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democratical　frenzy。
　　　　Secondly；　Public　stocks；　being　a　kind　of　paper…credit；　have
all　the　disadvantages　attending　that　species　of　money。　They
banish　gold　and　silver　from　the　most　considerable　commerce　of　the
state；　reduce　them　to　common　circulation；　and　by　that　means
render　all　provisions　and　labour　dearer　than　otherwise　they　would
be。
　　　　Thirdly；　The　taxes；　which　are　levied　to　pay　the　interests　of
these　debts；　are　apt　either　to　heighten　the　price　of　labour；　or
be　an　oppression　on　the　poorer　sort。
　　　　Fourthly；　As　foreigners　possess　a　great　share　of　our　national
funds；　they　render　the　public；　in　a　manner；　tributary　to　them；
and　may　in　time　occasion　the　transport　of　our　people　and　our
industry。
　　　　Fifthly；　The　greater　part　of　the　public　stock　being　always　in
the　hands　of　idle　people；　who　live　on　their　revenue；　our　funds；
in　that　view；　give　great　encouragement　to　an　useless　and　unactive
life。
　　　　But　though　the　injury；　that　arises　to　commerce　and　industry
from　our　public　funds；　will　appear；　upon　balancing　the　whole；　not
inconsiderable；　it　is　trivial；　in　comparison　of　the　prejudice
that　results　to　the　state　considered　as　a　body　politic；　which
must　support　itself　in　the　society　of　nations；　and　have　various
transactions　with　other　states　in　wars　and　negociations。　The　ill；
there；　is　pure　and　unmixed；　without　any　favourable　circumstance
to　atone　for　it；　and　it　is　an　ill　too　of　a　nature　the　highest　and
most　important。
　　　　We　have；　indeed；　been　told；　that　the　public　is　no　weaker　upon
account　of　its　debts；　since　they　are　mostly　due　among　ourselves；
and　bring　as　much　property　to　one　as　they　take　from　another。　It
is　like　transferring　money　from　the　right　hand　to　the　left；　which
leaves　the　person　neither　richer　nor　poorer　than　before。　Such
loose　reasonings　and　specious　comparisons　will　always　pass；　where
we　judge　not　upon　principles。　I　ask；　Is　it　possible；　in　the
nature　of　things；　to　overburthen　a　nation　with　taxes；　even　where
the　sovereign　resides　among　them？　The　very　doubt　seems
extravagant；　since　it　is　requisite；　in　every　community；　that
there　be　a　certain　proportion　observed　between　the　laborious　and
the　idle　part　of　it。　But　if　all　our　present　taxes　be　mortgaged；
must　we　not　invent　new　ones？　And　may　not　this　matter　be　carried
to　a　length　that　is　ruinous　and　destructive？
　　　　In　every　nation；　there　are　always　some　methods　of　levying
money　more　easy　than　others；　agreeably　to　the　way　of　living　of
the　people；　and　the　commodities　they　make　use　of。　In　GREAT
BRITAIN；　the　excises　upon　malt　and　beer　afford　a　large　revenue；
because　the　operations　of　malting　and　brewing　are　tedious；　and
are　impossible　to　be　concealed；　and　at　the　same　time；　these
commodities　are　not　so　absolutely　necessary　to　life；　as　that　the
raising　of　their　price　would　very　much　affect　the　poorer　sort。
These　taxes　being　all　mortgaged；　what　difficulty　to　find　new
ones！　what　vexation　and　ruin　of　the　poor！
　　　　Duties　upon　consumptions　are　more　equal　and　easy　than　those
upon　possessions。　What　a　loss　to　the　public；　that　the　former　are
all　exhausted；　and　that　we　must　have　recourse　to　the　more
grievous　method　of　levying　taxes！
　　　　Were　all　the　proprietors　of　land　only　stewards　to　the　public；
must　not　necessity　force　them　to　practise　all　the　arts　of
oppression　used　by　stewards；　where　the　absence　or　negligence　of
the　proprietor　render　them　secure　against　enquiry？
　　　　It　will　scarcely　be　asserted；　that　no　bounds　ought　ever　to　be
set　to　national　debts；　and　that　the　public　would　be　no　weaker；
were　twelve　or　fifteen　shillings　in　the　pound；　land…tax；
mortgaged；　with　all　the　present　customs　and　excises。　There　is
something；　therefore；　in　the　case；　beside　the　mere　transferring
of　property　from　the　one　hand　to　another。　In　500　years；　the
posterity　of　those　now　in　the　coaches；　and　of　those　upon　the
boxes；　will　probably　have　changed　places；　without　affecting　the
public　by　these　revolutions。
　　　　Suppose　the　public　once　fairly　brought　to　that　condition；　to
which　it　is　hastening　with　such　amazing　rapidity；　suppose　the
land　to　be　taxed　eighteen　or　nineteen　shillings　in　the　pound；　for
it　can　never　bear　the　whole　twenty；　suppose　all　the　excises　and
customs　to　be　screwed　up　to　the　utmost　which　the　nation　can　bear；
without　entirely　losing　its　commerce　and　industry；　and　suppose
that　all　those　funds　are　mortgaged　to　perpetuity；　and　that　the
invention　and　wit　of　all　our　projectors　can　find　no　new
imposition；　which　may　serve　as　the　foundation　of　a　new　loan；　and
let　us　consider　the　necessary　consequences　of　this　situation。
