sophist-第8节
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Str。 You follow close at heels； Theaetetus。 For the right method；
I conceive； will be to call into our presence the dualistic
philosophers and to interrogate them。 〃Come；〃 we will say； 〃Ye； who
affirm that hot and cold or any other two principles are the
universe；
what is this term which you apply to both of them； and what do you
mean when you say that both and each of them 'are'？ How are we to
understand the word 'are'？ Upon your view； are we to suppose that
there is a third principle over and above the other two…three in
all； and not two？ For clearly you cannot say that one of the two
principles is being； and yet attribute being equally to both of
them； for； if you did； whichever of the two is identified with
being； will comprehend the other； and so they will be one and not
two。〃
Theaet。 Very true。
Str。 But perhaps you mean to give the name of 〃being〃 to both of
them together？
Theaet。 Quite likely。
Str。 〃Then； friends；〃 we shall reply to them； 〃the answer
is plainly
that the two will still be resolved into one。〃
Theaet。 Most true。
Str。 〃Since then； we are in a difficulty； please to tell
us what you
mean； when you speak of being； for there can be no doubt that you
always from the first understood your own meaning； whereas we once
thought that we understood you； but now we are in a great strait。
Please to begin by explaining this matter to us； and let us no
longer fancy that we understand you； when we entirely misunderstand
you。〃 There will be no impropriety in our demanding an answer to
this question； either of the dualists or of the pluralists？
Theaet。 Certainly not。
Str。 And what about the assertors of the oneness of the all…must
we not endeavour to ascertain from them what they mean by 〃being〃？
Theaet。 By all means。
Str。 Then let them answer this question： One； you say； alone is？
〃Yes；〃 they will reply。
Theaet。 True。
Str。 And there is something which you call 〃being〃？
Theaet。 〃Yes。〃
Str。 And is being the same as one； and do you apply two
names to the
same thing？
Theaet。 What will be their answer； Stranger？
Str。 It is clear； Theaetetus； that he who asserts the
unity of being
will find a difficulty in answering this or any other question。
Theaet。 Why so？
Str。 To admit of two names； and to affirm that there is nothing
but unity； is surely ridiculous？
Theaet。 Certainly。
Str。 And equally irrational to admit that a name is anything？
Theaet。 How so？
Str。 To distinguish the name from the thing； implies duality。
Theaet。 Yes。
Str。 And yet he who identifies the name with the thing will be
compelled to say that it is the name of nothing； or if he
says that it
is the name of something； even then the name will only be the name
of a name； and of nothing else。
Theaet。 True。
Str。 And the one will turn out to be only one of one； and being
absolute unity； will represent a mere name。
Theaet。 Certainly。
Str。 And would they say that the whole is other than the one that
is； or the same with it？
Theaet。 To be sure they would； and they actually say so。
Str。 If being is a whole； as Parmenides sings；…
Every way like unto the fullness of a well…rounded sphere；
Evenly balanced from the centre on every side；
And must needs be neither greater nor less in any way；
Neither on this side nor on that…
then being has a centre and extremes； and； having these； must also
have parts。
Theaet。 True。
Str。 Yet that which has parts may have the attribute of
unity in all
the parts； and in this way being all and a whole； may be one？
Theaet。 Certainly。
Str。 But that of which this is the condition cannot be absolute
unity？
Theaet。 Why not？
Str。 Because； according to right reason； that which is truly one
must be affirmed to be absolutely indivisible。
Theaet。 Certainly。
Str。 But this indivisible； if made up of many parts； will
contradict
reason。
Theaet。 I understand。
Str。 Shall we say that being is one and a whole； because it has
the attribute of unity？ Or shall we say that being is not a whole at
all？
Theaet。 That is a hard alternative to offer。
Str。 Most true； for being； having in a certain sense the attribute
of one； is yet proved not to be the same as one； and the all is
therefore more than one。
Theaet。 Yes。
Str。 And yet if being be not a whole； through having the attribute
of unity； and there be such a thing as an absolute whole； being
lacks something of its own nature？
Theaet。 Certainly。
