the spirit of laws-第12节

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f　virtue；　as　their　ambition　was　inffamed　by　the　success　of　the　most　daring　of　their　members；＇2＇　as　the　prevailing　parties　were　successively　animated　by　the　spirit　of　faction；　the　government　was　continually　changing：　the　people；　amazed　at　so　many　revolutions；　in　vain　attempted　to　erect　a　commonwealth。　At　length；　when　the　country　had　undergone　the　most　violent　shocks；　they　were　obliged　to　have　recourse　to　the　very　government　which　they　had　so　wantonly　proscribed。　

When　Sylla　thought　of　restoring　Rome　to　her　liberty；　this　unhappy　city　was　incapable　of　receiving　that　blessing。　She　had　only　the　feeble　remains　of　virtue；　which　were　continually　diminishing。　Instead　of　being　roused　from　her　lethargy　by　C？sar；　Tiberius；　Caius　Claudius；　Nero；　and　Domitian；　she　riveted　every　day　her　chains；　if　she　struck　some　blows；　her　aim　was　at　the　tyrant；　not　at　the　tyranny。

The　politic　Greeks；　who　lived　under　a　popular　government；　knew　no　other　support　than　virtue。　The　modern　inhabitants　of　that　country　are　entirely　taken　up　with　manufacture；　commerce；　finances；　opulence；　and　luxury。

When　virtue　is　banished；　ambition　invades　the　minds　of　those　who　are　disposed　to　receive　it；　and　avarice　possesses　the　whole　community。　The　objects　of　their　desires　are　changed；　what　they　were　fond　of　before　has　become　indifferent；　they　were　free　while　under　the　restraint　of　laws；　but　they　would　fain　now　be　free　to　act　against　law；　and　as　each　citizen　is　like　a　slave　who　has　run　away　from　his　master；　that　which　was　a　maxim　of　equity　he　calls　rigour；　that　which　was　a　rule　of　action　he　styles　constraint；　and　to　precaution　he　gives　the　name　of　fear。　Frugality；　and　not　the　thirst　of　gain；　now　passes　for　avarice。　Formerly　the　wealth　of　individuals　constituted　the　public　treasure；　but　now　this　has　become　the　patrimony　of　private　persons。　The　members　of　the　commonwealth　riot　on　the　public　spoils；　and　its　strength　is　only　the　power　of　a　few；　and　the　licence　of　many。

Athens　was　possessed　of　the　same　number　of　forces　when　she　triumphed　so　gloriously　as　when　with　such　infamy　she　was　enslaved。　She　had　twenty　thousand　citizens＇3＇　when　she　defended　the　Greeks　against　the　Persians；　when　she　contended　for　empire　with　Sparta；　and　invaded　Sicily。　She　had　twenty　thousand　when　Demetrius　Phalereus　numbered　them＇4＇　as　slaves　are　told　by　the　head　in　a　market…place。　When　Philip　attempted　to　lord　it　over　Greece；　and　appeared　at　the　gates　of　Athens＇5＇　she　had　even　then　lost　nothing　but　time。　We　may　see　in　Demosthenes　how　difficult　it　was　to　awaken　her；　she　dreaded　Philip；　not　as　the　enemy　of　her　liberty；　but　of　her　pleasures。＇6＇　This　famous　city；　which　had　withstood　so　many　defeats；　and　having　been　so　often　destroyed　had　as　often　risen　out　of　her　ashes；　was　overthrown　at　Ch？ronea；　and　at　one　blow　deprived　of　all　hopes　of　resource。　What　does　it　avail　her　that　Philip　sends　back　her　prisoners；　if　he　does　not　return　her　men？　It　was　ever　after　as　easy　to　triumph　over　the　forces　of　Athens　as　it　had　been　difficult　to　subdue　her　virtue。

How　was　it　possible　for　Carthage　to　maintain　her　ground？　When　Hannibal；　upon　his　being　made　pr？tor；　endeavoured　to　hinder　the　magistrates　from　plundering　the　republic；　did　not　they　complain　of　him　to　the　Romans？　Wretches；　who　would　fain　be　citizens　without　a　city；　and　be　beholden　for　their　riches　to　their　very　destroyers！　Rome　soon　insisted　upon　having　three　hundred　of　their　principal　citizens　as　hostages；　she　obliged　them　next　to　surrender　their　arms　and　ships；　and　then　she　declared　war。＇7＇　From　the　desperate　efforts　of　this　defenceless　city；　one　may　judge　of　what　she　might　have　performed　in　her　full　vigour；　and　assisted　by　virtue。

4。　Of　the　Principle　of　Aristocracy。　As　virtue　is　necessary　in　a　popular　government；　it　is　requisite　also　in　an　aristocracy。　True　it　is　that　in　the　latter　it　is　not　so　absolutely　requisite。

The　people；　who　in　respect　to　the　nobility　are　the　same　as　the　subjects　with　regard　to　a　monarch；　are　restrained　by　their　laws。　They　have；　therefore；　less　occasion　for　virtue　than　the　people　in　a　democracy。　But　how　are　the　nobility　to　be　restrained？　They　who　are　to　execute　the　laws　against　their　colleagues　will　immediately　perceive　that　they　are　acting　against　themselves。　Virtue　is　therefore　necessary　in　this　body；　from　the　very　nature　of　the　constitution。

An　aristocratic　government　has　an　inherent　vigour；　unknown　to　democracy。　The　nobles　form　a　body；　who　by　their　prerogative；　and　for　their　own　particular　interest；　restrain　the　people；　it　is　sufficient　that　there　are　laws　in　being　to　see　them　executed。

