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第39节

e8东的信 _作者: 美 沃伦·巴菲特-第39节

小说: e8东的信 _作者: 美 沃伦·巴菲特 字数: 每页4000字

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) held by the panies in (3) as well as various assets and debts of the Wesco and Berkshire parent panies。
下表我们依(1)金融事业,包含互助储贷与史考特财务公司(2)保险事业,依投资部位分门别类(3)制造、出版、零售事业,去除某些非营业资产与购买法会计调整数(4)其它项目,包含前述非营业资产(主要是有价证券投资)及Wesco与Berkshire母公司所持有的资产与负债
If you bine the earnings and the net worths of these four segments; you will derive totals matching those shown on our GAAP statements。 However; we want to emphasize that our new presentation does not fall within the purview of our auditors; who in no way bless it。 (In fact; they may be horrified; I don’t want to ask。)
如果将以上四类的盈余与净值加总,你将得到与一般公认会计原则一致的总数,但是我们必须强调的是这种新的表示方法并未经过会计师看过,最好是不要,因为他们要是看到这种报表,一定会被吓个半死。
I referred earlier to a major change in GAAP that is expected in 1990。 This change relates to the calculation of deferred taxes; and is both plicated and controversial … so much so that its imposition; originally scheduled for 1989; was postponed for a year。
先前我曾提到在1990年会有另一项会计原则的重大变动,主要与递延所得税有关,这原则相当的复杂且极具争议性,以致于原定计画于1989年实施延后一年。
When implemented; the new rule will affect us in various ways。 Most important; we will be required to change the way we calculate our liability for deferred taxes on the unrealized appreciation of stocks held by our insurance panies。
当这项原则开始实施后,对我们有几个方面,最重要的一点就是我们必须重新修正旗下保险公司所持有的未实现股票资本利得,其计算递延所得税负债的方式,
Right now; our liability is layered。 For the unrealized appreciation that dates back to 1986 and earlier years; 1。2 billion; we have booked a 28% tax liability。 For the unrealized appreciation built up since; 600 million; the tax liability has been booked at 34%。 The difference reflects the increase in tax rates that went into effect in 1987。
原先我们在这方面的负债分作好几层,对于1986年以前帐列未实现利益,大约在12亿美元左右,系以28%的税率估算,对于1986年之后的帐列未实现利益,大约在6亿美元左右,系以34%的税率估算,1987年起调整税率的差异反应税负的差异。
It now appears; however; that the new accounting rule will require us to establish the entire liability at 34% in 1990; taking the charge against our earnings。 Assuming no change in tax rates by 1990; this step will reduce our earnings in that year (and thereby our reported net worth) by 71 million。 The proposed rule will also affect other items on our balance sheet; but these changes will have only a minor impact on earnings and net worth。
现在看起来,新的会计原则要求我们从1990年开始必须将所有未实现利益的预估税率订在34%,经估算光是这一项做法就会使得我们的年度盈余与净值减少七千多万美元,还不包含其它大大小小的影响。
We have no strong views about the desirability of this change in calculation of deferred taxes。 We should point out; however; that neither a 28% nor a 34% tax liability precisely depicts economic reality at Berkshire since we have no plans to sell the stocks in which we have the great bulk of our gains。
其实我们不认为这样转变有其必要性,因为对于Berkshire来说不管税率是28%或是34%,都不能反应我们公司的实质现况,因为我们从来不考虑出售我们具有庞大未实现利益的股票。
To those of you who are uninterested in accounting; I apologize for this dissertation。 I realize that many of you do not pore over our figures; but instead hold Berkshire primarily because you know that: (1) Charlie and I have the bulk of our money in Berkshire; (2) we intend to run things so that your gains or losses are in direct proportion to ours; and (3) the record has so far been satisfactory。 There is nothing necessarily wrong with this kind of approach to investing。 Other shareholders; however; prefer analysis approach and we want to supply the information they need。 In our own investing; we search for situations in which both approaches give us the same answer。
对于那些对会计不感兴趣的人,很抱歉耽误各位的时间,我很清楚你们当中有很多根本不会仔细去看数字,但却仍持续支持我们,因为你们知道(1)查理跟我本身的身家也都在里面(2)我们绝对会与各位共享荣枯(3)到目前为止先前的记录还算令人满意。事实上这种完全信任的投资方法并没有什么不好,但也有一些股东比较喜欢深入分析的方式,因此我们也有必要提供足够的信息给他们,至于Berkshire本身在做投资时,则是两种方法并用,重点在于能不能得到满意的答案。
Sources of Reported Earnings
帐列盈余的来源
In addition to supplying you with our new four…sector accounting material; we will continue to list the major sources of Berkshire reported earnings just as we have in the past。
除了提供给各位最新四个部门的会计资料,我们一如往常还是会提列出Berkshire帐列盈余的主要来源
In the following table; amortization of Goodwill and other major purchase…price accounting adjustments are not charged against the specific businesses to which they apply but are instead aggregated and shown separately。 This procedure lets you view the earnings of our businesses as they would have been reported had we not purchased them。 Ie explained in past reports why this form of presentation seems to us to be more useful to investors and managers than the standard GAAP presentation; which makes purchase…price adjustments on a business…by…business basis。 The total net earnings we show in the table are; of course; identical to the GAAP total in our audited financial statements。
在下表商誉的摊销数与购买法会计调整数会从个别被投资公司分离出来,单独加总列示,之所以这样做是为了让旗下各事业的盈余状况,不因我们的投资而有所影响,过去我一再地强调我们认为这样的表达方式,较之一般公认会计原则,不管是对投资者或是管理者来说,更有帮助,当然最后损益加总的数字仍然会与经会计师查核的数字一致。
Further information about these businesses is given in the Business Segment section on pages 32…34; and in the Management Discussion section on pages 36…40。 In these sections you also will find our segment earnings reported on a GAAP basis。 For information on Wesco businesses; I urge you to read Charlie Munger letter; which starts on page 52。 It contains the best description I have seen of the events that produced the present savings…and…loan crisis。 Also; take special note of Dave Hillstrom performance at Precision Steel Warehouse; a Wesco subsidiary。 Precision operates in an extremely petitive industry; yet Dave consistently achieves good returns on invested capital。 Though data is lacking to prove the point; I think it is likely that his performance; both in 1988 and years past; would rank him number one among his peers。
年报中还有企业个别部门的信息,有关Wesco公司的信息,我强烈建议大家可以看看查理孟格所写的年报,里头包含我看过对储贷机构危机事件写得最贴切的一篇文章,另外也可以顺便看看Precision钢铁厂,这家Wesco的子公司所处的产业竞争相当激烈,但经理人Dave仍然努力创造相当不错的绩效,虽然手头上缺乏资料来证明,但我相信他的表现绝对不比其它同侪逊色。
1988 Unit:US'000
Earnings Before Ine Tax After Ine Tax
Percent Total  Berkshire Share Berkshire Share
Earnings from Operation
Insurance Group
Underwriting #DIV/0! (11;081) (1;045)
Net Investment Ine #DIV/0! 231;250  197;779 
Buffalio News #DIV/0! 42;429  25;462 
Fechheimer 14;152  7;720 
Kirby 26;891  17;842 
Nebraska Furniture Mart #DIV/0! 18;439  9;099 
Scott Fetzer…Diversified 28;542  17;640 
See's Candies #DIV/0! 32;473  19;671 
Wesco Financial Corporation…Parent #DIV/0! 16;133  10;650 
World Book 27;890  18;021 
Amortization of Goodwill (2;806) (2;806)
Interest on Debt (35;613) (23;212)
Shareholder's Contribution (4;966) (3;217)
Other 34;717  19;837 
0  418;450    313;441 

