darwin and modern science-第140节

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　moving　equilibrium。　　At　the　same　time　this　definition　enables　him　to　illustrate　the　expression　〃survival　of　the　fittest。〃　　〃Every　living　organism　exhibits　such　a　moving　equilibriuma　balanced　set　of　functions　constituting　its　life；　and　the　overthrow　of　this　balanced　set　of　functions　or　moving　equilibrium　is　what　we　call　death。　　Some　individuals　in　a　species　are　so　constituted　that　their　moving　equilibria　are　less　easily　overthrown　than　those　of　other　individuals；　and　these　are　the　fittest　which　survive；　or；　in　Mr　Darwin's　language；　they　are　the　select　which　nature　preserves。〃　　（Ibid。　page　100。）　　Not　only　in　the　domain　of　organic　life；　but　in　all　domains；　the　summit　of　evolution　is；　according　to　Spencer；　characterised　by　such　a　harmonyby　a　moving　equilibrium。

Spencer's　analysis　of　the　concept　of　evolution；　based　on　a　great　variety　of　examples；　has　made　this　concept　clearer　and　more　definite　than　before。　　It　contains　the　three　elements；　integration；　differentiation　and　equilibration。　　It　is　true　that　a　concept　which　is　to　be　valid　for　all　domains　of　experience　must　have　an　abstract　character；　and　between　the　several　domains　there　is；　strictly　speaking；　only　a　relation　of　analogy。　　So　there　is　only　analogy　between　psychical　and　physical　evolution。　　But　this　is　no　serious　objection；　because　general　concepts　do　not　express　more　than　analogies　between　the　phenomena　which　they　represent。　　Spencer　takes　his　leading　terms　from　the　material　world　in　defining　evolution　（in　the　simplest　form）　as　integration　of　matter　and　dissipation　of　movement；　but　as　henot　always　quite　consistently　（Cf。　my　letter　to　him；　1876；　now　printed　in　Duncan's　〃Life　and　Letters　of　Herbert　Spencer〃；　page　178；　London；　1908。）assumed　a　correspondence　of　mind　and　matter；　he　could　very　well　give　these　terms　an　indirect　importance　for　psychical　evolution。　　Spencer　has　always；　in　my　opinion　with　full　right；　repudiated　the　ascription　of　materialism。　　He　is　no　more　a　materialist　than　Spinoza。　　In　his　〃Principles　of　Psychology〃　（paragraph　63）　he　expressed　himself　very　clearly：　　〃Though　it　seems　easier　to　translate　so…called　matter　into　so…called　spirit；　than　to　translate　so…called　spirit　into　so…called　matterwhich　latter　is　indeed　wholly　impossibleyet　no　translation　can　carry　us　beyond　our　symbols。〃　　These　words　lead　us　naturally　to　a　group　of　thinkers　whose　starting…point　was　psychical　evolution。　　But　we　have　still　one　aspect　of　Spencer's　philosophy　to　mention。

Spencer　founded　his　〃laws　of　evolution〃　on　an　inductive　basis；　but　he　was　convinced　that　they　could　be　deduced　from　the　law　of　the　conservation　of　energy。　　Such　a　deduction　is；　perhaps；　possible　for　the　more　elementary　forms　of　evolution；　integration　and　differentiation；　but　it　is　not　possible　for　the　highest　form；　the　equilibration；　which　is　a　harmony　of　integration　and　differentiation。　　Spencer　can　no　more　deduce　the　necessity　for　the　eventual　appearance　of　〃moving　equilibria〃　of　harmonious　totalities　than　Hegel　could　guarantee　the　〃higher　unities〃　in　which　all　contradictions　should　be　reconciled。　　In　Spencer's　hands　the　theory　of　evolution　acquired　a　more　decidedly　optimistic　character　than　in　Darwin's；　but　I　shall　deal　later　with　the　relation　of　Darwin's　hypothesis　to　the　opposition　of　optimism　and　pessimism。

II。　　While　the　starting…point　of　Spencer　was　biological　or　cosmological；　psychical　evolution　being　conceived　as　in　analogy　with　physical；　a　group　of　eminent　thinkersin　Germany　Wundt；　in　France　Fouillee；　in　Italy　Ardigo　took；　each　in　his　own　manner；　their　starting…point　in　psychical　evolution　as　an　original　fact　and　as　a　type　of　all　evolution；　the　hypothesis　of　Darwin　coming　in　as　a　corroboration　and　as　a　special　example。　　They　maintain　the　continuity　of　evolution；　they　find　this　character　most　prominent　in　psychical　evolution；　and　this　is　for　them　a　motive　to　demand　a　corresponding　continuity　in　the　material；　especially　in　the　organic　domain。

To　Wundt　and　Fouillee　the　concept　of　will　is　prominent。　　They　see　the　type　of　all　evolution　in　the　transformation　of　the　life　of　will　from　blind　impulse　to　conscious　choice；　the　theories　of　Lamarck　and　Darwin　are　used　to　support　the　view　that　there　is　in　nature　a　tendency　to　evolution　in　steady　reciprocity　with　external　conditions。　　The　struggle　for　life　is　here　only　a　secondary　fact。　　Its　apparent　prominence　is　explained　by　the　circumstance　that　the　influence　of　external　conditions　is　easily　made　out；　while　inner　conditions　can　be　verified　only　through　their　effects。　　For　Ardigo　the　evolution　of　thought　was　the　starting…point　and　the　type：　　in　the　evolution　of　a　scientific　hypothesis　we　see　a　progress　from　the　indefinite　（indistinto）　to　the　definite　（distinto）；　and　this　is　a　characteristic　of　all　evolution；　as　Ardigo　has　pointed　out　in　a　series　of　works。　　The　opposition　between　indistinto　and　distinto　corresponds　to　Spencer's　opposition　between　homogeneity　and　heterogeneity。　　The　hypothesis　of　the　origin　of　differences　of　species　from　more　simple　forms　is　a　special　example　of　the　general　law　of　evolution。

