criminal psychology-第55节

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e　consideration　of　motives　with　regard　to　education；　earlier　life；　etc。；　in　their　relation　to　sentencing。　Only　when　statistics　will　be　made　to　deal　actually　and　in　every　direction　with　qualities　and　not　merely　with　quantities　will　they　begin　to　have　a　really　scientific　value。


Topic　II。　KNOWLEDGE。　Section　34。

Criminal　law；　like　all　other　disciplines；　must　ask　under　what　conditions　and　when　we　are　entitled　to　say　‘‘we　know。''　The　answer　is　far　from　being　perennially　identical；　though　it　might　have　been　expected　that　the　conviction　of　knowledge　would　be　ever　united　with　identical　conditions。　The　strange　and　significant　difference　is　determined　by　the　question　whether　the　verdict；　‘‘we　know；''　will　or　will　not　have　practical　consequences。　When　we　discuss　some　question　like　the　place　of　a　certain　battle；　the　temperature　of　the　moon；　or　the　appearance　of　a　certain　animal　in　the　Pliocene；　we　first　assume　that　there　_*is_　a　true　answer；　reasons　for　and　against　will　appear；　the　former　increase　in　number；　and　suddenly　we　discover　in　some　book　the　assurance　that；　‘‘We　know　the　fact。''　That　assurance　passes　into　so　and　so　many　other　books；　and　if　it　is　untrue；　no　essential　harm　can　be　done。

But　when　science　is　trying　to　determine　the　quality　of　some　substance；　the　therapeutic　efficiency　of　some　poison；　the　possibilities　of　some　medium　of　communication；　the　applicability　of　some　great　national　economic　principle　like　free　trade；　then　it　takes　much　more　time　to　announce；　‘‘We　know　that　this　is　so　and　not　otherwise。''　In　this　case　one　sees　clearly　that　tremendous　consequences　follow　on　the　practical　interpretation　of　‘‘we　know；''　and　therefore　there　is　in　these　cases　quite　a　different　taxation　of　knowledge　from　that　in　cases　where　the　practical　consequences　are　comparatively　negligible。　

Our　work　is　obviously　one　of　concrete　practical　consequences。　It　contains；　moreover；　conditions　that　make　imperfect　knowledge　equivalent　to　complete　ignorance；　for　in　delivering　sentence　every　‘‘no''　may　each　time　mean；　‘‘We　know　that　he　has　not　done　it''　or　again；　‘‘We　know　that　it　is　not　altogether　certain　that　he　has　done　it。''　Our　knowledge　in　such　cases　is　limited　to　the　recognition　of　the　confusion　of　the　subject；　and　knowledge　in　its　widest　sense　is　the　consciousness　of　some　definite　content；　in　this　case；　confusion。　Here；　as　everywhere；　knowledge　is　not　identical　with　truth；　knowledge　is　only　subjective　truth。　Whoever　knows；　has　reasons　for　considering　things　true　and　none　against　so　considering　them。　Here；　he　is　entitled　to　assume　that　all　who　recognize　his　knowledge　will　justify　it。　But；　when　even　everybody　justifies　his　knowledge；　it　can　be　justified　only　in　its　immediacy；　to…morrow　the　whole　affair　may　look　different。　For　this　reason　we　criminalists　assert　much　less　than　other　investigators　that　we　seek　the　truth；　if　we　presume　to　such　an　assertion；　we　should　not　have　the　institutions　of　equity；　revision；　and；　in　criminal　procedure；　retrial。　Our　knowledge；　when　named　modestly；　is　only　the　innermost　conviction　that　some　matter　is　so　and　so　according　to　human　capacity；　and　‘‘such　and　such　a　condition　of　things。''　Parenthetically；　we　agree　that　‘‘such　and　such　a　condition　of　things''　may　alter　with　every　instant　and　we　declare　ourselves　ready　to　study　the　matter　anew　if　the　conditions　change。　We　demand　material；　but　relative　truth。

One　of　the　acutest　thinkers；　J。　R。　von　Mayer；　the　discoverer　of　the　working　principle　of　‘‘conservation　of　energy；''　says；　‘‘the　most　important；　if　not　the　only　rule　for　real　natural　science　is　this：　Always　to　believe　that　it　is　our　task　to　know　the　phenomena　before　we　seek　explanation　of　higher　causes。　If　a　fact　is　once　known　in　all　its　aspects；　it　is　thereby　explained　and　the　duty　of　science　fulfilled。''　The　author　did　not　have　us　dry…souled　lawyers　in　mind　when　he　made　this　assertion；　but　we　who　modestly　seek　to　subordinate　our　discipline　to　that　of　the　correct　one　of　natural　science；　must　take　this　doctrine　absolutely　to　heart。　Every　crime　we　study　is　a　fact；　and　once　we　know　it　in　all　its　aspects　and　have　accounted　for　every　little　detail；　we　have　explained　it　and　have　done　our　duty。

