darwin and modern science-第142节

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ring　this　interval　it　was　evident　to　an　attentive　reader　that　Darwin　himself　did　not　found　his　standard　of　good　and　evil　on　the　features　of　the　life　of　nature　he　had　emphasised　so　strongly。　　He　did　not　justify　the　ways　along　which　nature　reached　its　ends；　he　only　pointed　them　out。　　The　〃real〃　was　not　to　him；　as　to　Hegel；　one　with　the　〃rational。〃　　Darwin　has；　indeed；　by　his　whole　conception　of　nature；　rendered　a　great　service　to　ethics　in　making　the　difference　between　the　life　of　nature　and　the　ethical　life　appear　in　so　strong　a　light。　　The　ethical　problem　could　now　be　stated　in　a　sharper　form　than　before。　　But　this　was　not　the　first　time　that　the　idea　of　the　struggle　for　life　was　put　in　relation　to　the　ethical　problem。　　In　the　seventeenth　century　Thomas　Hobbes　gave　the　first　impulse　to　the　whole　modern　discussion　of　ethical　principles　in　his　theory　of　bellum　omnium　contra　omnes。　　Men；　he　taught；　are　in　the　state　of　nature　enemies　one　of　another；　and　they　live　either　in　fright　or　in　the　glory　of　power。　　But　it　was　not　the　opinion　of　Hobbes　that　this　made　ethics　impossible。　　On　the　contrary；　he　found　a　standard　for　virtue　and　vice　in　the　fact　that　some　qualities　and　actions　have　a　tendency　to　bring　us　out　of　the　state　of　war　and　to　secure　peace；　while　other　qualities　have　a　contrary　tendency。　　In　the　eighteenth　century　even　Immanuel　Kant's　ideal　ethics　hadso　far　as　can　be　seena　similar　origin。　　Shortly　before　the　foundation　of　his　definitive　ethics；　Kant　wrote　his　〃Idee　zu　einer　allgemeinen　Weltgeschichte〃　（1784）；　wherein　a　way　which　reminds　us　of　Hobbes；　and　is　prophetic　of　Darwinhe　describes　the　forward…driving　power　of　struggle　in　the　human　world。　　It　is　here　as　with　the　struggle　of　the　trees　for　light　and　air；　through　which　they　compete　with　one　another　in　height。　　Anxiety　about　war　can　only　be　allayed　by　an　ordinance　which　gives　everyone　his　full　liberty　under　acknowledgment　of　the　equal　liberty　of　others。　　And　such　ordinance　and　acknowledgment　are　also　attributes　of　the　content　of　the　moral　law；　as　Kant　proclaimed　it　in　the　year　after　the　publication　of　his　essay　（1785）　　（Cf。　my　〃History　of　Modern　Philosophy〃　（English　translation　London；　1900）；　I。　pages　76…79。）　　Kant　really　came　to　his　ethics　by　the　way　of　evolution；　though　he　afterwards　disavowed　it。　　Similarly　the　same　line　of　thought　may　be　traced　in　Hegel　though　it　has　been　disguised　in　the　form　of　speculative　dialectics。　　（〃Herrschaft　und　Knechtschaft〃；　〃Phanomenologie　des　Geistes〃；　IV。　A。；　Leiden；　1907。）　　And　in　Schopenhauer's　theory　of　the　blind　will　to　live　and　its　abrogation　by　the　ethical　feeling；　which　is　founded　on　universal　sympathy；　we　have　a　more　individualistic　form　of　the　same　idea。

It　was；　then；　not　entirely　a　foreign　point　of　view　which　Darwin　introduced　into　ethical　thought；　even　if　we　take　no　account　of　the　poetical　character　of　the　word　〃struggle〃　and　of　the　more　direct　adaptation；　through　the　use　and　non…use　of　power；　which　Darwin　also　emphasised。　　In　〃The　Descent　of　Man〃　he　has　devoted　a　special　chapter　（〃The　Descent　of　Man〃；　Vol。　I。　Ch。　iii。）　to　a　discussion　of　the　origin　of　the　ethical　consciousness。　　The　characteristic　expression　of　this　consciousness　he　found；　just　as　Kant　did；　in　the　idea　of　〃ought〃；　it　was　the　origin　of　this　new　idea　which　should　be　explained。　　His　hypothesis　was　that　the　ethical　〃ought〃　has　its　origin　in　the　social　and　parental　instincts；　which；　as　well　as　other　instincts　（e。g。　the　instinct　of　self…preservation）；　lie　deeper　than　pleasure　and　pain。　　In　many　species；　not　least　in　the　human　species；　these　instincts　are　fostered　by　natural　selection；　and　when　the　powers　of　memory　and　comparison　are　developed；　so　that　single　acts　can　be　valued　according　to　the　claims　of　the　deep　social　instinct；　then　consciousness　of　duty　and　remorse　are　possible。　　Blind　instinct　has　developed　to　conscious　ethical　will。

As　already　stated；　Darwin；　as　a　moral　philosopher　belongs　to　the　school　that　was　founded　by　Shaftesbury；　and　was　afterwards　represented　by　Hutcheson；　Hume；　Adam　Smith；　Comte　and　Spencer。　　His　merit　is；　first；　that　he　has　given　this　tendency　of　thought　a　biological　foundation；　and　that　he　has　stamped　on　it　a　doughty　character　in　showing　that　ethical　ideas　and　sentiments；　rightly　conceived；　are　forces　which　are　at　work　in　the　struggle　for　life。

