criminal psychology-第65节
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sitions occur and it is very hard then to localize a blow or stab。 So； too； when an arm is held backward in such a way as to turn the flat of the hand uppermost。 It is still more difficult to locate a wound when one part of the body is held by another person and the skin pulled aside。
2。 The sensation of wetness is composed of that of cold and easy movement over surface。 Hence； when we touch without warning a cold smooth piece of metal； we think that we are touching something wet。 But the converse is true for we believe that we are touching something cold and smooth when it is only wet。 Hence the numerous mistakes about bleeding after wounds。 The wounded man or his companions believe that they have felt blood when they have only felt some smooth metal； or they have really felt blood and have taken it for something smooth and cold。 Mistakes about whether there was blood or not have led to frequent confusion。
3。 Repetition； and hence summation； intensifies and clarifies the sensation of touch。 As a consequence； whenever we want to test anything by touching it we do so repeatedly； drawing the finger up and down and holding the object between the fingers； for the same reason we repeatedly feel objects with pleasant exteriors。 We like to move our hands up and down smooth or soft furry surfaces； in order to sense them more clearly； or to make the sensation different because of its duration and continuance。 Hence it is important； every time something has to be determined through touch； to ask whether the touch occurred once only or was repeated。 The relation is not the same in this case as between a hasty glance and accurate survey； for in touching； essential differences may appear。
4。 It is very difficult to determine merely by touch whether a thing is straight or crooked； flat； convex or concave。 Weber has shown that a glass plate drawn before the finger in such wise as to be held weakly at first； then more powerfully； then again more powerfully seems to be convex and when the reverse is done； concave。 Flatness is given when the distance is kept constant。
5。 According to Vierordt；＇1＇ the motion of a point at a constant rate over a sizable piece of skin； e。 g。； the back of the hand from the wrist to the finger tips； gives； if not looked at； the definite impression of increasing rapidity。 In the opposite direction； the definiteness is less but increases with the extent of skin covered。 This indicates that mistakes may be made in such wounds as cuts； scratches； etc。
＇1＇ K。 Vierordt： Der Zeitsinn nach Versuchen。 Tbingen 1868。
6。 The problem may arise of the reliability of impressions of habitual pressure。 Weber made the earliest experiments； later verified by Fechner； showing that the sensation of weight differs a great deal on different portions of the skin。 The most sensitive are the forehead； the temples； the eyelids； the inside of the forearm。 The most insensitive are the lips； the trunk and the finger…nails。 If piles of six silver dollars are laid on various parts of the body； and then removed； one at a time； the differences are variously felt。 In order to notice a removal the following number must be taken away：
One dollar from the top of the finger；
One dollar from the sole of the foot；
Two dollars from the flat of the hand；
Two dollars from the shoulder blade；
Three dollars from the heel；
Four dollars from the back of the head；
Four dollars from the breast；
Five dollars from the middle of the back；
Five dollars from the abdomen。
Further examinations have revealed nothing new。 Successful experiments to determine differences between men and women； educated and uneducated； in the acuteness of the sense of pressure； have not been made。 The facts they involve may be of use in cases of assault； choking； etc。
Topic 2。 PERCEPTION AND CONCEPTION。
Section 44。
What lawyers have to consider in the transition from purely sensory impressions to intellectual conceptions of these impressions； is the possibility of later reproducing any observed object or event。 Many so…called scientific distinctions have； under the impulse of scientific psychology； lost their status。 Modern psychology does not see sharply…drawn boundaries between perception and memory； and suggests that the proper solution of the problem of perception is the solution of the problem of knowledge。＇1＇
＇1＇ The first paragraph； pp。 78…79； is omitted in the translation。
With regard to the relation of consciousness to perception we will make the distinctions made by Fischer。＇2＇ There are two spheres or regions of consciousness： the region of sensation； and of external perception。 The former involves the inner structure of the organism； the latter passes from the organism into the objective world。 Consciousness has a sphere of action in which it deals with the external world by means of the motor nerves and muscles； and a sphere of perception which is the business of the senses。
＇2＇ E。 L。 Fischer： Theorie der Gesichtswahrnehmung。 Mainz 1891。
External perception involves three principal functions： apprehension； differentiation； and combination。 Perception in the narrower sense of the term is the simple sensory conscious apprehension of some present object stimulating our eyes。 We discover by means of it what the object is； its relation to ourselves and other things； its distance from us； its name； etc。
What succeeds this apprehension is the most important thing for us lawyers； i。 e。 _*recognition_。 Recognition indicates only that an object has sufficiently impressed a mind to keep it known and identifiable。 It is indifferent what the nature of the recognized object is。 According to Hume the object may be an enduring thing （‘‘non… interrupted and non…dependent on mind''）； or it may be identical with perception itself。 In the latter case the perception is considered as a logical judgment like the judgment： ‘‘It is raining；'' or the feeling that ‘‘it is raining；'' and there recognition is only the recognition of a perception。 Now judgments of this sort are what we get from witnesses； and what we have to examine and evaluate。 This must be done from two points of view。 First； from the point of view of the observer and collector of instances who is seeking to discover the principle which governs them。 If this is not done the deductions that we make are at least unreliable； and in most cases； false。 As Mach says； ‘‘If once observation has determined all the facts of any natural science； a new period begins for that science； the period of deduction。'' But how often do we lawyers distinguish these two periods in our own work。＇1＇
＇1＇ A sentence is here omitted。
The second point of importance is the presence of mistakes in the observations。 The essential mistakes are classified by Schiel under two headings。 Mistakes in observation are positive or negative； wrong observation or oversight。 The latter occurs largely through preconceived opinions。 The opponents of Copernicus concluded that the earth did not move because otherwise a stone dropped from the top of a tower would reach the ground a little to the west。 If the adherents of Copernicus had made the experiment they would have discovered that the stone does fall as the theory requires。 Similar oversights occur in the lawyer's work hundreds of times。 We are impressed with exceptions that are made by others or by ourselves； and give up some already tried approach without actually testing the truth of the exception which challenges it。 I have frequently； while at work； thought of the story of some one of the Georges； who did not like scholars and set the following problem to a number of philosophers and physicists： ‘‘When I put a ten pound stone into a hundred pound barrel of water the whole weighs a hundred and ten pounds； but when I put a live fish of ten pounds into the barrel the whole still weighs only a hundred pounds？'' Each one of the scholars had his own convincing explanation； until finally the king asked one of the foot…men； who said that he would like to see the experiment tried before he made up his mind。 I remember a case in which a peasant was accused of having committed arson for the sake of the insurance。 He asserted that he had gone into a room with a candle and that a long spider's web which was hanging down had caught fire from it accidentally and had inflamed the straw which hung from the roof。 So the catastrophe had occurred。 Only in the second examination did it occur to anybody to ask whether spider's web can burn at all； and the first experiment showed that that was impossible。
Most experiences of this kind indicate that in recognizing events we must proceed slowly； without leaping； and that we may construct our notions only on the basis of knowledge we already possess。 Saint Thomas says； ‘‘Omnes cognitio fit secundum similitudinem cogniti in cognoscente。'' If this bit of wisdom were kept in mind in the examination of witnesses it would be an easier and simpler task than usual。 Only when the unknown is connected with the known is it possible to understand the former。 If it is not done the witness will hardly be able to answer。 He nowhere finds support； or he seeks one of his own； and naturally finds th
