on memory and reminiscence-第1节

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　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　350　BC



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　ON　MEMORY　AND　REMINISCENCE



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　by　Aristotle



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　translated　by　J。　I。　Beare



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　　WE　have；　in　the　next　place；　to　treat　of　Memory　and　Remembering；



considering　its　nature；　its　cause；　and　the　part　of　the　soul　to　which



this　experience；　as　well　as　that　of　Recollecting；　belongs。　For　the



persons　who　possess　a　retentive　memory　are　not　identical　with　those



who　excel　in　power　of　recollection；　indeed；　as　a　rule；　slow　people



have　a　good　memory；　whereas　those　who　are　quick…witted　and　clever



are　better　at　recollecting。



　　We　must　first　form　a　true　conception　of　these　objects　of　memory；　a



point　on　which　mistakes　are　often　made。　Now　to　remember　the　future



is　not　possible；　but　this　is　an　object　of　opinion　or　expectation



（and　indeed　there　might　be　actually　a　science　of　expectation；　like



that　of　divination；　in　which　some　believe）；　nor　is　there　memory　of　the



present；　but　only　sense…perception。　For　by　the　latter　we　know　not



the　future；　nor　the　past；　but　the　present　only。　But　memory　relates



to　the　past。　No　one　would　say　that　he　remembers　the　present；　when　it



is　present；　e。g。　a　given　white　object　at　the　moment　when　he　sees　it；



nor　would　one　say　that　he　remembers　an　object　of　scientific



contemplation　at　the　moment　when　he　is　actually　contemplating　it；



and　has　it　full　before　his　mind；…of　the　former　he　would　say　only



that　he　perceives　it；　of　the　latter　only　that　he　knows　it。　But　when



one　has　scientific　knowledge；　or　perception；　apart　from　the



actualizations　of　the　faculty　concerned；　he　thus　'remembers'　（that　the



angles　of　a　triangle　are　together　equal　to　two　right　angles）；　as　to



the　former；　that　he　learned　it；　or　thought　it　out　for　himself；　as　to



the　latter；　that　he　heard；　or　saw；　it；　or　had　some　such　sensible



experience　of　it。　For　whenever　one　exercises　the　faculty　of



remembering；　he　must　say　within　himself；　'I　formerly　heard　（or



otherwise　perceived）　this；'　or　'I　formerly　had　this　thought'。



　　Memory　is；　therefore；　neither　Perception　nor　Conception；　but　a　state



or　affection　of　one　of　these；　conditioned　by　lapse　of　time。　As　already



observed；　there　is　no　such　thing　as　memory　of　the　present　while



present；　for　the　present　is　object　only　of　perception；　and　the　future；



of　expectation；　but　the　object　of　memory　is　the　past。　All　memory；



therefore；　implies　a　time　elapsed；　consequently　only　those　animals



which　perceive　time　remember；　and　the　organ　whereby　they　perceive　time



is　also　that　whereby　they　remember。



　　The　subject　of　'presentation'　has　been　already　considered　in　our



work　On　the　Soul。　Without　a　presentation　intellectual　activity　is



impossible。　For　there　is　in　such　activity　an　incidental　affection



identical　with　one　also　incidental　in　geometrical　demonstrations。



For　in　the　latter　case；　though　we　do　not　for　the　purpose　of　the



proof　make　any　use　of　the　fact　that　the　quantity　in　the　triangle



（for　example；　which　we　have　drawn）　is　determinate；　we　nevertheless



draw　it　determinate　in　quantity。　So　likewise　when　one　exerts　the



intellect　（e。g。　on　the　subject　of　first　principles）；　although　the



object　may　not　be　quantitative；　one　envisages　it　as　quantitative；



though　he　thinks　it　in　abstraction　from　quantity；　while；　on　the



other　hand；　if　the　object　of　the　intellect　is　essentially　of　the　class



of　things　that　are　quantitative；　but　indeterminate；　one　envisages　it



as　if　it　had　determinate　quantity；　though　subsequently；　in　thinking



it；　he　abstracts　from　its　determinateness。　Why　we　cannot　exercise



the　intellect　on　any　object　absolutely　apart　from　the　continuous；　or



apply　it　even　to　non…temporal　things　unless　in　connexion　with　time；　is



another　question。　Now；　one　must　cognize　magnitude　and　motion　by



means　of　the　same　faculty　by　which　one　cognizes　time　（i。e。　by　that



which　is　also　the　faculty　of　memory）；　and　the　presentation　（involved



in　such　cognition）　is　an　affection　of　the　sensus　communis；　whence　this



follows；　viz。　that　the　cognition　of　these　objects　（magnitude；　motion



time）　is　effected　by　the　（said　sensus　communis；　i。e。　the）　primary



faculty　of　perception。　Accordingly；　memory　（not　merely　of　sensible；



but）　even　of　intellectual　objects　involves　a　presentation：　hence　we



