which　supposes　three　definitions；　or　rather　three　facts：　that　a　republican　government　is　that　in　which　the　body；　or　only　a　part　of　the　people；　is　possessed　of　the　supreme　power；　monarchy；　that　in　which　a　single　person　governs　by　fixed　and　established　laws；　a　despotic　government；　that　in　which　a　single　person　directs　everything　by　his　own　will　and　caprice。

This　is　what　I　call　the　nature　of　each　government；　we　must　now　inquire　into　those　laws　which　directly　conform　to　this　nature；　and　consequently　are　the　fundamental　institutions。

2。　Of　the　Republican　Government；　and　the　Laws　in　relation　to　Democracy。＇1＇　When　the　body　of　the　people　is　possessed　of　the　supreme　power；　it　is　called　a　democracy。　When　the　supreme　power　is　lodged　in　the　hands　of　a　part　of　the　people；　it　is　then　an　aristocracy。

In　a　democracy　the　people　are　in　some　respects　the　sovereign；　and　in　others　the　subject。

There　can　be　no　exercise　of　sovereignty　but　by　their　suffrages；　which　are　their　own　will；　now　the　sovereign's　will　is　the　sovereign　himself。　The　laws　therefore　which　establish　the　right　of　suffrage　are　fundamental　to　this　government。　And　indeed　it　is　as　important　to　regulate　in　a　republic；　in　what　manner；　by　whom；　to　whom；　and　concerning　what；　suffrages　are　to　be　given；　as　it　is　in　a　monarchy　to　know　who　is　the　prince；　and　after　what　manner　he　ought　to　govern。

Libanius＇2＇　says　that　at　Athens　a　stranger　who　intermeddled　in　the　assemblies　of　the　people　was　punished　with　death。　This　is　because　such　a　man　usurped　the　rights　of　sovereignty。

It　is　an　essential　point　to　fix　the　number　of　citizens　who　are　to　form　the　public　assemblies；　otherwise　it　would　be　uncertain　whether　the　whole；　or　only　a　part　of　the　people；　had　given　their　votes。　At　Sparta　the　number　was　fixed　at　ten　thousand。　But　Rome；　designed　by　Providence　to　rise　from　the　weakest　beginnings　to　the　highest　pitch　of　grandeur；　Rome；　doomed　to　experience　all　the　vicissitudes　of　fortune；　Rome；　who　had　sometimes　all　her　inhabitants　without　her　walls；　and　sometimes　all　Italy　and　a　considerable　part　of　the　world　within　them；　Rome；　I　say；　never　fixed　the　number＇3＇　and　this　was　one　of　the　principal　causes　of　her　ruin。

The　people；　in　whom　the　supreme　power　resides；　ought　to　have　the　management　of　everything　within　their　reach：　that　which　exceeds　their　abilities　must　be　conducted　by　their　ministers。

But　they　cannot　properly　be　said　to　have　their　ministers；　without　the　power　of　nominating　them：　it　is；　therefore；　a　fundamental　maxim　in　this　government；　that　the　people　should　choose　their　ministers　　that　is；　their　magistrates。

They　have　occasion；　as　well　as　monarchs；　and　even　more　so；　to　be　directed　by　a　council　or　senate。　But　to　have　a　proper　confidence　in　these；　they　should　have　the　choosing　of　the　members；　whether　the　election　be　made　by　themselves；　as　at　Athens；　or　by　some　magistrate　deputed　for　that　purpose；　as　on　certain　occasions　was　customary　at　Rome。

The　people　are　extremely　well　qualified　for　choosing　those　whom　they　are　to　entrust　with　part　of　their　authority。　They　have　only　to　be　determined　by　things　to　which　they　cannot　be　strangers；　and　by　facts　that　are　obvious　to　sense。　They　can　tell　when　a　person　has　fought　many　battles；　and　been　crowned　with　success；　they　are；　therefore；　capable　of　electing　a　general。　They　can　tell　when　a　judge　is　assiduous　in　his　office；　gives　general　satisfaction；　and　has　never　been　charged　with　bribery：　this　is　sufficient　for　choosing　a　pr？tor。　They　are　struck　with　the　magnificence　or　riches　of　a　fellow…citizen；　no　more　is　requisite　for　electing　an　edile。　These　are　facts　of　which　they　can　have　better　information　in　a　public　forum　than　a　monarch　in　his　palace。　But　are　they　capable　of　conducting　an　intricate　affair；　of　seizing　and　improving　the　opportunity　and　critical　moment　of　action？　No；　this　surpasses　their　abilities。

Should　we　doubt　the　people's　natural　capacity；　in　respect　to　the　discernment　of　merit；　we　need　only　cast　an　eye　on　the　series　of　surprising　elections　made　by　the　Athenians　and　Romans；　which　no　one　surely　will　attribute　to　hazard。