But　the　word　explain　does　not　lead　us　very　far。　It　is　mainly　a　matter　of　reducing　the　mass　of　the　inexplicable　to　a　minimum　and　the　whole　to　its　simplest　terms。　If　only　we　succeed　in　this　reduction！　In　most　cases　we　substitute　for　one　well…known　term；　not　　another　still　better　one；　but　a　strange　one　which　may　mean　different　things　to　different　people。　So　again；　we　explain　one　event　by　means　of　another　more　difficult　one。　It　is　unfortunate　that　we　lawyers　are　more　than　all　others　inclined　to　make　unnecessary　explanations；　because　our　criminal　law　has　accustomed　us　to　silly　definitions　which　rarely　bring　us　closer　to　the　issue　and　which　supply　us　only　with　a　lot　of　words　difficult　to　understand　instead　of　easily　comprehensible　ones。　Hence　we　reach　explanations　both　impossible　and　hard　to　make；　explanations　which　we　ourselves　are　often　unwilling　to　believe。　And　again　we　try　to　explain　and　to　define　events　which　otherwise　would　have　been　understood　by　everybody　and　which　become　doubtful　and　uncertain　because　of　the　attempt。　The　matter　becomes　especially　difficult　when　we　feel　ourselves　unsure；　or　when　we　have　discovered　or　expect　contradiction。　Then　we　try　to　convince　ourselves　that　we　know　something；　although　at　the　beginning　we　were　clearly　enough　aware　that　we　knew　nothing。　We　must　not　forget　that　our　knowledge　can　attain　only　to　ideas　of　things。　It　consists　alone　in　the　perception　of　the　relation　and　agreement；　or　in　the　incompatibility　and　contradiction　of　some　of　our　ideas。　Our　task　lies　exactly　in　the　explication　of　these　impressions；　and　the　more　thoroughly　that　is　done　the　greater　and　more　certain　is　the　result。　But　we　must　never　trust　our　own　impressions　merely。　‘‘When　the　theologian；　who　deals　with　the　supersensible；　has　said　all　that；　from　his　point　of　view；　he　can　say；　when　the　jurist；　who　represents　those　fundamental　laws　which　are　the　result　of　social　experience；　has　considered　all　reasons　from　his　own　point　of　view；　the　final　authority　in　certain　cases　must　be　the　physician　who　is　engaged　in　studying　the　life　of　the　body。''

I　get　this　from　Maudsley；＇1＇　and　it　leads　us　to　keep　in　mind　that　our　knowledge　is　very　one…sided　and　limited；　and　that　an　event　is　known　only　when　all　have　spoken　who　possess　especial　knowledge　of　its　type。　Hence；　every　criminalist　is　required　to　found　his　knowledge　upon　that　of　the　largest　possible　number　of　experts　and　not　to　judge　or　discuss　any　matter　which　requires　especial　information　without　having　first　consulted　an　expert　with　regard　to　it。　Only　the　sham　knows　everything；　the　trained　man　understands　how　little　the　mind　of　any　individual　may　grasp；　and　how　many　must　coperate　in　order　to　explain　the　very　simplest　things。


＇1＇　Henry　Maudsley：　Physiology　and　Pathology　of　the　Mind。


The　complexity　of　the　matter　lies　in　the　essence　of　the　concept　　‘‘to　be。''　We　use　the　word　‘‘to　be''　to　indicate　the　intent　of　all　perceived　and　perceivable。　‘‘　‘To　be'　and　‘to　know'　are　identical　in　so　far　as　they　have　identical　content；　and　the　content　may　be　known？''＇1＇


＇1＇　Jessen：　Versuch　einer　wissenschaftlichen　Begrndung　der　Psychologie。　Berlin　1855。



PART　II。

OBJECTIVE　CONDITIONS　OF　CRIMINAL　INVESTIGATION：　THE　MENTAL　ACTIVITY　OF　THE　EXAMINEE。

TITLE　A。　GENERAL　CONDITIONS。

Topic　I。　OF　SENSE…PERCEPTION。

Section　35。


Our　conclusions　depend　upon　perceptions　made　by　ourselves　and　others。　And　if　the　perceptions　are　good　our　judgments　_*may_　be　good；　if　they　are　bad　our　judgments　_*must_　be　bad。　Hence；　to　study　the　forms　of　sense…perception　is　to　study　the　fundamental　conditions　of　the　administration　of　law；　and　the　greater　the　attention　thereto；　the　more　certain　is　the　administration。

It　is　not　our　intention　to　develop　a　theory　of　perception。　We　have　only　to　extract　those　conditions　which　concern　important　circumstances；　criminologically　considered；　and　from　which　we　may　see　how　we　and　those　we　examine；　perceive　matters。　A　thorough　and　comprehensive　study　of　this　question　can　not　be　too　much　recommended。　Recent　science　has　made　much　progress　in　this　direction；　and　has　discovered　much　of　great　importance　for　us。　To　ignore　this　is　to　confine　oneself　merely　to　the　superficial　and　external；　and　hence　to　the　inconceivable　and　incomprehensible；　to　ignoring　valuable　material　for　superficial　reasons；　and　what　is　worse；　to　identifying　material　as　important　which　properly　understood　has　no　value　whatever。


Section　36。　（a）　General　Considerations。

The　criminalist　studies　the　physiological　psychology＇1＇　of　the　senses　and　their　functions；　in　order　to　ascertain　their　nature；　their　influence　upon　images　and　concepts；　their　trustworthiness；　their　reliability　and　its　conditions；　and　the　relation　of　perception　to　the　object。　The　question　applies　equally　to　the　judge；　the　jury；　the　witness；　and　the　accused。　Once　the　essence　of　the　function　and　relation　of　sense…perception　is　understood；　its　application　in　individual　cases　becomes　easy。


＇1＇　For　a　general　consideration　of　perception　see　James；　Principles　of　Psychology。　Angell；　Psychology。



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