the six enneads-第103节
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a thing of quantity and extension； the sensible object will coincide with it point by point of their co…expansion so that any given point in the faculty will perceive solely what coincides with it in the object： and thus nothing in us could perceive any thing as a whole。 This cannot be： the faculty entire must be a unity； no such dividing is possible； this is no matter in which we can think of equal sections coinciding； the centre of consciousness has no such relation of equality with any sensible object。 The only possible ratio of divisibility would be that of the number of diverse elements in the impinging sensation： are we then to suppose that each part of the soul； and every part of each part； will have perception？ Or will the part of the parts have none？ That is impossible： every part； then； has perception； the ＇hypothetical＇ magnitude； of soul and each part of soul； is infinitely divisible； there will therefore be in each part an infinite number of perceptions of the object； and therefore an infinitude of representations of it at our centre of consciousness。 If the sentient be a material entity sensation could only be of the order of seal…impressions struck by a ring on wax； in this case by sensible objects on the blood or on the intervenient air。 If； at this； the impression is like one made in liquids… as would be reasonable… it will be confused and wavering as upon water； and there can be no memory。 If the impressions are permanent； then either no fresh ones can be stamped upon the occupied ground… and there can be no change of sensations… or； others being made； the former will be obliterated； and all record of the past is done away with。 If memory implies fresh sensations imposed upon former ones； the earlier not barring their way； the soul cannot be a material entity。 7。 We come to the same result by examining the sense of pain。 We say there is pain in the finger： the trouble is doubtless in the finger； but our opponents must admit that the sensation of the pain is in the centre of consciousness。 The suffering member is one thing； the sense of suffering is another： how does this happen？ By transmission； they will say： the psychic pneuma ＇= the semi…material principle of life＇ stationed at the finger suffers first； and stage by stage the trouble is passed on until at last it reaches the centre of consciousness。 But on this theory； there must be a sensation in the spot first suffering pain； and another sensation at a second point of the line of transmission； another in the third and so on； many sensations； in fact an unlimited series； to deal with one pain； and at the last moment the centre of consciousness has the sensation of all these sensations and of its own sensation to boot。 Or to be exact； these serial sensations will not be of the pain in the finger： the sensation next in succession to the suffering finger will be of pain at the joint； a third will tell of a pain still higher up： there will be a series of separate pains： The centre of consciousness will not feel the pain seated at the finger； but only that impinging upon itself： it will know this alone； ignore the rest and so have no notion that the finger is in pain。 Thus： Transmission would not give sensation of the actual condition at the affected spot： it is not in the nature of body that where one part suffers there should be knowledge in another part； for body is a magnitude； and the parts of every magnitude are distinct parts； therefore we need； as the sentient； something of a nature to be identical to itself at any and every spot； this property can belong only to some other form of being than body。 8。 It can be shown also that the intellectual act would similarly be impossible if the soul were any form of body。 If sensation is apprehension by means of the soul's employment of the body； intellection cannot be a similar use of the body or it would be identical with sensation。 If then intellection is apprehension apart from body； much more must there be a distinction between the body and the intellective principle： sensation for objects of sense； intellection for the intellectual object。 And even if this be rejected； it must still be admitted that there do exist intellections of intellectual objects and perceptions of objects not possessing magnitude： how； we may then ask； can a thing of magnitude know a thing that has no magnitude； or how can the partless be known by means of what has parts？ We will be told 〃By some partless part。〃 But； at this； the intellective will not be body： for contact does not need a whole； one point suffices。 If then it be conceded… and it cannot be denied… that the primal intellections deal with objects completely incorporeal； the principle of intellection itself must know by virtue of being； or becoming； free from body。 Even if they hold that all intellection deals with the ideal forms in Matter； still it always takes place by abstraction from the bodies ＇in which these forms appear＇ and the separating agent is the Intellectual…Principle。 For assuredly the process by which we abstract circle； triangle； line or point； is not carried through by the aid of flesh or Matter of any kind； in all such acts the soul or mind must separate itself from the material： at once we see that it cannot be itself material。 Similarly it will be agreed that； as beauty and justice are things without magnitude； so must be the intellective act that grasps them。 When such non…magnitudes come before the soul； it receives them by means of its partless phase and they will take position there in partless wise。 Again： if the Soul is a body； how can we account for its virtues… moral excellence ＇Sophrosyne＇； justice； courage and so forth？ All these could be only some kind of rarefied body ＇pneuma＇； or blood in some form； or we might see courage as a certain resisting power in that pneuma； moral quality would be its happy blending； beauty would lie wholly in the agreeable form of impressions received； such comeliness as leads us to describe people as attractive and beautiful from their bodily appearance。 No doubt strength and grace of form go well enough with the idea of rarefied body； but what can this rarefied body want with moral excellence？ On the contrary its interest would lie in being comfortable in its environments and contacts； in being warmed or pleasantly cool； in bringing everything smooth and caressing and soft around it： what could it care about a just distribution？ Then consider the objects of the soul's contemplation； virtue and the other Intellectual forms with which it is occupied； are these eternal or are we to think that virtue rises here or there； helps； then perishes？ These things must have an author and a source and there； again； we are confronted by something perdurable： the soul's contemplation； then； must be of the eternal and unchanging； like the concepts of geometry： if eternal and unchanging； these objects are not bodies： and that which is to receive them must be of equivalent nature： it cannot therefore be body； since all body…nature lacks permanence； is a thing of flux。 8。 A。 ＇sometimes appearing as 9＇ There are those who insist on the activities observed in bodies… warming； chilling； thrusting； pressing… and class soul with body； as it were to assure its efficacy。 This ignores the double fact that the very bodies themselves exercise such efficiency by means of the incorporeal powers operating in them； and that these are not the powers we attribute to soul： intellection； perception； reasoning； desire； wise and effective action in all regards； these point to a very different form of being。 In transferring to bodies the powers of the unembodied； this school leaves nothing to that higher order。 And yet that it is precisely in virtue of bodiless powers that bodies possess their efficiency is clear from certain reflections： It will be admitted that quality and quantity are two different things； that body is always a thing of quantity but not always a thing of quality： matter is not qualified。 This admitted； it will not be denied that quality； being a different thing from quantity； is a different thing from body。 Obviously quality could not be body when it has not quantity as all body must； and； again； as we have said； body； any thing of mass； on being reduced to fragments； ceases to be what it was； but the quality it possessed remains intact in every particle… for instance the sweetness of honey is still sweetness in each speck… this shows that sweetness and all other qualities are not body。 Further： if the powers in question were bodies； then necessarily the stronger powers would be large masses and those less efficient small masses： but if there are large masses with small while not a few of the smaller masses manifest great powers； then the efficiency must be vested in something other than magnitude； efficacy； thus； belongs to non…magnitude。 Again； Matter； they tell us； remains unchanged as long as it is body； but produces variety upon accepting qualities； is not this proof enough that the entrants ＇with whose arrival the changes happen＇ are Reason…Principles and not of the bodily order？ They must not remind us that when pneuma and blood are no longer present； animals die：