We　know　that　though　the　people　of　Rome　assumed　the　right　of　raising　plebeians　to　public　offices；　yet　they　never　would　exert　this　power；　and　though　at　Athens　the　magistrates　were　allowed；　by　the　law　of　Aristides；　to　be　elected　from　all　the　different　classes　of　inhabitants；　there　never　was　a　case；　says　Xenophon；＇4＇　when　the　common　people　petitioned　for　employments　which　could　endanger　either　their　security　or　their　glory。

As　most　citizens　have　sufficient　ability　to　choose；　though　unqualified　to　be　chosen；　so　the　people；　though　capable　of　calling　others　to　an　account　for　their　administration；　are　incapable　of　conducting　the　administration　themselves。

The　public　business　must　be　carried　on　with　a　certain　motion；　neither　too　quick　nor　too　slow。　But　the　motion　of　the　people　is　always　either　too　remiss　or　too　violent。　Sometimes　with　a　hundred　thousand　arms　they　overturn　all　before　them；　and　sometimes　with　a　hundred　thousand　feet　they　creep　like　insects。

In　a　popular　state　the　inhabitants　are　divided　into　certain　classes。　It　is　in　the　manner　of　making　this　division　that　great　legislators　have　signalised　themselves；　and　it　is　on　this　the　duration　and　prosperity　of　democracy　have　ever　depended。

Servius　Tullius　followed　the　spirit　of　aristocracy　in　the　distribution　of　his　classes。　We　find　in　Livy＇5＇　and　in　Dionysius　Halicarnassus；＇6＇　in　what　manner　he　lodged　the　right　of　suffrage　in　the　hands　of　the　principal　citizens。　He　had　divided　the　people　of　Rome　into　193　centuries；　which　formed　six　classes；　and　ranking　the　rich；　who　were　in　smaller　numbers；　in　the　first　centuries；　and　those　in　middling　circumstances；　who　were　more　numerous；　in　the　next；　he　flung　the　indigent　multitude　into　the　last；　and　as　each　century　had　but　one　vote＇7＇　it　was　property　rather　than　numbers　that　decided　the　election。

Solon　divided　the　people　of　Athens　into　four　classes。　In　this　he　was　directed　by　the　spirit　of　democracy；　his　intention　not　being　to　fix　those　who　were　to　choose；　but　such　as　were　eligible：　therefore；　leaving　to　every　citizen　the　right　of　election；　he　made＇8＇　the　judges　eligible　from　each　of　those　four　classes；　but　the　magistrates　he　ordered　to　be　chosen　only　out　of　the　first　three；　consisting　of　persons　of　easy　fortunes。＇9＇

As　the　division　of　those　who　have　a　right　of　suffrage　is　a　fundamental　law　in　republics；　so　the　manner　of　giving　this　suffrage　is　another　fundamental。

The　suffrage　by　lot　is　natural　to　democracy；　as　that　by　choice　is　to　aristocracy。＇10＇

The　suffrage　by　lot　is　a　method　of　electing　that　offends　no　one；　but　animates　each　citizen　with　the　pleasing　hope　of　serving　his　country。

Yet　as　this　method　is　in　itself　defective；　it　has　been　the　endeavour　of　the　most　eminent　legislators　to　regulate　and　amend　it。

Solon　made　a　law　at　Athens　that　military　employments　should　be　conferred　by　choice；　but　that　senators　and　judges　should　be　elected　by　lot。

The　same　legislator　ordained　that　civil　magistracies；　attended　with　great　expense；　should　be　given　by　choice；　and　the　others　by　lot。

In　order；　however；　to　amend　the　suffrage　by　lot；　he　made　a　rule　that　none　but　those　who　presented　themselves　should　be　elected；　that　the　person　elected　should　be　examined　by　judges＇11＇　and　that　every　one　should　have　a　right　to　accuse　him　if　he　were　unworthy　of　the　office：＇12＇　this　participated　at　the　same　time　of　the　suffrage　by　lot；　and　of　that　by　choice。　When　the　time　of　their　magistracy　had　expired；　they　were　obliged　to　submit　to　another　judgment　in　regard　to　their　conduct。　Persons　utterly　unqualified　must　have　been　extremely　backward　in　giving　in　their　names　to　be　drawn　by　lot。

The　law　which　determines　the　manner　of　giving　suffrage　is　likewise　fundamental　in　a　democracy。　It　is　a　question　of　some　importance　whether　the　suffrages　ought　to　be　public　or　secret。　Cicero　observes＇13＇　that　the　laws＇14＇　which　rendered　them　secret　towards　the　close　of　the　republic　were　the　cause　of　its　decline。　But　as　this　is　differently　practised　in　different　republics；　I　shall　offer　here　my　thoughts　concerning　this　subject。

The　people's　suffrages　ought　doubtless　to　be　public＇15＇　and　this　should　be　considered　as　a　fundamental　law　of　democracy。　The　lower　class　ought　to　be　directed　by　those　of　higher　rank；　and　restrained　within　bounds　by　the　gravity　of　eminent　personages。　Hence；　by　rendering　the　suffrages　secret　in　the　Roman　republic；　all　was　lost；　it　was　no　longer　possible　to　direct　a　populace　that　sought　its　own　d