criminal psychology-第70节
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idness。 Maudsley believes the first question difficult to answer。 He leans on Darwin； who points out that musicians play as quickly as they can apprehend the notes。 The question will affect the lawyer in so far as it is necessary to determine whether； after some time； an image of an event may ensue from which it is possible to infer back to the individuality of the witness。 No other example can be used here； because on the rocky problem of the occurrence of images are shattered even the regulative arts of most modern psychophysics。
The second problem is of greater significance。 Whether any practical use of its solution can be made； I can not say； but it urges consideration。 Exner has observed that the uniform vividness of an image lasts hardly a second。 The image as a whole does not disappear in this time； but its content endures unchanged for so long at most。 Then it fades in waves。 The correctness of this description may be tested by anybody。 But I should like to add that my observations of my own images indicate that in the course of a progressive repetition of the recall of an image its content is not equally capable of reproduction。 I believe； further； that no essential leaps occur in this alteration of the content of an idea； but that the alteration moves in some definite direction。 If； then； I recall the idea of some object successively； I will imagine it not at one time bigger； then smaller； then again bigger； etc。； on the contrary； the series of images will be such that each new image will be either progressively bigger or progressively smaller。
If this observation of mine is correct and the phenomenon is not purely personal； Exner's description becomes of great value in examination； which because of its length； requires the repeated recall of standardizing images； and this in its turn causes an alteration in the ideational content。 We frequently observe that a witness persuades himself into the belief of some definite idea in the course of his examination； inasmuch as with regard to some matter he says more and more definite things at the end than at the beginning。 This may possibly be contingent on the alteration of frequently recalled ideas。 One could make use of the process which is involved in the reproduction of the idea； by implying it； and so not being compelled to return endlessly to something already explained。
How other people construct their ideas； we do not； as we have seen； know； and the difficulty of apprehending the ideas or images of other people； many authorities clearly indicate。＇1＇
＇1＇ Cf。 Ncke in Gross's Archiv VII； 340。
Topic 4。 INTELLECTUAL PROCESSES。
Section 46。 （a） General Considerations。
Lichtenberg said somewhere； ‘‘I used to know people of great scholarship； in whose head the most important propositions were folded up in excellent order。 But I don't know what occurred there； whether the ideas were all mannikins or all little women there were no results。 In one corner of the head； these gentlemen put away saltpeter； in another sulphur； in a third charcoal； but these did not combine into gunpowder。 Then again； there are people in whose heads everything seeks out and finds everything else； everything pairs off with everything else； and arranges itself variously。'' What Lichtenberg is trying to do is to indicate that the cause of the happy condition of the last…named friends is imagination。 That imagination is influential； is certain； but it is equally certain that the human understanding is so different with different people as to permit such phenomena as Lichtenberg describes。 I do not want to discuss the quantity of understanding。 I shall deal； this time； with its quality； by means of which the variety of its uses may be explained。 It would be a mistake to think of the understanding as capable of assuming different forms。 If it were it would be possible to construct from the concept understanding a group of different powers whose common quality would come to us off… hand。 But with regard to understanding we may speak only of more or less and we must think of the difference in effect in terms only of the difference of the forms of its application。 We see the effects of the understanding alone； not the understanding itself； and however various a burning city； cast iron； a burn； and steaming water may be； we recognize that in spite of the difference of effect； the same fire has brought about all these results。 The difference in the uses of the understanding； therefore； lies in the manner of its application。 Hence these applications will help us； when we know them； to judge the value of what they offer us。 The first question that arises when we are dealing with an important witness who has made observations and inferences； is this： ‘‘How intelligent is he？ and what use does he make of his intelligence？ That is； What are his processes of reasoning？''
I heard； from an old diplomat； whose historic name is as significant as his experience； that he made use of a specific means to discover what kind of mind a person had。 He used to tell his subjects the following story： ‘‘A gentleman； carrying a small peculiarly…formed casket； entered a steam car； where an obtrusive commercial traveler asked him at once what was contained in the casket。 ‘My Mungo is inside！' ‘Mungo？ What is that？' ‘Well； you know that I suffer from delirium tremens； and when I see the frightful images and figures； I let my Mungo out and he eats them up。' ‘But； sir； these images and figures do not really exist。' ‘Of course they don't really exist； but my Mungo doesn't really exist； either； so it's all right！' ''
The old gentleman asserted that he could judge of the intelligence of his interlocutor by the manner in which the latter received this story。
Of course it is impossible to tell every important witness the story of Mungo； but something similar may be made use of which could be sought out of the material in the case。 Whoever has anything worthy the name of practice will then be able to judge the manner of the witness's approach； and especially the degree of intelligence he possesses。 The mistake must not be made； however； that this requires splendid deductions； it is best to stick to simple facts。 Goethe's golden word is still true： ‘‘The greatest thing is to understand that all fact is theory 。 。 。 do not look behind phenomena； they are themselves the doctrine。'' We start； therefore； with some simple fact which has arisen in the case and try to discover what the witness will do with it。 It is not difficult； you may know a thing badly in a hundred ways； but you know it well in only one way。 If the witness handles the fact properly； we may trust him。 We learn； moreover； from this handling how far the man may be objective。 His perception as witness means to him only an experience； and the human mind may not collect experiences without； at the same time； weaving its speculations into them。 But though everyone does this； he does it according to his nature and nurture。 There is little that is as significant as the manner； the intensity； and the direction in and with which a witness introduces his speculation into the story of his experience。 Whole sweeps of human character may show themselves up with one such little explanation。 It is for this reason that Kant called the human understanding architectonic； it aims to bring together all its knowledge under one single system； and this according to fixed rules and systems defined by the needs of ordinary mortals。 Only the genius has； like nature； his own unknown system。 And we do not need to count on this rarest of exceptions。
The people who constitute our most complicated problems are the average； and insignificant members of the human race。 Hume cited the prophet Alexander quite justly。 Alexander was a wise prophet； who selected Paphlagonis as the first scene of his deception because the people there were extraordinarily foolish and swallowed with pleasure the coarsest of swindles。 They had heard earlier of the genuineness and power of the prophet； and the smart ones laughed at him； the fools believed and spread his faith； his cause got adherents even among educated people； and finally Marcus Aurelius himself paid the matter so much attention as to rest the success of a military enterprise on a prophecy of Alexander's。 Tacitus narrates how Vespasian cured a blind man by spitting on him； and the story is repeated by Suetonius。
We must never forget that； however great a foolishness may be； there is always somebody to commit it。 It is Hume； again； I think； who so excellently describes what happens when some inconceivable story is told to uncritical auditors。 Their credulity increases the narrator's shamelessness； his shamelessness convinces their credulity。 Thinking for yourself is a rare thing； and the more one is involved with other people in matters of importance； the more one is convinced of the rarity。 And yet； so little is demanded in thinking。 ‘‘To abstract the red of blood from the collective impression； to discover the same concept in different things； to bring together under the same notion blood and beer； milk and snow；animals do not do this； it is thinking。''＇1＇ I might suggest that in the first place； various an
