the critique of pure reason-第70节

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accidental　products　of　reason；　but　are　necessitated　by　its　very

nature。　They　are　sophisms；　not　of　men；　but　of　pure　reason　herself；

from　which　the　Wisest　cannot　free　himself。　After　long　labour　he　may　be

able　to　guard　against　the　error；　but　he　can　never　be　thoroughly　rid　of

the　illusion　which　continually　mocks　and　misleads　him。

　　Of　these　dialectical　arguments　there　are　three　kinds；

corresponding　to　the　number　of　the　ideas　which　their　conclusions

present。　In　the　argument　or　syllogism　of　the　first　class；　I

conclude；　from　the　transcendental　conception　of　the　subject　contains

no　manifold；　the　absolute　unity　of　the　subject　itself；　of　which　I

cannot　in　this　manner　attain　to　a　conception。　This　dialectical

argument　I　shall　call　the　transcendental　paralogism。　The　second

class　of　sophistical　arguments　is　occupied　with　the　transcendental

conception　of　the　absolute　totality　of　the　series　of　conditions　for

a　given　phenomenon；　and　I　conclude；　from　the　fact　that　I　have　always　a

self…contradictory　conception　of　the　unconditioned　synthetical　unity

of　the　series　upon　one　side；　the　truth　of　the　opposite　unity；　of　which

I　have　nevertheless　no　conception。　The　condition　of　reason　in　these

dialectical　arguments；　I　shall　term　the　antinomy　of　pure　reason。

Finally；　according　to　the　third　kind　of　sophistical　argument；　I

conclude；　from　the　totality　of　the　conditions　of　thinking　objects　in

general；　in　so　far　as　they　can　be　given；　the　absolute　synthetical

unity　of　all　conditions　of　the　possibility　of　things　in　general；

that　is；　from　things　which　I　do　not　know　in　their　mere

transcendental　conception；　I　conclude　a　being　of　all　beings　which　I

know　still　less　by　means　of　a　transcendental　conception；　and　of

whose　unconditioned　necessity　I　can　form　no　conception　whatever。

This　dialectical　argument　I　shall　call　the　ideal　of　pure　reason。

　　　　　　　　　　CHAPTER　I。　Of　the　Paralogisms　of　Pure　Reason。



　　The　logical　paralogism　consists　in　the　falsity　of　an　argument　in

respect　of　its　form；　be　the　content　what　it　may。　But　a

transcendental　paralogism　has　a　transcendental　foundation；　and

concludes　falsely；　while　the　form　is　correct　and　unexceptionable。　In

this　manner　the　paralogism　has　its　foundation　in　the　nature　of　human

reason；　and　is　the　parent　of　an　unavoidable；　though　not　insoluble；

mental　illusion。

　　We　now　come　to　a　conception　which　was　not　inserted　in　the　general

list　of　transcendental　conceptions。　and　yet　must　be　reckoned　with

them；　but　at　the　same　time　without　in　the　least　altering；　or

indicating　a　deficiency　in　that　table。　This　is　the　conception；　or；

if　the　term　is　preferred；　the　judgement；　〃I　think。〃　But　it　is

readily　perceived　that　this　thought　is　as　it　were　the　vehicle　of　all

conceptions　in　general；　and　consequently　of　transcendental　conceptions

also；　and　that　it　is　therefore　regarded　as　a　transcendental

conception；　although　it　can　have　no　peculiar　claim　to　be　so　ranked；

inasmuch　as　its　only　use　is　to　indicate　that　all　thought　is

accompanied　by　consciousness。　At　the　same　time；　pure　as　this

conception　is　from　empirical　content　（impressions　of　the　senses）；　it

enables　us　to　distinguish　two　different　kinds　of　objects。　〃I；〃　as

thinking；　am　an　object　of　the　internal　sense；　and　am　called　soul。　That

which　is　an　object　of　the　external　senses　is　called　body。　Thus　the

expression；　〃I；〃　as　a　thinking　being；　designates　the　object…matter

of　psychology；　which　may　be　called　〃the　rational　doctrine　of　the

soul；〃　inasmuch　as　in　this　science　I　desire　to　know　nothing　of　the

soul　but　what；　independently　of　all　experience　（which　determines　me　in

concreto）；　may　be　concluded　from　this　conception　〃I；〃　in　so　far　as

it　appears　in　all　thought。

　　Now；　the　rational　doctrine　of　the　soul　is　really　an　undertaking　of

this　kind。　For　if　the　smallest　empirical　element　of　thought；　if　any

particular　perception　of　my　internal　state；　were　to　be　introduced

among　the　grounds　of　cognition　of　this　science；　it　would　not　be　a

rational；　but　an　empirical　doctrine　of　the　soul。　We　have　thus　before

us　a　pretended　science；　raised　upon　the　single　proposition；　〃I　think；〃

whose　foundation　or　want　of　foundation　we　may　very　properly；　and

agreeably　with　the　nature　of　a　transcendental　philosophy；　here

examine。　It　ought　not　to　be　objected　that　in　this　proposition；　which

expresses　the　perception　of　one's　self；　an　internal　experience　is

asserted；　and　that　consequently　the　rational　doctrine　of　the　soul

which　is　founded　upon　it；　is　not　pure；　but　partly　founded　upon　an

