shorter logic-第44节

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discoverable　in　the　Ground；　and；　with　a　higher　truth；　in　the　Notion。　Even　the
word　Absolute　is　often　used　to　mean　more　than　'abstract'。　Absolute　space　and
absolute　time；　for　example；　is　another　way　of　saying　abstract　space　and　abstract
time。　

When　the　principles　of　Essence　are　taken　as　essential　principles　of　thought　they
become　predicates　of　a　presupposed　subject；　which；　because　they　are　essential；　is
'everything'。　The　propositions　thus　arising　have　been　stated　as　universal　Laws　of
Thought。　Thus　the　first　of　them；　the　maxim　of　Identity；　reads：　Everything　is
identical　with　itself；　A　=　A：　and　negatively；　A　cannot　at　the　same　time　be　A　and
Not…A。　This　maxim；　instead　of　being　a　true　law　of　thought；　is　nothing　but　the　law
of　abstract　understanding。　The　propositional　form　itself　contradicts　it：　for　a
proposition　always　promises　a　distinction　between　subject　and　predicate；　while
the　present　one　does　not　fulfil　what　its　form　requires。　But　the　Law　is　particularly
set　aside　by　the　following　so…called　Laws　of　Thought；　which　make　laws　out　of　its
opposite。　It　is　asserted　that　the　maxim　of　Identity；　though　it　cannot　be　proved；
regulates　the　procedure　of　every　consciousness；　and　that　experience　shows　it　to
be　accepted　as　soon　as　its　terms　are　apprehended。　To　this　alleged　experience　of
the　logic　books　may　be　opposed　the　universal　experience　that　no　mind　thinks　or
forms　conceptions　or　speaks　in　accordance　with　this　law；　and　that　no　existence　of
any　kind　whatever　conforms　to　it。　

Utterances　after　the　fashion　of　this　pretended　law　（A　planet　is　a　planet；　Magnetism　is　magnetism；
Mind　is　Mind）　are；　as　they　deserve　to　be；　reputed　silly。　That　is　certainly　a　matter　of　general
experience。　The　logic　which　seriously　propounds　such　laws　and　the　scholastic　world　in　which
alone　they　are　valid　have　long　been　discredited　with　practical　common　sense　as　well　as　with　the
philosophy　of　reason。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　115n

Identity　is；　in　the　first　place；　the　repetition　of　what　we　had　earlier　as　Being；　but　as　become；　through
supersession　of　its　character　of　immediateness。　It　is　therefore　Being　as　Ideality。　It　is　important　to
come　to　a　proper　understanding　on　the　true　meaning　of　Identity；　and；　for　that　purpose；　we　must
especially　guard　against　taking　it　as　abstract　identity；　to　the　exclusion　of　all　Difference。　That　is　the
touchstone　for　distinguishing　all　bad　philosophy　from　what　alone　deserves　the　name　of　philosophy。
Identity　in　its　truth；　as　an　Ideality　of　what　immediately　is；　is　a　high　category　for　our　religious　modes
of　mind　as　well　as　all　other　forms　of　thought　and　mental　activity。　The　true　knowledge　of　God；　it
may　be　said；　begins　when　we　know　him　as　identity　…　as　absolute　identity。　To　know　so　much　is　to
see　all　the　power　and　glory　of　the　world　sinks　into　nothing　in　God's　presence；　and　subsists　only　as
the　reflection　of　his　power　and　his　glory。　In　the　same　way；　Identity；　as　self…consciousness；　is　what
distinguishes　man　from　nature；　particularly　from　the　brutes　which　never　reach　the　point　of
comprehending　themselves　as　'I'；　that　is；　pure　self…contained　unity。　So　again；　in　connection　with
thought；　the　main　thing　is　not　to　confuse　the　true　Identity；　which　contains　Being　and　its
characteristics　ideally　transfigured　in　it；　with　an　abstract　Identity；　identity　of　bare　form。　All　the
charges　of　narrowness；　hardness；　meaninglessness；　which　are　so　often　directed　against　thought
from　the　quarter　of　feeling　and　immediate　perception　rest　on　the　perverse　assumption　that　thought
acts　only　as　a　faculty　of　abstract　Identification。　The　Formal　Logic　itself　confirms　this　assumption　by
laying　down　the　supreme　law　of　thought　（so…called）　which　has　been　discussed　above。　If　thinking
were　no　more　than　an　abstract　Identity；　we　could　not　but　own　it　to　be　a　most　futile　and　tedious
business。　No　doubt　the　notion；　and　the　idea　too；　are　identical　with　themselves：　but　identical　only　in
so　far　as　they　at　the　same　time　involve　distinction。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　（ii）　Difference
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　116
Essence　is　mere　Identity　and　reflection　in　itself　only　as　it　is　self…relating　negativity；
and　in　that　way　self…repulsion。　It　contains　therefore　essentially　the　characteristic
of　Difference。　