Realized Securities Gain 131;671  85;829 
Total Earnings…all entities 0  550;121    399;270 
*不包含史考特飞兹金融集团的利息费用
*Excludes interest expense of Scott Fetzer Financial Group。
我们旗下各项营运事业所创造的盈余,不管是依绝对值或是与同业相较,实在是相当出色,对此我们衷心感谢这些辛苦的经理人,你我应该感到庆幸能与他们一起共事。
The earnings achieved by our operating businesses are superb; whether measured on an absolute basis or against those of their petitors。 For that we thank our operating managers: You and I are fortunate to be associated with them。 At Berkshire; associations like these last a long time。 We do not remove superstars from our lineup merely because they have attained a specified age … whether the traditional 65; or the 95 reached by Mrs。 B on the eve of Hanukkah in 1988。 Superb managers are too scarce a resource to be discarded simply because a cake gets crowded with candles。 Moreover; our experience with newly…minted MBAs has not been that great。 Their academic records always look terrific and the candidates always know just what to say; but too often they are short on personal mitment to the pany and general business savvy。 It difficult to teach a new dog old tricks。
在Berkshire,这样的关系可以维持相当长久,我们不会因为这些杰出优秀的明星经理人年纪到了一定程度就把他们给换掉,不管是65岁或是B太太在1988年所打破的95岁上限,明星的经理人实在是可遇不可求的稀罕珍宝,他们就像是插满蜡烛的蛋糕,如何叫人舍得把他们丢弃,相较之下,我们对于新进的MBA企管硕士的评价就没有那么高了,他们的学术经历看起来总是很吓人,讲起话来头头是道,但个人对于企业长期发展的投入却相当有限,实在是很难去教菜狗那套老伎俩。
Here an update on our major

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