e8东的信 _作者: 美 沃伦·巴菲特-第33节
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Accounting rules dictate that we take into ine only the dividends these panies pay us … which are little more than nominal … rather than our share of their earnings； which in 1987 amounted to well over 100 million。 On the other hand； accounting rules provide that the carrying value of these three holdings … owned； as they are； by insurance panies … must be recorded on our balance sheet at current market prices。 The result： GAAP accounting lets us reflect in our net worth the up…to…date underlying values of the businesses we partially own； but does not let us reflect their underlying earnings in our ine account。 In the case of our controlled panies； just the opposite is true。 Here； we show full earnings in our ine account but never change asset values on our balance sheet； no matter how much the value of a business might have increased since we purchased it。
在我们具有控制权的投资事业，情况却刚好相反，我们可以在损益表上充分表示其获利状况，但不管这些资产在我们买下之后，价值在无形间如何地增加，我们也无法在资产负债表上做任何的变动。
Our mental approach to this accounting schizophrenia is to ignore GAAP figures and to focus solely on the future earning power of both our controlled and non…controlled businesses。 Using this approach； we establish our own ideas of business value； keeping these independent from both the accounting values shown on our books for controlled panies and the values placed by a sometimes foolish market on our partially…owned panies。 It is this business value that we hope to increase at a reasonable （or； preferably； unreasonable） rate in the years ahead。
我们对于这种会计精神分裂症的调整心态方式就是不去理会一般公认会计原则所编制的数字，而只专注于这些具控制权或者是部份股权的公司，其未来的获利能力，采用这种方法，我们依自己的概念建立一套企业价值的评价模式，它有别于会计帐上所显示的具控制权的帐面投资成本以及有的时候高的离谱的部份股权投资市值，这才是我们真正想要在未来年度持续稳定增加的数字（当然若能以不合理的速度成长的话更好）。
Marketable Securities – Other
其它有价证券
除了上述的三家重要投资事业，我们的保险公司也持有大量的有价证券，
主要可以分为五个类型，分别为：
（1）长期股票投资（2）长期固定收益债券（3）中期固定收益债券（4）短期约当现金（5）短期套利交易
In addition to our three permanent mon stock holdings； we hold large quantities of marketable securities in our insurance panies。 In selecting these； we can choose among five major categories： （1） long…term mon stock investments； （2） medium…term fixed…ine securities； （3） long…term fixed ine securities； （4） short…term cash equivalents； and （5） short…term arbitrage mitments。
对于这五种类型的交易，我们没有特别的偏好，我们只是持续不断地寻找最高的税后报酬预计的数学期望值，且仅限于我们认为了解熟悉的投资，我们无意让与短期的帐面盈余好看，我们的目标是让长期的净值极大化。
We have no particular bias when it es to choosing from these categories。 We just continuously search among them for the highest after…tax returns as measured by 〃mathematical expectation；〃 limiting ourselves always to investment alternatives we think we understand。 Our criteria have nothing to do with maximizing immediately reportable earnings； our goal； rather； is to maximize eventual net worth。
首先谈谈普通股投资，1987年股市的表现精彩连连，但最后指数却没有太大的进展，道琼整个年度只涨了2。3％，你知道这就好象是在坐云霄飞车一样，市场先生在十月以前爆跳如雷，但之后却突然收敛了下来。
o Let's look first at mon stocks。 During 1987 the stock market was an area of much excitement but little net movement： The Dow advanced 2。3％ for the year。 You are aware； of course； of the roller coaster ride that produced this minor change。 Mr。 Market was on a manic rampage until October and then experienced a sudden； massive seizure。
市场上有所谓专业的投资人，掌管着数以亿万计的资金，就是这些人造成市场的动荡，他们不去研究企业下一步发展的方向，反而专研于其它基金经理人下一步的动向，对他们来说，股票只不过是赌博交易的筹码，就像是大富翁里的棋子一样。
We have 〃professional〃 investors； those who manage many billions； to thank for most of this turmoil。 Instead of focusing on what businesses will do in the years ahead； many prestigious money managers now focus on what they expect other money managers to do in the days ahead。 For them； stocks are merely tokens in a game； like the thimble and flatiron in Monopoly。
他们的做法发展到极致，便形成所谓的投资组合保险，一个在1986到1987年间广为基金经理人所接受的一种策略，这种策略只不过是像投机者停损单一样，当投资组合或是类似指数期货价格下跌时就必须处分持股，这种策略不管如此，只要下跌到一定程度便会涌出一大堆卖单，根据一份研究报告显示：有高达600亿到900亿的股票投资在1987年十月中面临一触即发的险境。