In　the　views　of　Wundt　and　Fouillee　we　find　the　fundamental　idea　of　idealism：　　psychical　phenomena　as　expressions　of　the　innermost　nature　of　existence。　　They　differ　from　the　older　Idealism　in　the　great　stress　which　they　lay　on　evolution　as　a　real；　historical　process　which　is　going　on　through　steady　conflict　with　external　conditions。　　The　Romantic　dread　of　reality　is　broken。　　It　is　beyond　doubt　that　Darwin's　emphasis　on　the　struggle　for　life　as　a　necessary　condition　of　evolution　has　been　a　very　important　factor　in　carrying　philosophy　back　to　reality　from　the　heaven　of　pure　ideas。　　The　philosophy　of　Ardigo；　on　the　other　side；　appears　more　as　a　continuation　and　deepening　of　positivism；　though　the　Italian　thinker　arrived　at　his　point　of　view　independently　of　French…English　positivism。　　The　idea　of　continuous　evolution　is　here　maintained　in　opposition　to　Comte's　and　Mill's　philosophy　of　discontinuity。　　From　Wundt　and　Fouillee　Ardigo　differs　in　conceiving　psychical　evolution　not　as　an　immediate　revelation　of　the　innermost　nature　of　existence；　but　only　as　a　single；　though　the　most　accessible　example；　of　evolution。

III。　　To　the　French　philosophers　Boutroux　and　Bergson；　evolution　proper　is　continuous　and　qualitative；　while　outer　experience　and　physical　science　give　us　fragments　only；　sporadic　processes　and　mechanical　combinations。　　To　Bergson；　in　his　recent　work　〃L'Evolution　Creatrice〃；　evolution　consists　in　an　elan　de　vie　which　to　our　fragmentary　observation　and　analytic　reflexion　appears　as　broken　into　a　manifold　of　elements　and　processes。　　The　concept　of　matter　in　its　scientific　form　is　the　result　of　this　breaking　asunder；　essential　for　all　scientific　reflexion。　　In　these　conceptions　the　strongest　opposition　between　inner　and　outer　conditions　of　evolution　is　expressed：　　in　the　domain　of　internal　conditions　spontaneous　development　of　qualitative　formsin　the　domain　of　external　conditions　discontinuity　and　mechanical　combination。

We　see；　then；　that　the　theory　of　evolution　has　influenced　philosophy　in　a　variety　of　forms。　　It　has　made　idealistic　thinkers　revise　their　relation　to　the　real　world；　it　has　led　positivistic　thinkers　to　find　a　closer　connection　between　the　facts　on　which　they　based　their　views；　it　has　made　us　all　open　our　eyes　for　new　possibilities　to　arise　through　the　prima　facie　inexplicable　〃spontaneous〃　variations　which　are　the　condition　of　all　evolution。　　This　last　point　is　one　of　peculiar　interest。　　Deeper　than　speculative　philosophy　and　mechanical　science　saw　in　the　days　of　their　triumph；　we　catch　sight　of　new　streams；　whose　sources　and　laws　we　have　still　to　discover。　　Most　sharply　does　this　appear　in　the　theory　of　mutation；　which　is　only　a　stronger　accentuation　of　a　main　point　in　Darwinism。　　It　is　interesting　to　see　that　an　analogous　problem　comes　into　the　foreground　in　physics　through　the　discovery　of　radioactive　phenomena；　and　in　psychology　through　the　assumption　of　psychical　new　formations　（as　held　by　Boutroux；　William　James　and　Bergson）。　　From　this　side；　Darwin's　ideas；　as　well　as　the　analogous　ideas　in　other　domains；　incite　us　to　renewed　examination　of　our　first　principles；　their　rationality　and　their　value。　　On　the　other　hand；　his　theory　of　the　struggle　for　existence　challenges　us　to　examine　the　conditions　and　discuss　the　outlook　as　to　the　persistence　of　human　life　and　society　and　of　the　values　that　belong　to　them。　　It　is　not　enough　to　hope　（or　fear？）　the　rising　of　new　forms；　we　have　also　to　investigate　the　possibility　of　upholding　the　forms　and　ideals　which　have　hitherto　been　the　bases　of　human　life。　　Darwin　has　here　given　his　age　the　most　earnest　and　most　impressive　lesson。　　This　side　of　Darwin's　theory　is　of　peculiar　interest　to　some　special　philosophical　problems　to　which　I　now　pass。

IV。

Among　philosophical　problems　the　problem　of　knowledge　has　in　the　last　century　occupied　a　foremost　place。　　It　is　natural；　then；　to　ask　how　Darwin　and　the　hypothesis　whose　most　eminent　representative　he　is；　stand　to　this　problem。

Darwin　started　an　hypothesis。　　But　every　hypothesis　is　won　by　inference　from　certain　presuppositions；　and　every　inference　is　based　on　the　general　principles　of　human　thought。　　The　evolution　hypothesis　presupposes；　then；　human