the spirit of laws-第11节

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　since　the　subversion　of　their　laws；　were　it　not　for　this　only　barrier　against　the　incursions　of　arbitrary　power？　A　barrier　ever　useful　when　there　is　no　other：　for　since　a　despotic　government　is　productive　of　the　most　dreadful　calamities　to　human　nature；　the　very　evil　that　restrains　it　is　beneficial　to　the　subject。

In　the　same　manner　as　the　ocean；　threatening　to　overflow　the　whole　earth；　is　stopped　by　weeds　and　pebbles　that　lie　scattered　along　the　shore；　so　monarchs；　whose　power　seems　unbounded；　are　restrained　by　the　smallest　obstacles；　and　suffer　their　natural　pride　to　be　subdued　by　supplication　and　prayer。

The　English；　to　favour　their　liberty；　have　abolished　all　the　intermediate　powers　of　which　their　monarchy　was　composed。　They　have　a　great　deal　of　reason　to　be　jealous　of　this　liberty；　were　they　ever　to　be　so　unhappy　as　to　lose　it；　they　would　be　one　of　the　most　servile　nations　upon　earth。

Mr。　Law；　through　ignorance　both　of　a　republican　and　monarchical　constitution；　was　one　of　the　greatest　promoters　of　absolute　power　ever　known　in　Europe。　Besides　the　violent　and　extraordinary　changes　owing　to　his　direction；　he　would　fain　suppress　all　the　intermediate　ranks；　and　abolish　the　political　communities。　He　was　dissolving＇25＇　the　monarchy　by　his　chimerical　reimbursements；　and　seemed　as　if　he　even　wanted　to　redeem　the　constitution。

It　is　not　enough　to　have　intermediate　powers　in　a　monarchy；　there　must　be　also　a　depositary　of　the　laws。　This　depositary　can　only　be　the　judges　of　the　supreme　courts　of　justice；　who　promulgate　the　new　laws；　and　revive　the　obsolete。　The　natural　ignorance　of　the　nobility；　their　indolence　and　contempt　of　civil　government；　require　that　there　should　be　a　body　invested　with　the　power　of　reviving　and　executing　the　laws；　which　would　be　otherwise　buried　in　oblivion。　The　prince's　council　are　not　a　proper　depositary。　They　are　naturally　the　depositary　of　the　momentary　will　of　the　prince；　and　not　of　the　fundamental　laws。　Besides；　the　prince's　council　is　continually　changing；　it　is　neither　permanent　nor　numerous；　neither　has　it　a　sufficient　share　of　the　confidence　of　the　people；　consequently　it　is　capable　of　setting　them　right　in　difficult　conjunctures；　or　of　reducing　them　to　proper　obedience。

Despotic　governments；　where　there　are　no　fundamental　laws；　have　no　such　kind　of　depositary。　Hence　it　is　that　religion　has　generally　so　much　influence　in　those　countries；　because　it　forms　a　kind　of　permanent　depositary；　and　if　this　cannot　be　said　of　religion；　it　may　of　the　customs　that　are　respected　instead　of　laws。

5。　Of　the　Laws　in　relation　to　the　Nature　of　a　despotic　Government。　From　the　nature　of　despotic　power　it　follows　that　the　single　person；　invested　with　this　power；　commits　the　execution　of　it　also　to　a　single　person。　A　man　whom　his　senses　continually　inform　that　he　himself　is　everything　and　that　his　subjects　are　nothing；　is　naturally　lazy；　voluptuous；　and　ignorant。　In　consequence　of　this；　he　neglects　the　management　of　public　affairs。　But　were　he　to　commit　the　administration　to　many；　there　would　be　continual　disputes　among　them；　each　would　form　intrigues　to　be　his　first　slave；　and　he　would　be　obliged　to　take　the　reins　into　his　own　hands。　It　is；　therefore；　more　natural　for　him　to　resign　it　to　a　vizir；＇26＇　and　to　invest　him　with　the　same　power　as　himself。　The　creation　of　a　vizir　is　a　fundamental　law　of　this　government。

It　is　related　of　a　pope　that　he　had　started　an　infinite　number　of　difficulties　against　his　election；　from　a　thorough　conviction　of　his　incapacity。　At　length　he　was　prevailed　on　to　accept　of　the　pontificate；　and　resigned　the　administration　entirely　to　his　nephew。　He　was　soon　struck　with　surprise；　and　said；　〃I　should　never　have　thought　that　these　things　were　so　easy。〃　The　same　may　be　said　of　the　princes　of　the　East；　who；　being　educated　in　a　prison　where　eunuchs　corrupt　their　hearts　and　debase　their　understandings；　and　where　they　are　frequently　kept　ignorant　even　of　their　high　rank；　when　drawn　forth　in　order　to　be　placed　on　the　throne；　are　at　first　confounded：　but　as　soon　as　they　have　chosen　a　vizir；　and　abandoned　themselves　in　their　seraglio　to　the　most　brutal　passions；　pursuing；　in　the　midst　of　a　prostituted　court；　every　capricious　extravagance；　they　would　never　have　dreamed　that　they　could　find　matters　so　easy。

The　more　extensive　the　empire；　the　larger　the　seraglio；　and　consequently　the　more　voluptuous　the　prince。　Hence　the　more　nations　such　a　sovereign　has　to　rule；　the　less　he　attends　to　the　cares　of　government；　the　more　important　his　affairs；　the　less　he　makes　them　the　subject　of　his　deliberations。

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1。　Compare　Aristotle；　Politics；　vi。　2。

2。　Declamations；　17；　18。


3。　See　the　Considerations　on　the　Causes　of　the　Grandeur　and　Decline　of　the　Romans；　9。

