three dialogues-第7节
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。 What object do you mean？ the object of the senses？
。 The same。
。 It is then immediately perceived？ ｛195｝
。 Right。
。 Make me to understand the difference between what is
immediately perceived and a sensation。
。 The sensation I take to be an act of the mind
perceiving； besides which； there is something perceived； and this
I call the 。 For example； there is red and yellow on that
tulip。 But then the act of perceiving those colours is in me
only； and not in the tulip。
。 What tulip do you speak of？ Is it that which you
see？
。 The same。
。 And what do you see beside colour； figure； and
extension？
。 Nothing。
。 What you would say then is that the red and yellow
are coexistent with the extension； is it not？
。 That is not all； I would say they have a real
existence without the mind； in some unthinking substance。
。 That the colours are really in the tulip which I see
is manifest。 Neither can it be denied that this tulip may exist
independent of your mind or mine； but； that any immediate object
of the senses； that is； any idea； or combination of ideas
should exist in an unthinking substance； or exterior to
minds； is in itself an evident contradiction。 Nor can I imagine
how this follows from what you said just now； to wit； that the
red and yellow were on the tulip ； since you do not
pretend to that unthinking substance。
。 You have an artful way； Philonous； of diverting our
inquiry from the subject。
。 I see you have no mind to be pressed that way。 To
return then to your distinction between and ；
if I take you right； you distinguish in every perception two
things； the one an action of the mind； the other not。
。 True。
。 And this action cannot exist in； or belong to； any
unthinking thing； but； whatever beside is implied in a perception
may？ ｛196｝
。 That is my meaning。
。 So that if there was a perception without any act of
the mind； it were possible such a perception should exist in an
unthinking substance？
。 I grant it。 But it is impossible there should be such
a perception。
。 When is the mind said to be active？
。 When it produces； puts an end to； or changes；
anything。
。 Can the mind produce； discontinue； or change
anything； but by an act of the will？
。 It cannot。
。 The mind therefore is to be accounted in
its perceptions so far forth as is included in them？
。 It is。
。 In plucking this flower I am active； because I do it
by the motion of my hand； which was consequent upon my volition；
so likewise in applying it to my nose。 But is either of these
smelling？
。 。
。 I act too in drawing the air through my nose；
because my breathing so rather than otherwise is the effect of my
volition。 But neither can this be called ： for； if it
were； I should smell every time I breathed in that manner？
。 True。
。 Smelling then is somewhat consequent to all this？
。 It is。
。 But I do not find my will concerned any farther。
Whatever more there is as that I perceive such a particular
smell； or any smell at all this is independent of my will； and
therein I am altogether passive。 Do you find it otherwise with
you； Hylas？
。 No； the very same。
。 Then； as to seeing； is it not in your power to open
your eyes； or keep them shut； to turn them this or that way？
。 Without doubt。
。 But； doth it in like manner depend on will
that in looking on this flower you perceive rather than
any other colour？ Or； directing your open eyes towards yonder
part of the heaven； can you avoid seeing the sun？ Or is light or
darkness the effect of your volition？
。 No； certainly。
。 You are then in these respects altogether passive？
｛197｝
。 I am。
。 Tell me now； whether consists in perceiving
light and colours； or in opening and turning the eyes？
。 Without doubt； in the former。
。 Since therefore you are in the very perception of
light and colours altogether passive； what is become of that
action you were speaking of as an ingredient in every sensation？
And； doth it not follow from your own concessions； that the
perception of light and colours； including no action in it； may
exist in an unperceiving substance？ And is not this a plain
contradiction？
。 I know not what to think of it。
。 Besides； since you distinguish the and
in every perception； you must do it in that of pain。
But how is it possible that pain； be it as little active as you
please； should exist in an unperceiving substance？ In short； do
but consider the point； and then confess ingenuously； whether
light and colours； tastes； sounds； &c。 are not all equally
passions or sensations in the soul。 You may indeed call them
； and give them in words what subsistence you
please。 But； examine your own thoughts； and then tell me whether
it be not as I say？
。 I acknowledge； Philonous； that； upon a fair
observation of what passes in my mind； I can discover nothing
else but that I am a thinking being； affected with variety of
sensations； neither is it possible to conceive how a sensation
should exist in an unperceiving substance。 But then； on the other
hand； when I look on sensible things in a different view；
considering them as so many modes and qualities； I find it
necessary to suppose a ； without which they
cannot be conceived to exist。
。 call you it？ Pray； by which of
your senses came you acquainted with that being？
。 It is not itself sensible； its modes and qualities
only being perceived by the senses。
。 I presume then it was by reflexion and reason you
obtained
the idea of it？
。 I do not pretend to any proper positive of it。
However； I conclude it exists； because qualities cannot be
conceived to exist without a support。
。 It seems then you have only a relative of
it； or that you conceive it not otherwise than by conceiving the
relation it bears to sensible qualities？ ｛198｝
。 Right。
。 Be pleased therefore to let me know wherein that
relation
consists。
。 Is it not sufficiently expressed in the term
； or ？
。 If so； the word should import that it
is spread under the sensible qualities or accidents？
。 True。
。 And consequently under extension？
。 I own it。
。 It is therefore somewhat in its own nature entirely
distinct
from extension？
。 I tell you； extension is only a mode； and Matter is
something that supports modes。 And is it not evident the thing
supported is different from the thing supporting？
。 So that something distinct from； and exclusive of；
extension is supposed to be the of extension？
。 Just so。
。 Answer me； Hylas。 Can a thing be spread without
extension？ or is not the idea of extension necessarily included
in ？
。 It is。
。 Whatsoever therefore you suppose spread under
anything must have in itself an extension distinct from the
extension of that thing under which it is spread？
。 It must。
。 Consequently； every corporeal substance； being the
of extension； must have in itself another extension；
by which it is qualified to be a ： and so on to
infinity。 And I ask whether this be not absurd in itself； and
repugnant to what you granted just now； to wit； that the
was something distinct from and exclusive of
extension？
。 Aye but； Philonous； you take me wrong。 I do not mean
that Matter is in a gross literal sense under extension。
The word is used only to express in general the same
thing with 。
。 Well then； let us examine the relation implied in
the term 。 Is it not that it stands under accidents？
。 The very same。
。 But； that one thing may stand under or support
another； must it not be extended？
。 It must。 ｛199｝
。 Is not therefore this supposition liable to the same
absurdity with the former？
。 You still take things in a strict literal sense。 That
is not fair； Philonous。
。 I am not for imposing any sense on your words： you
are at liberty to explain them as you please。 Only； I beseech
you； make me understand something by them。 You tell me Matter
supports or stands under accidents。 How！ is it as your legs
support your body？
。 No； that is the literal sense。
。 Pray let me know any sense； li
