criminal psychology-第51节
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n question often believes himself to have seen what he infers and swears to it。
There are a great many similar processes at the bottom of impressions that depend only upon swift and unconscious inference。 Suppose； e。 g。； that I am shown the photograph of a small section of a garden； through which a team is passing。 Although I observe the image of only a small portion of the garden and therefore have no notion of its extent； still； in speaking of it； I shall proba… bly speak of a very big garden。 I have inferred swiftly and unconsciously that in the fact that a wagon and horses were present in the pictured portion of the garden； is implied great width of road； for even gardens of average size do not have such wide roads as to admit wagons； the latter occurring only in parks and great gardens。 Hence my conclusion： the garden must be very big。 Such inferences＇1＇ are frequent； whence the question as to the source and the probability of the witness's information； whether it is positive or only an impression。 Evidently such an impression may be correct。 It will be correct often； inasmuch as impressions occur only when inferences have been made and tested repeatedly。 But it is necessary in any case to review the sequence of inferences which led to this impression and to examine their correctness。 Unfortunately the witness is rarely aware whether he has perceived or merely inferred。
＇1＇ Cf。 Gross's Archiv； I； 93； II； 140； III； 250； VII； 155。
Examination is especially important when the impression has been made after the observation of a few marks or only a single one and not very essential one at that。 In the example of the team the impression may have been attained by inference； but frequently it will have been attained through some unessential； purely personal； determinative characteristic。 ‘‘Just as the ancient guest recognizes his friend by fitting halves of the ring； so we recognize the object and its constitution from one single characteristic； and hence the whole vision of it is vivified by that characteristic。''＇2＇
＇2＇ H。 Aubert： Physiologie der Netzhaut。 Breslau 1865。
All this is very well if no mistakes are made。 When Tertullian said； ‘‘Credo quia impossibile est；'' we will allow honesty of statement to this great scholar； especially as he was speaking about matters of religion； but when Socrates said of the works of Heraclitus the Obscure： ‘‘What I understand of it is good； I think that what I do not understand is also good''he was not in earnest。 Now the case of many people who are not as wise as Tertullian and Socrates is identical with theirs。 Numerous examinations of witnesses made me think of Tertullian's maxim； for the testimonies presented the most improbable things as facts。 And when they even explained the most unintelligible things I thought： ‘‘And what you do not understand is also good。''
This belief of uncultured people in their own intelligence has been most excellently portrayed by Wieland in his immortal ‘‘Abderites。'' The fourth philosopher says： ‘‘What you call the world is essentially an infinite series of worlds which envelop one another like the skin of an onion。'' ‘‘Very clear；'' said the Abderites； and thought they understood the philosopher because they knew perfectly well what an onion looked like。 The inference which is drawn from the comprehension of one term in a comparison to the comprehension of the other is one of the most important reasons for the occurrence of so many misunderstandings。 The example； as such； is understood； but its application to the assertion and the question whether the latter is also made clear by the example are forgotten。 This explains the well known and supreme power of examples and comparisons； and hence the wise of all times have used comparisons in speaking to the poor in spirit。 Hence； too； the great effect of comparisons； and also the numerous and coarse misunderstandings and the effort of the untrained and unintelligent to clarify those things they do not understand by means of comparisons。 Fortunately they have； in trying to explain the thing to other people； the habit of making use of these difficultly discovered comparisons so that the others； if they are only sufficiently observant； may succeed in testing the correctness of the inference from one term in a comparison to the other。 We do this frequently in examining witnesses； and we discover that the witness has made use of a figure to clarify some unintelligible point and that he necessarily understands it since it lies within the field of his instruments of thought。 But what is compared remains as confused to him as before。 The test of it； therefore； is very tiring and mainly without results； because one rarely succeeds in liberating a man from some figure discovered with difficulty。 He always returns to it because he understands it； though really not what he compares。 But what is gained in such a case is not little； for the certainty that； so revealed； the witness does not understand the matter in hand； easily determines the value of his testimony。
The fullness of the possibilities under which anything may be asserted is also of importance in this matter。 The inference that a thing is impossible is generally made by most people in such wise that they first consider the details of the eventualities they already know； or immediately present。 Then； when these are before them； they infer that the matter is quite impossibleand whether one or more different eventualities have missed of consideration； is not studied at all。 Our kindly professor of physics once told us： ‘‘Today I intended to show you the beautiful experiments in the interference of lightbut it can not be observed in daylight and when I draw the curtains you raise rough…house。 The demonstration is therefore impossible and I take the instruments away。'' The good man did not consider the other eventuality； that we might be depended upon to behave decently even if the curtains were drawn。
Hence the rule that a witness's assertion that a thing is impossible must never be trusted。 Take the simplest example。 The witness assures us that it is impossible for a theft to have been committed by some stranger from outside。 If you ask him why； he will probably tell you： ‘‘Because the door was bolted and the windows barred。'' The eventuality that the thief might have entered by way of the chimney； or have sent a child between the bars of the window； or have made use of some peculiar instrument； etc。； are not considered； and would not be if the question concerning the ground of the inference had not been put。
We must especially remember that we criminalists ‘‘must not dally with mathematical truth but must seek historical truth。 We start with a mass of details； unite them； and succeed by means of this union and test in attaining a result which permits us to judge concerning the existence and the characteristics of past events。'' The material of our work lies in the mass of details； and the manner and reliability of its presentation determines the certainty of our inferences。
Seen more closely the winning of this material may be described as Hume describes it：＇1＇ ‘‘If we would satisfy ourselves； therefore； concerning the nature of that evidence which assures us of matters of fact； we must inquire how we arrive at the knowledge of cause and effect。 I shall venture to affirm as a general proposition which admits of no exception； that the knowledge of this relation is not； in any instance； attained by reasonings a priori； but arises entirely from experience； when we find that any particular objects are constantly conjoined with each other； 。 。 。 nor can our reason； unassisted by experience； ever draw any inference concerning real existence and matter of fact。''
＇1＇ David Hume： Enquiry； p。 33 （Open Court Ed。）。
In the course of his explanation Hume presents two propositions；
（1） I have found that such an object has always been attended with such an effect。
（2） I foresee that other objects which are in appearance similar； will be attended with similar effects。
He goes on： ‘‘I shall allow； if you please； that the one proposition may justly be inferred from the other； I know in fact that it always is inferred。 But if you insist that the inference is made by a chain of reasoning； I desire you to produce that chain of reasoning。 The connection between these propositions is not intuitive。 There is required a medium which may enable the mind to draw such an inference； if； indeed； it be drawn by reasoning and argument。 What the medium is； I must confess； passes my comprehension； and it is incumbent on those to produce it who assert that it exists； and is the origin of all our conclusions concerning matters of fact。''
If we regard the matter more closely we may say with certainty： This medium exists not as a substance but as a transition。 When I speak in the proposition of ‘‘such an object；'' I already have ‘‘similar'' in mind； inasmuch as there is nothing absolutely like anything else； and when I say in the first proposition； ‘‘such an object；'' I have already passed into the assertion made in the second proposition。
Suppose that we take these propositions concretely：
（1） I have discovered t