empirical　principle。　For　this　internal　perception　is　nothing　more　than

the　mere　apperception；　〃I　think；〃　which　in　fact　renders　all

transcendental　conceptions　possible；　in　which　we　say；　〃I　think

substance；　cause；　etc。〃　For　internal　experience　in　general　and　its

possibility；　or　perception　in　general；　and　its　relation　to　other

perceptions；　unless　some　particular　distinction　or　determination

thereof　is　empirically　given；　cannot　be　regarded　as　empirical

cognition；　but　as　cognition　of　the　empirical；　and　belongs　to　the

investigation　of　the　possibility　of　every　experience；　which　is

certainly　transcendental。　The　smallest　object　of　experience　（for

example；　only　pleasure　or　pain）；　that　should　be　included　in　the

general　representation　of　self…consciousness；　would　immediately　change

the　rational　into　an　empirical　psychology。

　　〃I　think〃　is　therefore　the　only　text　of　rational　psychology；　from

which　it　must　develop　its　whole　system。　It　is　manifest　that　this

thought；　when　applied　to　an　object　（myself）；　can　contain　nothing　but

transcendental　predicates　thereof；　because　the　least　empirical

predicate　would　destroy　the　purity　of　the　science　and　its　independence

of　all　experience。

　　But　we　shall　have　to　follow　here　the　guidance　of　the　categories…

only；　as　in　the　present　case　a　thing；　〃I；〃　as　thinking　being；　is　at

first　given；　we　shall…　not　indeed　change　the　order　of　the　categories

as　it　stands　in　the　table…　but　begin　at　the　category　of　substance；

by　which　at　the　a　thing　a　thing　is　represented　and　proceeds

backwards　through　the　series。　The　topic　of　the　rational　doctrine　of

the　soul；　from　which　everything　else　it　may　contain　must　be　deduced；

is　accordingly　as　follows：



　　　　　　　　　　　　1　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　2

　　The　Soul　is　SUBSTANCE　　　　　　　As　regards　its　quality

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　it　is　SIMPLE



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　3

　　　　　　　　　　As　regards　the　different

　　　　　　　　　　times　in　which　it　exists；

　　　　　　　　　　it　is　numerically　identical；

　　　　　　　　　　that　is　UNITY；　not　Plurality。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　4

　　It　is　in　relation　to　possible　objects　in　space*



　　*The　reader；　who　may　not　so　easily　perceive　the　psychological

sense　of　these　expressions；　taken　here　in　their　transcendental

abstraction；　and　cannot　guess　why　the　latter　attribute　of　the　soul

belongs　to　the　category　of　existence；　will　find　the　expressions

sufficiently　explained　and　justified　in　the　sequel。　I　have；

moreover；　to　apologize　for　the　Latin　terms　which　have　been

employed；instead　of　their　German　synonyms；　contrary　to　the　rules　of

correct　writing。　But　I　judged　it　better　to　sacrifice　elegance　to

perspicuity。



　　From　these　elements　originate　all　the　conceptions　of　pure

psychology；　by　combination　alone；　without　the　aid　of　any　other

principle。　This　substance；　merely　as　an　object　of　the　internal

sense；　gives　the　conception　of　Immateriality；　as　simple　substance；

that　of　Incorruptibility；　its　identity；　as　intellectual　substance；

gives　the　conception　of　Personality；　all　these　three　together；

Spirituality。　Its　relation　to　objects　in　space　gives　us　the　conception

of　connection　（commercium）　with　bodies。　Thus　it　represents　thinking

substance　as　the　principle　of　life　in　matter；　that　is；　as　a　soul

（anima）；　and　as　the　ground　of　Animality；　and　this；　limited　and

determined　by　the　conception　of　spirituality；　gives　us　that　of

Immortality。

　　Now　to　these　conceptions　relate　four　paralogisms　of　a　transcendental

psychology；　which　is　falsely　held　to　be　a　science　of　pure　reason。

touching　the　nature　of　our　thinking　being。　We　can；　however；　lay　at　the

foundation　of　this　science　nothing　but　the　simple　and　in　itself

perfectly　contentless　representation　〃I　which　cannot　even　be　called

a　conception；　but　merely　a　consciousness　which　accompanies　all

conceptions。　By　this　〃I；〃　or　〃He；〃　or　〃It；〃　who　or　which　thinks；

nothing　more　is　represented　than　a　transcendental　subject　of　thought　=

x；　which　is　cognized　only　by　means　of　the　thoughts　that　are　its

predicates；　and　of　which；　apart　from　these；　we　cannot　form　the　least

conception。　Hence　in　a　perpetual　circle；　inasmuch　as　we　must　always

employ　it；　in　order　to　frame　any　judgement　respecting　it。　And　this

inconvenience　we　find　it　impossible　to　rid　ourselves　of；　because

consciousness　in　itself　is　not　so　much　a　representation　distinguishing

a　particular　object；　as　a　form　of　representation　in　general；　in　so　far

as　it　may　be　termed　cognition；　for　in　and　by　cognition　alone　do　I

think　anything。

　　I