But　easy　as　it　may　be　for　the　body　of　the　nobles　to　restrain　the　people；　it　is　difficult　to　restrain　themselves。＇8＇　Such　is　the　nature　of　this　constitution；　that　it　seems　to　subject　the　very　same　persons　to　the　power　of　the　laws；　and　at　the　same　time　to　exempt　them。

Now　such　a　body　as　this　can　restrain　itself　only　in　two　ways；　either　by　a　very　eminent　virtue；　which　puts　the　nobility　in　some　measure　on　a　level　with　the　people；　and　may　be　the　means　of　forming　a　great　republic；　or　by　an　inferior　virtue；　which　puts　them　at　least　upon　a　level　with　one　another；　and　upon　this　their　preservation　depends。

Moderation　is　therefore　the　very　soul　of　this　government；　a　moderation；　I　mean；　founded　on　virtue；　not　that　which　proceeds　from　indolence　and　pusillanimity。

5。　That　Virtue　is　not　the　Principle　of　a　Monarchical　Government。　In　monarchies；　policy　effects　great　things　with　as　little　virtue　as　possible。　Thus　in　the　nicest　machines；　art　has　reduced　the　number　of　movements；　springs；　and　wheels。

The　state　subsists　independently　of　the　love　of　our　country；　of　the　thirst　of　true　glory；　of　self…denial；　of　the　sacrifice　of　our　dearest　interests；　and　of　all　those　heroic　virtues　which　we　admire　in　the　ancients；　and　to　us　are　known　only　by　tradition。　

The　laws　supply　here　the　place　of　those　virtues；　they　are　by　no　means　wanted；　and　the　state　dispenses　with　them：　an　action　performed　here　in　secret　is　in　some　measure　of　no　consequence。

Though　all　crimes　be　in　their　own　nature　public；　yet　there　is　a　distinction　between　crimes　really　public　and　those　that　are　private；　which　are　so　called　because　they　are　more　injurious　to　individuals　than　to　the　community。

Now　in　republics　private　crimes　are　more　public；　that　is；　they　attack　the　constitution　more　than　they　do　individuals；　and　in　monarchies；　public　crimes　are　more　private；　that　is；　they　are　more　prejudicial　to　private　people　than　to　the　constitution。

I　beg　that　no　one　will　be　offended　with　what　I　have　been　saying；　my　observations　are　founded　on　the　unanimous　testimony　of　historians。　I　am　not　ignorant　that　virtuous　princes　are　so　very　rare；　but　I　venture　to　affirm　that　in　a　monarchy　it　is　extremely　difficult　for　the　people　to　be　virtuous。＇9＇

Let　us　compare　what　the　historians　of　all　ages　have　asserted　concerning　the　courts　of　monarchs；　let　us　recollect　the　conversations　and　sentiments　of　people　of　all　countries；　in　respect　to　the　wretched　character　of　courtiers；　and　we　shall　find　that　these　are　not　airy　speculations；　but　truths　confirmed　by　a　sad　and　melancholy　experience。

Ambition　in　idleness；　meanness　mixed　with　pride；　a　desire　of　riches　without　industry；　aversion　to　truth；　flattery；　perfidy；　violation　of　engagements；　contempt　of　civil　duties；　fear　of　the　prince's　virtue；　hope　from　his　weakness；　but；　above　all；　a　perpetual　ridicule　cast　upon　virtue；　are；　I　think；　the　characteristics　by　which　most　courtiers　in　all　ages　and　countries　have　been　constantly　distinguished。　Now；　it　is　exceedingly　difficult　for　the　leading　men　of　the　nation　to　be　knaves；　and　the　inferior　sort　to　be　honest；　for　the　former　to　be　cheats；　and　the　latter　to　rest　satisfied　with　being　only　dupes。

But　if　there　should　chance　to　be　some　unlucky　honest　man＇10＇　among　the　people。　Cardinal　Richelieu；　in　his　political　testament；　seems　to　hint　that　a　prince　should　take　care　not　to　employ　him。＇11＇　So　true　is　it　that　virtue　is　not　the　spring　of　this　government！　It　is　not　indeed　excluded；　but　it　is　not　the　spring　of　government。

6。　In　what　Manner　Virtue　is　supplied　in　a　Monarchical　Government。　But　it　is　high　time　for　me　to　have　done　with　this　subject；　lest　I　should　be　suspected　of　writing　a　satire　against　monarchical　government。　Far　be　it　from　me；　if　monarchy　wants　one　spring；　it　is　provided　with　another。　Honour；　that　is；　the　prejudice　of　every　person　and　rank；　supplies　the　place　of　the　political　virtue　of　which　I　have　been　speaking；　and　is　everywhere　her　representative：　here　it　is　capable　of　inspiring　the　most　glorious　actions；　and；　joined　with　the　force　of　laws；　may　lead　us　to　the　end　of　government　as　well　as　virtue　itself。

Hence；　in　well…regulated　monarchies；　they　are　almost　all　good　subjects；　and　very　few　good　men；　for　to　be　a　good　man＇12＇　a　good　intention　is　necessary；＇13＇　and　we　should　love　our　country；　not　so　much　on　our　own　account；　as　out　of　regard　to　the　community。　

7。　Of　the　Principle　of　Monarchy。　A　monarchical　government　supposes；　as　we　have　already　observed；　pre…eminences　and　ranks；　as　likewise　a　noble　descent。　Now　since　it　is　the　nature　of　honour　to　aspire　to　preferments　and　titles；　it　is　properly　placed　in　this　government。

Ambition　is　pernicious　in　a　republic。　But　in　a　monarchy　it　has　some　good　effects；　it