4。　Pp。　691；　693；　ed。　Wechel；　1596。

5。　Bk。　i。

6。　Bk。　iv；　art。　15　et　seq。

7。　See　in　the　Considerations　on　the　Causes　of　the　Grandeur　and　Decline　of　the　Romans；　9；　how　this　spirit　of　Servius　Tullius　was　preserved　in　the　republic。

8。　Dionysius　Halicarnassus；　Eulogium　of　Isocrates；　ii；　p。　97；　ed。　Wechel。　Pollux；　viii。　10；　art。　130。

9。　See　Aristotle's　Politics；　ii。　12。

10。　Ibid；　iv。　9。

11。　See　the　oration　of　Demosthenes；　De　Falsa　legat。；　and　the　oration　against　Timarchus。

12。　They　used　even　to　draw　two　tickets　for　each　place；　one　which　gave　the　place；　and　the　other　which　named　the　person　who　was　to　succeed；　in　case　the　first　was　rejected。

13。　De　Leg。；　i；　iii。

14。　They　were　called　leges　tabulares；　two　tablets　were　presented　to　each　citizen；　the　first　marked　with　an　A；　for　Antique；　or　I　forbid　it；　and　the　other　with　an　U　and　an　R；　for　Uti　rogas；　or　Be　it　as　you　desire。

15。　At　Athens　the　people　used　to　lift　up　their　hands。

16。　As　at　Venice。

17。　The　thirty　tyrants　at　Athens　ordered　the　suffrages　of　the　Areopagites　to　be　public；　in　order　to　manage　them　as　they　pleased。　　Lysias；　Orat。　contra　Agorat。　8。

18。　See　Dionysius　Halicarnassus；　iv；　ix。

19。　See　Mr。　Addison；　Travels　to　Italy；　p。　16。

20。　They　were　named　at　first　by　the　consuls。

21。　This　is　what　ruined　the　republic　of　Rome。　See　Considerations　on　the　Causes　of　the　Grandeur　and　Decline　of　the　Romans；　14；　16。

22。　Tournefort；　Voyages。

23。　At　Lucca　the　magistrates　are　chosen　only　for　two　months。

24。　Diodorus；　xviii；　p。　601；　ed。　Rhodoman。

25。　Ferdinand；　king　of　Aragon；　made　himself　grand　master　of　the　orders；　and　that　alone　changed　the　constitution。

26。　The　Eastern　kings　are　never　without　vizirs；　says　Sir　John　Chardin。



Book　III。　Of　the　Principles　of　the　Three　Kinds　of　Government

1。　Difference　between　the　Nature　and　Principle　of　Government。　Having　examined　the　laws　in　relation　to　the　nature　of　each　government；　we　must　investigate　those　which　relate　to　its　principle。

There　is　this　difference　between　the　nature　and　principle＇1＇　of　government；　that　the　former　is　that　by　which　it　is　constituted；　the　latter　that　by　which　it　is　made　to　act。　One　is　its　particular　structure；　and　the　other　the　human　passions　which　set　it　in　motion。

Now；　laws　ought　no　less　to　relate　to　the　principle　than　to　the　nature　of　each　government。　We　must；　therefore；　inquire　into　this　principle；　which　shall　be　the　subject　of　this　third　book。

2。　Of　the　Principle　of　different　Governments。　I　have　already　observed　that　it　is　the　nature　of　a　republican　government　that　either　the　collective　body　of　the　people；　or　particular　families；　should　be　possessed　of　the　supreme　power；　of　a　monarchy；　that　the　prince　should　have　this　power；　but　in　the　execution　of　it　should　be　directed　by　established　laws；　of　a　despotic　government；　that　a　single　person　should　rule　according　to　his　own　will　and　caprice。　This　enables　me　to　discover　their　three　principles；　which　are　thence　naturally　derived。　I　shall　begin　with　a　republican　government；　and　in　particular　with　that　of　democracy。

3。　Of　the　Principle　of　Democracy。　There　is　no　great　share　of　probity　necessary　to　support　a　monarchical　or　despotic　government。　The　force　of　laws　in　one；　and　the　prince's　arm　in　the　other；　are　sufficient　to　direct　and　maintain　the　whole。　But　in　a　popular　state；　one　spring　more　is　necessary；　namely；　virtue。

What　I　have　here　advanced　is　confirmed　by　the　unanimous　testimony　of　historians；　and　is　extremely　agreeable　to　the　nature　of　things。　For　it　is　clear　that　in　a　monarchy；　where　he　who　commands　the　execution　of　the　laws　generally　thinks　himself　above　them；　there　is　less　need　of　virtue　than　in　a　popular　government；　where　the　person　entrusted　with　the　execution　of　the　laws　is　sensible　of　his　being　subject　to　their　direction。

Clear　is　it　also　that　a　monarch　who；　through　bad　advice　or　indolence；　ceases　to　enforce　the　execution　of　the　laws；　may　easily　repair　the　evil；　he　has　only　to　follow　other　advice；　or　to　shake　off　this　indolence。　But　when；　in　a　popular　government；　there　is　a　suspension　of　the　laws；　as　this　can　proceed　only　from　the　corruption　of　the　republic；　the　state　is　certainly　undone。

A　very　droll　spectacle　it　was　in　the　last　century　to　behold　the　impotent　efforts　of　the　English　towards　the　establishment　of　democracy。　As　they　who　had　a　share　in　the　direction　of　public　affairs　were　void　of　virtue；　as　their　ambition　was　inffamed　by　the　success　of　the　most　daring　of　their　members；＇2＇　as　t