Str。 Upon this view； again； being； having a defect of being； will
become not…being？
Theaet。 True。
Str。 And； again； the all becomes more than one； for being and the
whole will each have their separate nature。
Theaet。 Yes。
Str。 But if the whole does not exist at all； all the previous
difficulties remain the same； and there will be the further
difficulty； that besides having no being； being can never have come
into being。
Theaet。 Why so？
Str。 Because that which comes into being always comes into being
as a whole； so that he who does not give whole a place among beings；
cannot speak either of essence or generation as existing。
Theaet。 Yes； that certainly appears to be true。
Str。 Again； how can that which is not a whole have any
quantity？ For
that which is of a certain quantity must necessarily be the whole of
that quantity。
Theaet。 Exactly。
Str。 And there will be innumerable other points； each of them
causing infinite trouble to him who says that being is either； one
or two。
Theaet。 The difficulties which are dawning upon us prove this； for
one objection connects with another； and they are always involving
what has preceded in a greater and worse perplexity。
Str。 We are far from having exhausted the more exact thinkers who
treat of being and not…being。 But let us be content to leave
them； and
proceed to view those who speak less precisely； and we shall find as
the result of all； that the nature of being is quite as difficult to
comprehend as that of not…being。
Theaet。 Then now we will go to the others。
Str。 There appears to be a sort of war of Giants and Gods going on
amongst them； they are fighting with one another about the nature of
essence。
Theaet。 How is that？
Str。 Some of them are dragging down all things from heaven and
from the unseen to earth； and they literally grasp in their hands
rocks and oaks； of these they lay hold； and obstinately
maintain； that
the things only which can be touched or handled have being
or essence；
because they define being and body as one； and if any one else says
that what is not a body exists they altogether despise him； and will
hear of nothing but body。
Theaet。 I have often met with such men； and terrible fellows they
are。
Str。 And that is the reason why their opponents cautiously defend
themselves from above； out of an unseen world； mightily contending
that true essence consists of certain intelligible and incorporeal
ideas； the bodies of the materialists； which by them are
maintained to
be the very truth； they break up into little bits by their
arguments； and affirm them to be； not essence； but generation and
motion。 Between the two armies； Theaetetus； there is always
an endless
conflict raging concerning these matters。
Theaet。 True。
Str。 Let us ask each party in turn； to give an account of
that which
they call essence。
Theaet。 How shall we get it out of them？
Str。 With those who make being to consist in ideas； there will be
less difficulty； for they are civil people enough； but there will be
very great difficulty； or rather an absolute impossibility；
in getting
an opinion out of those who drag everything down to matter。 Shall I
tell you what we must do？
Theaet。 What？
Str。 Let us； if we can； really improve them； but if this is not
possible； let us imagine them to be better than they are； and more
willing to answer in accordance with the rules of argument； and then
their opinion will be more worth having； for that which better men
acknowledge has more weight than that which is acknowledged by
inferior men。 Moreover we are no respecters of persons； but seekers
after time。
Theaet。 Very good。
Str。 Then now； on the supposition that they are improved；
let us ask
them to state their views； and do you interpret them。
Theaet。 Agreed。
Str。 Let them say whether they would admit that there is such a
thing as a mortal animal。
Theaet。 Of course they would。
Str。 And do they not acknowledge this to be a body having a soul？
Theaet。 Certainly they do。
Str。 Meaning to say the soul is something which exists？
Theaet。 True。
Str。 And do they not say that one soul is just； and another
unjust； and that one soul is wise； and another foolish？
Theaet。 Certainly。
Str。 And that the just and wise soul becomes just and wise by the
possession of justice and wisdom； and the opposite under opposite
circumstances？
Theaet。 Yes； they do。
Str。 But surely that which may be present or may be absent will be
admitted
