the critique of pure reason-第97节

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limit　them；　in　various　forms。

　　Thus　the　volition　of　every　man　has　an　empirical　character；　which

is　nothing　more　than　the　causality　of　his　reason；　in　so　far　as　its

effects　in　the　phenomenal　world　manifest　the　presence　of　a　rule；

according　to　which　we　are　enabled　to　examine；　in　their　several　kinds

and　degrees；　the　actions　of　this　causality　and　the　rational　grounds

for　these　actions；　and　in　this　way　to　decide　upon　the　subjective

principles　of　the　volition。　Now　we　learn　what　this　empirical　character

is　only　from　phenomenal　effects；　and　from　the　rule　of　these　which　is

presented　by　experience；　and　for　this　reason　all　the　actions　of　man　in

the　world　of　phenomena　are　determined　by　his　empirical　character；

and　the　co…operative　causes　of　nature。　If；　then；　we　could

investigate　all　the　phenomena　of　human　volition　to　their　lowest

foundation　in　the　mind；　there　would　be　no　action　which　we　could　not

anticipate　with　certainty；　and　recognize　to　be　absolutely　necessary

from　its　preceding　conditions。　So　far　as　relates　to　this　empirical

character；　therefore；　there　can　be　no　freedom；　and　it　is　only　in　the

light　of　this　character　that　we　can　consider　the　human　will；　when　we

confine　ourselves　to　simple　observation　and；　as　is　the　case　in

anthropology；　institute　a　physiological　investigation　of　the　motive

causes　of　human　actions。

　　But　when　we　consider　the　same　actions　in　relation　to　reason…　not　for

the　purpose　of　explaining　their　origin；　that　is；　in　relation　to

speculative　reason；　but　to　practical　reason；　as　the　producing　cause　of

these　actions…　we　shall　discover　a　rule　and　an　order　very　different

from　those　of　nature　and　experience。　For　the　declaration　of　this

mental　faculty　may　be　that　what　has　and　could　not　but　take　place　in

the　course　of　nature；　ought　not　to　have　taken　place。　Sometimes；　too；

we　discover；　or　believe　that　we　discover；　that　the　ideas　of　reason　did

actually　stand　in　a　causal　relation　to　certain　actions　of　man；　and

that　these　actions　have　taken　place　because　they　were　determined；

not　by　empirical　causes；　but　by　the　act　of　the　will　upon　grounds　of

reason。

　　Now；　granting　that　reason　stands　in　a　causal　relation　to

phenomena；　can　an　action　of　reason　be　called　free；　when　we　know

that；　sensuously；　in　its　empirical　character；　it　is　completely

determined　and　absolutely　necessary？　But　this　empirical　character　is

itself　determined　by　the　intelligible　character。　The　latter　we

cannot　cognize；　we　can　only　indicate　it　by　means　of　phenomena；　which

enable　us　to　have　an　immediate　cognition　only　of　the　empirical

character。*　An　action；　then；　in　so　far　as　it　is　to　be　ascribed　to　an

intelligible　cause；　does　not　result　from　it　in　accordance　with

empirical　laws。　That　is　to　say；　not　the　conditions　of　pure　reason；　but

only　their　effects　in　the　internal　sense；　precede　the　act。　Pure

reason；　as　a　purely　intelligible　faculty；　is　not　subject　to　the

conditions　of　time。　The　causality　of　reason　in　its　intelligible

character　does　not　begin　to　be；　it　does　not　make　its　appearance　at　a

certain　time；　for　the　purpose　of　producing　an　effect。　If　this　were　not

the　case；　the　causality　of　reason　would　be　subservient　to　the

natural　law　of　phenomena；　which　determines　them　according　to　time；　and

as　a　series　of　causes　and　effects　in　time；　it　would　consequently　cease

to　be　freedom　and　become　a　part　of　nature。　We　are　therefore

justified　in　saying：　〃If　reason　stands　in　a　causal　relation　to

phenomena；　it　is　a　faculty　which　originates　the　sensuous　condition

of　an　empirical　series　of　effects。〃　For　the　condition；　which　resides

in　the　reason；　is　non…sensuous；　and　therefore　cannot　be　originated；　or

begin　to　be。　And　thus　we　find…　what　we　could　not　discover　in　any

empirical　series…　a　condition　of　a　successive　series　of　events

itself　empirically　unconditioned。　For；　in　the　present　case；　the

condition　stands　out　of　and　beyond　the　series　of　phenomena…　it　is

intelligible；　and　it　consequently　cannot　be　subjected　to　any

sensuous　condition；　or　to　any　time…determination　by　a　preceding　cause。



　　*The　real　morality　of　actions…　their　merit　or　demerit；　and　even　that

of　our　own　conduct；　is　completely　unknown　to　us。　Our　estimates　can

relate　only　to　their　empirical　character。　How　much　is　the　result　of

the　action　of　free　will；　how　much　is　to　be　ascribed　to　nature　and　to

blameless　error；　or　to　a　happy　constitution　of　temperament　（merito

fortunae）；　no　one　can　discover；　nor；　for　this　reason；　determine　with