There　are　still　many　questions　to　solve。　　Not　only　does　the　ethical　development　within　the　human　species　contain　features　still　unexplained　（The　works　of　Westermarck　and　Hobhouse　throw　new　light　on　many　of　these　features。）；　but　we　are　confronted　by　the　great　problem　whether　after　all　a　genetic　historical　theory　can　be　of　decisive　importance　here。　　To　every　consequent　ethical　consciousness　there　is　a　standard　of　value；　a　primordial　value　which　determines　the　single　ethical　judgments　as　their　last　presupposition；　and　the　〃rightness〃　of　this　basis；　the　〃value〃　of　this　value　can　as　little　be　discussed　as　the　〃rationality〃　of　our　logical　principles。　　There　is　here　revealed　a　possibility　of　ethical　scepticism　which　evolutionistic　ethics　（as　well　as　intuitive　or　rationalistic　ethics）　has　overlooked。　　No　demonstration　can　show　that　the　results　of　the　ethical　development　are　definitive　and　universal。　　We　meet　here　again　with　the　important　opposition　of　systematisation　and　evolution。　　There　will；　I　think；　always　be　an　open　question　here；　though　comparative　ethics；　of　which　we　have　so　far　only　the　first　attempts；　can　do　much　to　throw　light　on　it。

It　would　carry　us　too　far　to　discuss　all　the　philosophical　works　on　ethics；　which　have　been　influenced　directly　or　indirectly　by　evolutionism。　　I　may；　however；　here　refer　to　the　book　of　C。M。　Williams；　〃A　Review　of　the　Systems　of　Ethics　founded　on　the　Theory　of　Evolution〃　（New　York　and　London；　1893。）；　in　which；　besides　Darwin；　the　following　authors　are　reviewed：　　Wallace；　Haeckel；　Spencer；　Fiske；　Rolph；　Barratt；　Stephen；　Carneri；　Hoffding；　Gizycki；　Alexander；　Ree。　　As　works　which　criticise　evolutionistic　ethics　from　an　intuitive　point　of　view　and　in　an　instructive　way；　may　be　cited：　　Guyau　〃La　morale　anglaise　contemporaine〃　（Paris；　1879。）；　and　Sorley；　〃Ethics　of　Naturalism〃。　　I　will　only　mention　some　interesting　contributions　to　ethical　discussion　which　can　be　found　in　Darwinism　besides　the　idea　of　struggle　for　life。

The　attention　which　Darwin　has　directed　to　variations　has　opened　our　eyes　to　the　differences　in　human　nature　as　well　as　in　nature　generally。　　There　is　here　a　fact　of　great　importance　for　ethical　thought；　no　matter　from　what　ultimate　premiss　it　starts。　　Only　from　a　very　abstract　point　of　view　can　different　individuals　be　treated　in　the　same　manner。　　The　most　eminent　ethical　thinkers；　men　such　as　Jeremy　Bentham　and　Immanuel　Kant；　who　discussed　ethical　questions　from　very　opposite　standpoints；　agreed　in　regarding　all　men　as　equal　in　respect　of　ethical　endowment。　　In　regard　to　Bentham；　Leslie　Stephen　remarks：　　〃He　is　determined　to　be　thoroughly　empirical；　to　take　men　as　he　found　them。　　But　his　utilitarianism　supposed　that　men's　views　of　happiness　and　utility　were　uniform　and　clear；　and　that　all　that　was　wanted　was　to　show　them　the　means　by　which　their　ends　could　be　reached。〃　　（〃English　literature　and　society　in　the　eighteenth　century〃；　London；　1904；　page　187。）　　And　Kant　supposed　that　every　man　would　find　the　〃categorical　imperative〃　in　his　consciousness；　when　he　came　to　sober　reflexion；　and　that　all　would　have　the　same　qualifications　to　follow　it。　　But　if　continual　variations；　great　or　small；　are　going　on　in　human　nature；　it　is　the　duty　of　ethics　to　make　allowance　for　them；　both　in　making　claims；　and　in　valuing　what　is　done。　　A　new　set　of　ethical　problems　have　their　origin　here。　　（Cf。　my　paper；　〃The　law　of　relativity　in　Ethics；〃　〃International　Journal　of　Ethics〃；　Vol。　I。　1891；　pages　37…62。）　　It　is　an　interesting　fact　that　Stuart　Mill's　book　〃On　Liberty〃　appeared　in　the　same　year　as　〃The　Origin　of　Species〃。　　Though　Mill　agreed　with　Bentham　about　the　original　equality　of　all　men's　endowments；　he　regarded　individual　differences　as　a　necessary　result　of　physical　and　social　influences；　and　he　claimed　that　free　play　shall　be　allowed　to　differences　of　character　so　far　as　is　possible　without　injury　to　other　men。　　It　is　a　condition　of　individual　and　social　progress　that　a　man's　mode　of　action　should　be　determined　by　his　own　character　and　not　by　tradition　and　custom；　nor　by　abstract　rules。　　This　view　was　to　be　corroborated　by　the　theory　of　Darwin。

But　here　we　have　reached　a　point　of　view　from　which　the　criticism；　which　in　recent　years　has　often　been　directed　against　Darwinthat　small　variations　are　of　no　importance　in　the　struggle　for　lifeis　of　no　weight。　　From　an　ethical　standpoint；　and　particularly　from　the　ethical　standpoint　of　Darwin　himself；　it　is　a　duty　to　foster　individual　differences　that　can　be　valuable；　even　though　they　can　neither　be　of　service　for　physical　preservation　nor　be　physically　inherited。　　The　distinction　between　variation　and　mutation　is　here　without　importance。　　It　is　quite　natural　that　biologists　should　be　particularly　interested　in　such　variations　as　can　be　inherited　and　produce　new　species。　　But　in　the　human　world　there　is　not　only　a　physical；　but　also　a　mental　and　social　heredity。　　When　an　ideal　human　character　has　taken　form；　then