may　conclude　that　it　belongs　to　the　faculty　of　intelligence　only



incidentally；　while　directly　and　essentially　it　belongs　to　the　primary



faculty　of　sense…perception。



　　Hence　not　only　human　beings　and　the　beings　which　possess　opinion



or　intelligence；　but　also　certain　other　animals；　possess　memory。　If



memory　were　a　function　of　（pure）　intellect；　it　would　not　have　been



as　it　is　an　attribute　of　many　of　the　lower　animals；　but　probably；　in



that　case；　no　mortal　beings　would　have　had　memory；　since；　even　as



the　case　stands；　it　is　not　an　attribute　of　them　all；　just　because



all　have　not　the　faculty　of　perceiving　time。　Whenever　one　actually



remembers　having　seen　or　heard；　or　learned；　something；　he　includes



in　this　act　（as　we　have　already　observed）　the　consciousness　of



'formerly'；　and　the　distinction　of　'former'　and　'latter'　is　a



distinction　in　time。



　　Accordingly　if　asked；　of　which　among　the　parts　of　the　soul　memory　is



a　function；　we　reply：　manifestly　of　that　part　to　which



'presentation'　appertains；　and　all　objects　capable　of　being



presented　（viz。　aistheta）　are　immediately　and　properly　objects　of



memory；　while　those　（viz。　noeta）　which　necessarily　involve　（but　only



involve）　presentation　are　objects　of　memory　incidentally。



　　One　might　ask　how　it　is　possible　that　though　the　affection　（the



presentation）　alone　is　present；　and　the　（related）　fact　absent；　the



latter…that　which　is　not　present…is　remembered。　（The　question　arises）；



because　it　is　clear　that　we　must　conceive　that　which　is　generated



through　sense…perception　in　the　sentient　soul；　and　in　the　part　of



the　body　which　is　its　seat…viz。　that　affection　the　state　whereof　we



call　memory…to　be　some　such　thing　as　a　picture。　The　process　of



movement　（sensory　stimulation）　involved　the　act　of　perception　stamps



in；　as　it　were；　a　sort　of　impression　of　the　percept；　just　as　persons



do　who　make　an　impression　with　a　seal。　This　explains　why；　in　those　who



are　strongly　moved　owing　to　passion；　or　time　of　life；　no　mnemonic



impression　is　formed；　just　as　no　impression　would　be　formed　if　the



movement　of　the　seal　were　to　impinge　on　running　water；　while　there　are



others　in　whom；　owing　to　the　receiving　surface　being　frayed；　as



happens　to　（the　stucco　on）　old　（chamber）　walls；　or　owing　to　the



hardness　of　the　receiving　surface；　the　requisite　impression　is　not



implanted　at　all。　Hence　both　very　young　and　very　old　persons　are



defective　in　memory；　they　are　in　a　state　of　flux；　the　former　because



of　their　growth；　the　latter；　owing　to　their　decay。　In　like　manner；



also；　both　those　who　are　too　quick　and　those　who　are　too　slow　have　bad



memories。　The　former　are　too　soft；　the　latter　too　hard　（in　the　texture



of　their　receiving　organs）；　so　that　in　the　case　of　the　former　the



presented　image　（though　imprinted）　does　not　remain　in　the　soul；



while　on　the　latter　it　is　not　imprinted　at　all。



　　But　then；　if　this　truly　describes　what　happens　in　the　genesis　of



memory；　（the　question　stated　above　arises：）　when　one　remembers；　is



it　this　impressed　affection　that　he　remembers；　or　is　it　the



objective　thing　from　which　this　was　derived？　If　the　former；　it　would



follow　that　we　remember　nothing　which　is　absent；　if　the　latter；　how　is



it　possible　that；　though　perceiving　directly　only　the　impression；　we



remember　that　absent　thing　which　we　do　not　perceive？　Granted　that



there　is　in　us　something　like　an　impression　or　picture；　why　should　the



perception　of　the　mere　impression　be　memory　of　something　else；　instead



of　being　related　to　this　impression　alone？　For　when　one　actually



remembers；　this　impression　is　what　he　contemplates；　and　this　is　what



he　perceives。　How　then　does　he　remember　what　is　not　present？　One　might



as　well　suppose　it　possible　also　to　see　or　hear　that　which　is　not



present。　In　reply；　we　suggest　that　this　very　thing　is　quite



conceivable；　nay；　actually　occurs　in　experience。　A　picture　painted



on　a　panel　is　at　once　a　picture　and　a　likeness：　that　is；　while　one　and



the　same；　it　is　both　of　these；　although　the　'being'　of　both　is　not　the



same；　and　one　may　contemplate　it　either　as　a　picture；　or　as　a



likeness。　Just　in　the　same　way　we　have　to　conceive　that　the　mnemonic



presentation　within　us　is　something　which　by　itself　is　merely　an



object　of　contemplation；　while；　in…relation　to　something　else；　it　is



also　a　presentation　of　that　other　thing。　In　so　far　as　it　is　regarded



in　itself；　it　is　only　an　object　of　contemplation；　or　a　presentation；



but　when　co