perfect　justice。



　　But；　in　another　respect；　the　same　cause　belongs　also　to　the　series

of　phenomena。　Man　is　himself　a　phenomenon。　His　will　has　an　empirical

character；　which　is　the　empirical　cause　of　all　his　actions。　There　is

no　condition…　determining　man　and　his　volition　in　conformity　with　this

character…　which　does　not　itself　form　part　of　the　series　of　effects　in

nature；　and　is　subject　to　their　law…　the　law　according　to　which　an

empirically　undetermined　cause　of　an　event　in　time　cannot　exist。　For

this　reason　no　given　action　can　have　an　absolute　and　spontaneous

origination；　all　actions　being　phenomena；　and　belonging　to　the　world

of　experience。　But　it　cannot　be　said　of　reason；　that　the　state　in

which　it　determines　the　will　is　always　preceded　by　some　other　state

determining　it。　For　reason　is　not　a　phenomenon；　and　therefore　not

subject　to　sensuous　conditions；　and；　consequently；　even　in　relation　to

its　causality；　the　sequence　or　conditions　of　time　do　not　influence

reason；　nor　can　the　dynamical　law　of　nature；　which　determines　the

sequence　of　time　according　to　certain　rules；　be　applied　to　it。

　　Reason　is　consequently　the　permanent　condition　of　all　actions　of　the

human　will。　Each　of　these　is　determined　in　the　empirical　character

of　the　man；　even　before　it　has　taken　place。　The　intelligible

character；　of　which　the　former　is　but　the　sensuous　schema；　knows　no

before　or　after；　and　every　action；　irrespective　of　the　time…relation

in　which　it　stands　with　other　phenomena；　is　the　immediate　effect　of

the　intelligible　character　of　pure　reason；　which；　consequently；　enjoys

freedom　of　action；　and　is　not　dynamically　determined　either　by

internal　or　external　preceding　conditions。　This　freedom　must　not　be

described；　in　a　merely　negative　manner；　as　independence　of　empirical

conditions；　for　in　this　case　the　faculty　of　reason　would　cease　to　be　a

cause　of　phenomena；　but　it　must　be　regarded；　positively；　as　a

faculty　which　can　spontaneously　originate　a　series　of　events。　At　the

same　time；　it　must　not　be　supposed　that　any　beginning　can　take　place

in　reason；　on　the　contrary；　reason；　as　the　unconditioned　condition

of　all　action　of　the　will；　admits　of　no　time…conditions；　although

its　effect　does　really　begin　in　a　series　of　phenomena…　a　beginning

which　is　not；　however；　absolutely　primal。

　　I　shall　illustrate　this　regulative　principle　of　reason　by　an

example；　from　its　employment　in　the　world　of　experience；　proved　it

cannot　be　by　any　amount　of　experience；　or　by　any　number　of　facts；

for　such　arguments　cannot　establish　the　truth　of　transcendental

propositions。　Let　us　take　a　voluntary　action…　for　example；　a

falsehood…　by　means　of　which　a　man　has　introduced　a　certain　degree

of　confusion　into　the　social　life　of　humanity；　which　is　judged

according　to　the　motives　from　which　it　originated；　and　the　blame　of

which　and　of　the　evil　consequences　arising　from　it；　is　imputed　to

the　offender。　We　at　first　proceed　to　examine　the　empirical　character

of　the　offence；　and　for　this　purpose　we　endeavour　to　penetrate　to

the　sources　of　that　character；　such　as　a　defective　education；　bad

company；　a　shameless　and　wicked　disposition；　frivolity；　and　want　of

reflection…　not　forgetting　also　the　occasioning　causes　which　prevailed

at　the　moment　of　the　transgression。　In　this　the　procedure　is　exactly

the　same　as　that　pursued　in　the　investigation　of　the　series　of

causes　which　determine　a　given　physical　effect。　Now；　although　we

believe　the　action　to　have　been　determined　by　all　these　circumstances；

we　do　not　the　less　blame　the　offender。　We　do　not　blame　him　for　his

unhappy　disposition；　nor　for　the　circumstances　which　influenced　him；

nay；　not　even　for　his　former　course　of　life；　for　we　presuppose　that

all　these　considerations　may　be　set　aside；　that　the　series　of

preceding　conditions　may　be　regarded　as　having　never　existed；　and　that

the　action　may　be　considered　as　completely　unconditioned　in　relation

to　any　state　preceding；　just　as　if　the　agent　commenced　with　it　an

entirely　new　series　of　effects。　Our　blame　of　the　offender　is

grounded　upon　a　law　of　reason；　which　requires　us　to　regard　this

faculty　as　a　cause；　which　could　have　and　ought　to　have　otherwise

determined　the　behaviour　of　the　culprit；　independently　of　all

empirical　conditions。　This　causality　of　reason　we　do　not　regard　as　a

co…operating　agency；　but　as　complete　in　itself。　It　matters　not　whether

the　sensuous　impulses　favoured　or　opposed　the　action　of　this

causality；　the　offence　is　estimated　according　to　its　intelligible

character…　the　offen