Though　the　imperfect　state　of　our　political　knowledge；　and　the
narrow　capacities　of　men；　make　it　difficult　to　fortel　the　effects
which　will　result　from　any　untried　measure；　the　seeds　of　ruin　are
here　scattered　with　such　profusion　as　not　to　escape　the　eye　of
the　most　careless　observer。
　　　　In　this　unnatural　state　of　society；　the　only　persons；　who
possess　any　revenue　beyond　the　immediate　effects　of　their
industry；　are　the　stock…holders；　who　draw　almost　all　the　rent　of
the　land　and　houses；　besides　the　produce　of　all　the　customs　and
excises。　These　are　men；　who　have　no　connexions　with　the　state；
who　can　enjoy　their　revenue　in　any　part　of　the　globe　in　which
they　chuse　to　reside；　who　will　naturally　bury　themselves　in　the
capital　or　in　great　cities；　and　who　will　sink　into　the　lethargy
of　a　stupid　and　pampered　luxury；　without　spirit；　ambition；　or
enjoyment。　Adieu　to　all　ideas　of　nobility；　gentry；　and　family。
The　stocks　can　be　transferred　in　an　instant；　and　being　in　such　a
fluctuating　state；　will　seldom　be　transmitted　during　three
generations　from　father　to　son。　Or　were　they　to　remain　ever　so
long　in　one　family；　they　convey　no　hereditary　authority　or　credit
to　the　possessor；　and　by　this　means；　the　several　ranks　of　men；
which　form　a　kind　of　independent　magistracy　in　a　state；
instituted　by　the　hand　of　nature；　are　entirely　lost；　and　every
man　in　authority　derives　his　influence　from　the　commission　alone
of　the　sovereign。　No　expedient　remains　for　preventing　or
suppressing　insurrections；　but　mercenary　armies：　No　expedient　at
all　remains　for　resisting　tyranny。　Elections　are　swayed　by
bribery　and　corruption　alone：　And　the　middle　power　between　king
and　people　being　totally　removed；　a　grievous　despotism　must
infallibly　prevail。　The　landholders；　despised　for　their　poverty；
and　hated　for　their　oppressions；　will　be　utterly　unable　to　make
any　opposition　to　it。
　　　　Though　a　resolution　should　be　formed　by　the　legislature　never
to　impose　any　tax　which　hurts　commerce　and　discourages　industry；
it　will　be　impossible　for　men；　in　subjects　of　such　extreme
delicacy；　to　reason　so　justly　as　never　to　be　mistaken；　or　amidst
difficulties　so　urgent；　never　to　be　seduced　from　their
resolution。　The　continual　fluctuations　in　commerce　require
continual　alterations　in　the　nature　of　the　taxes；　which　exposes
the　legislature　every　moment　to　the　danger　both　of　wilful　and
involuntary　error。　And　any　great　blow　given　to　trade；　whether　by
injudicious　taxes　or　by　other　accidents；　throws　the　whole　system
of　government　into　confusion。
　　　　But　what　expedient　can　the　public　now　employ；　even　supposing
trade　to　continue　in　the　most　flourishing　condition；　in　order　to
support　its　foreign　wars　and　enterprizes；　and　to　defend　its　own
honour　and　interests；　or　those　of　its　allies？　I　do　not　ask　how
the　public　is　to　exert　such　a　prodigious　power　as　it　has
maintained　during　our　late　wars；　where　we　have　so　much　exceeded；
not　only　our　own　natural　strength；　but　even　that　of　the　greatest
empires。　This　extravagance　is　the　abuse　complained　of；　as　the
source　of　all　the　dangers；　to　which　we　are　at　present　exposed。
But　since　we　must　still　suppose　great　commerce　and　opulence　to
remain；　even　after　every　fund　is　mortgaged；　these　riches　must　be
defended　by　proportional　power；　and　whence　is　the　public　to
derive　the　revenue　which　supports　it？　It　must　plainly　be　from　a
continual　taxation　of　the　annuitants；　or；　which　is　the　same
thing；　from　mortgaging　anew；　on　every　exigency；　a　certain　part　of
their　annuities；　and　thus　making　them　contribute　to　their　own
defence；　and　to　that　of　the　nation。　But　the　difficulties；
attending　this　system　of　policy；　will　easily　appear；　whether　we
suppose　the　king　to　have　become　absolute　master；　or　to　be　still
controuled　by　national　councils；　in　which　the　annuitants
themselves　must　necessarily　bear　the　principal　sway。
　　　　If　the　prince　has　become　absolute；　as　may　naturally　be
expected　from　this　situation　of　affairs；　it　is　so　easy　for　him　to
encrease　his　exactions　upon　the　annuitants；　which　amount　only　to
the　retaining　money　in　his　own　hands；　that　this　species　of
property　would　soon　lose　all　its　credit；　and　the　whole　income　of
every　individual　in　the　state　must　lie　entirely　at　the　mercy　of
the　sovereign：　A　degree　of　despotism；　which　no　oriental　monarchy
has　ever　yet　attained。　If；　on　the　contrary；　the　consent　of　the
annuitants　be　requisite　for　every　taxation；　they　will　never　be
persuaded　to　contribute　sufficiently　even　to　the　support　of
government；　as　the　diminution　of　their　revenue　must　in　that　case
be　very　sensible；　would　not　be　disguised　under　the　appearance　of
a　branch　of　excise　or　customs；　and　would　not　be