An extreme example of what their attitude leads to is 〃portfolio insurance；〃 a money…management strategy that many leading investment advisors embraced in 1986…1987。 This strategy … which is simply an exotically…labeled version of the small speculator's stop…loss order dictates that ever increasing portions of a stock portfolio； or their index…future equivalents； be sold as prices decline。 The strategy says nothing else matters： A downtick of a given magnitude automatically produces a huge sell order。 According to the Brady Report； 60 billion to 90 billion of equities were poised on this hair trigger in mid…October of 1987。
若是你认为投资顾问是被请来投资的，那你就大错特错了，在买下一家农场后，一个理性的主人会不会叫其不动产经纪人开始寻求可能的买主，只因为隔壁的农场最近卖出的价格更低一些？或是你会不会一早起来就想要把你的房子卖掉，只因为几分钟前你听到隔壁的房子以比以前便宜的价格脱手。
If you've thought that investment advisors were hired to invest； you may be bewildered by this technique。 After buying a farm； would a rational owner next order his real estate agent to start selling off pieces of it whenever a neighboring property was sold at a lower price？ Or would you sell your house to whatever bidder was available at 9：31 on some morning merely because at 9：30 a similar house sold for less than it would have
brought on the previous day？
这样的举动正是投资组合风险理论告诉退休基金或是学术单位当他们持有福特或是通用电气部份股权时，应该要做的动作，因为这些公司的价值越被低估，你就越应该赶快把他们处分掉，根据逻辑推论，这种方法还要求投资机构在股价反弹时再把他们买回来，一想到有这么多的资金，掌握在整天沉溺在爱莉丝梦游仙境般的经理人手中，也难怪股票市场会有如此不寻常的表现。
Moves like that； however； are what portfolio insurance tells a pension fund or university to make when it owns a portion of enterprises such as Ford or General Electric。 The less these panies are being valued at； says this approach； the more vigorously they should be sold。 As a 〃logical〃 corollary； the approach mands the institutions to repurchase these panies … I'm not making this up … once their prices have rebounded significantly。 Considering that huge sums are controlled by managers following such Alice…in…Wonderland practices； is it any surprise that markets sometimes behave in aberrational fashion？
然而许多评论家在观察最近所发生的事时，归纳出一个不正确的结论，他们喜欢说由于股票市场掌握在这些投资大户手上，所以小额投资人根本一点机会也没有，这种结论实在是大大地错误，不管资金多寡，这样的市场绝对有利于任何投资者，只要他能够坚持自己的投资理念，事实上由手握重金的基金经理人所造成的市场波动，反而使得真正的投资人有更好的机会可以去贯彻其明智的投资行动，只要他在面临股市波动时，不会因为财务或心理因素而被迫在不当的时机出脱手中持股，他就很难会受到伤害。
Many mentators； however； have drawn an incorrect conclusion upon observing recent events： They are fond of saying that the small investor has no chance in a market now dominated by the erratic behavior of the big boys。 This conclusion is dead wrong： Such markets are ideal for any investor … small or large … so long as he sticks to his investment knitting。 Volatility caused by money managers who speculate irrationally with huge sums will offer the true investor more chances to make intelligent investment moves。 He can be hurt by such volatility only if he is forced； by either financial or psychological pressures； to sell at untoward times。
在Berkshire过去几年，我们在股票市场实在没有什么可以发挥的地方，在十月的那段期间，有几支股票跌到相当吸引我们的价位，不过我们没有能够在他们反弹之前买到够多的股份，在1987年底除了永久的持股与短期的套利之外，我们并没有新增任何主要的股票投资组合（指5；000万美元以上），不过你大可以放心，一旦市场先生一定会给我们机会的时候，我们一定会好好把握住的。
At Berkshire； we have found little to do in stocks during the past few years。 During the break in October； a few stocks fell to prices that interested us； but we were unable to make meaningful purchases before they rebounded。 At yearend 1987 we had no major mon stock investments （that is； over 50 million） other than those we consider permanent or arbitrage holdings。 However； Mr。 Market will offer us opportunities … you can be sure of that … and； when he does； we will be willing and able to participate。
至于我们主要的资金避风港…中期的免税债券，在去年我已经解释过其特点，虽然在1987年间我们也有进出，但整个部位变化不大，总金额约在9亿美元左右，大部分的债券是属于1986年税务改革法案中祖父级的债券，不同于现在保险公司新买进的债券，他们享有百分之百免税的优惠。
o In the meantime； our major parking place for money is medium…term tax…exempt bonds； whose limited virtues I explained in last year's annual report。 Though we both bought and