Other…being　is　here　no　longer　qualitative；　taking　the　shape　of　the　character　or
limit。　It　is　now　in　essence；　in　self…relating　essence；　and　therefore　the　negation　is　at
the　same　time　a　relation　…　is；　in　short；　Distinction；　Relativity；　Mediation。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　116n
To　ask　'How　Identity　comes　to　Difference'　assumes　that　Identity　as　mere　abstract　Identity　is
something　of　itself；　and　Difference　also　something　else　equally　independent。　This　supposition
renders　an　answer　to　the　question　impossible。　If　Identity　is　viewed　as　diverse　from　Difference；　all
that　we　have　in　this　way　is　but　Difference；　and　hence　we　cannot　demonstrate　the　advance　to
difference；　because　the　person　who　asks　for　the　How　of　the　progress　thereby　implies　that　for　him
the　starting…point　is　non…existent。　The　question　then　when　put　to　the　test　has　obviously　no　meaning；
and　its　proposer　may　be　met　with　the　question　what　he　means　by　Identity；　whereupon　we　should
soon　see　that　he　attaches　no　idea　to　it　at　all；　and　that　Identity　is　for　him　an　empty　name。　As　we
have　seen；　besides；　Identity　is　undoubtedly　a　negative　…　not　however　an　abstract　empty　Nought；
but　the　negation　of　Being　and　its　characteristics。　Being　so；　Identity　is　at　the　same　time　self…relation；
and；　what　is　more；　negative　self…relation；　in　other　words；　it　draws　a　distinction　between　it　and
itself。　



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Diversity
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　117
Difference　is　first　of　all　（1）　immediate　difference；　i。e。　Diversity　or　Variety。　In
Diversity　the　different　things　are　each　individually　what　they　are；　and　unaffected
by　the　relation　in　which　they　stand　to　each　other。　This　relation　is　therefore
external　to　them。　In　consequence　of　the　various　things　being　thus　indifferent　to
the　difference　between　them；　it　falls　outside　them　into　a　third　thing；　the　agent　of
Comparison。　This　external　difference；　as　an　identity　of　the　objects　related；　is
Likeness；　as　a　non…identity　of　them；　is　Unlikeness。　

The　gap　which　understanding　allows　to　divide　these　characteristics　is　so　great　that
although　comparison　has　one　and　the　same　substratum　for　likeness　and
unlikeness；　which　are　explained　to　be　different　aspects　and　points　of　view　in　it；
still　likeness　by　itself　is　the　first　of　the　elements　alone；　viz。；　identity；　and
unlikeness　by　itself　is　difference。　

Diversity　has；　like　Identity；　been　transformed　into　a　maxim：　'Everything　is　various
or　different'：　or　'There　are　no　two　things　completely　like　each　other'。　Here
Everything　is　put　under　a　predicate；　which　is　the　reverse　of　the　identity　attributed
to　it　in　the　first　maxim：　and　therefore　under　a　law　contradicting　the　first。
However；　there　is　an　explanation。　As　the　diversity　is　supposed　due　only　to
external　circumstances；　anything　taken　per　se　is　expected　and　understood　always
to　be　identical　with　itself；　so　that　the　second　law　need　not　interfere　with　the　first。
But；　in　that　case；　variety　does　not　belong　to　the　something　or　everything　in
question：　it　constitutes　no　intrinsic　characteristic　of　the　subject：　and　the　second
maxim　on　this　showing　does　not　admit　of　being　stated　at　all。　If；　on　the　other　hand；
the　something　itself　is；　as　the　maxim　says；　diverse；　it　must　be　in　virtue　of　its　own
proper　character：　but　in　this　case　the　specific　difference；　and　not　variety　as　such；
is　what　is　intended。　And　this　is　the　meaning　of　the　maxim　of　Leibnitz。　

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　§　117n
When　understanding　sets　itself　to　study　Identity；　it　has　already　passed　beyond　it；　and　is　looking　at
Difference　in　the　shape　of　bare　Variety。　If　we　follow　the　so…called　law　of　Identity；　and　say；　The
sea　is　the　sea；　The　air　is　the　air；　The　moon　is　the　moon；　these　objects　pass　for　having　no　bearing
on　one　another。　What　we　have　before　us　therefore　is　not　Identity；　but　Difference。　We　do　not　stop
at　this　point；　however；　or　regard　things　merely　as　different。　We　compare　them　one　with　another；
and　then　discover　the　features　of　likeness　and　unlikeness。　The　work　of　the　finite　sciences　lies　to　a
great　extent　in　the　application　of　these　categories；　and　the　phrase　'scientific　treatment'　generally
means　no　more　than　the　method　which　has　for　its　aim　comparison　of　the　objects　under
examination。　This　method　has　undoubtedly　led　to　some　important　results；　we　may　particularly
mention　the　great　advance　of　modern　times　in　the　provinces　of　comparative　anatomy　and
comparative　linguistics。　But　it　is　going　too　far　to　suppose　that　the　comparative　method　can　be
employed　with　equal　success　in　all　branches　of　knowledge。　Not　…　and　this　must　be　emphasised　…
can　mere　comparison　ever　ultimately　satisfy　the　requirements　of　science。　Its　results　are　indeed
indispensable；　but　they　are　still　labours　only　preliminary　to　truly　intelligent　cognition。　

If　it　be　the　office　of　comparison　to　reduce　existing　differences　to　Identity；　the　science　which　most
perfectly　fulfils　that　end　is　mathematics。　The　reason　of　that　is　tha