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after an antecedent time; in which it did not exist。 But it can

receive its determined place in time only by the presupposition that

something existed in the foregoing state; upon which it follows

inevitably and always; that is; in conformity with a rule。 From all

this it is evident that; in the first place; I cannot reverse the

order of succession; and make that which happens precede that upon

which it follows; and that; in the second place; if the antecedent

state be posited; a certain determinate event inevitably and

necessarily follows。 Hence it follows that there exists a certain

order in our representations; whereby the present gives a sure

indication of some previously existing state; as a correlate; though

still undetermined; of the existing event which is given… a

correlate which itself relates to the event as its consequence;

conditions it; and connects it necessarily with itself in the series

of time。

  If then it be admitted as a necessary law of sensibility; and

consequently a formal condition of all perception; that the

preceding necessarily determines the succeeding time (inasmuch as I

cannot arrive at the succeeding except through the preceding); it must

likewise be an indispensable law of empirical representation of the

series of time that the phenomena of the past determine all

phenomena in the succeeding time; and that the latter; as events;

cannot take place; except in so far as the former determine their

existence in time; that is to say; establish it according to a rule。

For it is of course only in phenomena that we can empirically

cognize this continuity in the connection of times。

  For all experience and for the possibility of experience;

understanding is indispensable; and the first step which it takes in

this sphere is not to render the representation of objects clear;

but to render the representation of an object in general; possible。 It

does this by applying the order of time to phenomena; and their

existence。 In other words; it assigns to each phenomenon; as a

consequence; a place in relation to preceding phenomena; determined

a priori in time; without which it could not harmonize with time

itself; which determines a place a priori to all its parts。 This

determination of place cannot be derived from the relation of

phenomena to absolute time (for it is not an object of perception);

but; on the contrary; phenomena must reciprocally determine the places

in time of one another; and render these necessary in the order of

time。 In other words; whatever follows or happens; must follow in

conformity with a universal rule upon that which was contained in

the foregoing state。 Hence arises a series of phenomena; which; by

means of the understanding; produces and renders necessary exactly the

same order and continuous connection in the series of our possible

perceptions; as is found a priori in the form of internal intuition

(time); in which all our perceptions must have place。

  That something happens; then; is a perception which belongs to a

possible experience; which becomes real only because I look upon the

phenomenon as determined in regard to its place in time;

consequently as an object; which can always be found by means of a

rule in the connected series of my perceptions。 But this rule of the

determination of a thing according to succession in time is as

follows: 〃In what precedes may be found the condition; under which

an event always (that is; necessarily) follows。〃 From all this it is

obvious that the principle of cause and effect is the principle of

possible experience; that is; of objective cognition of phenomena;

in regard to their relations in the succession of time。

  The proof of this fundamental proposition rests entirely on the

following momenta of argument。 To all empirical cognition belongs

the synthesis of the manifold by the imagination; a synthesis which is

always successive; that is; in which the representations therein

always follow one another。 But the order of succession in

imagination is not determined; and the series of successive

representations may be taken retrogressively as well as progressively。

But if this synthesis is a synthesis of apprehension (of the

manifold of a given phenomenon);then the order is determined in the

object; or to speak more accurately; there is therein an order of

successive synthesis which determines an object; and according to

which something necessarily precedes; and when this is posited;

something else necessarily follows。 If; then; my perception is to

contain the cognition of an event; that is; of something which

really happens; it must be an empirical judgement; wherein we think

that the succession is determined; that is; it presupposes another

phenomenon; upon which this event follows necessarily; or in

conformity with a rule。 If; on the contrary; when I posited the

antecedent; the event did not necessarily follow; I should be

obliged to consider it merely as a subjective play of my

imagination; and if in this I represented to myself anything as

objective; I must look upon it as a mere dream。 Thus; the relation

of phenomena (as possible perceptions); according to which that

which happens is; as to its existence; necessarily determined in

time by something which antecedes; in conformity with a rule… in other

words; the relation of cause and effect… is the condition of the

objective validity of our empirical judgements in regard to the

sequence of perceptions; consequently of their empirical truth; and

therefore of experience。 The principle of the relation of causality in

the succession of phenomena is therefore valid for all objects of

experience; because it is itself the ground of the possibility of

experience。

  Here; however; a difficulty arises; which must be resolved。 The

principle of the connection of causality among phenomena is limited in

our formula to the succession thereof; although in practice we find

that the principle applies also when the phenomena exist together in

the same time; and that cause and effect may be simultaneous。 For

example; there is heat in a room; which does not exist in the open

air。 I look about for the cause; and find it to be the fire; Now the

fire as the cause is simultaneous with its effect; the heat of the

room。 In this case; then; there is no succession as regards time;

between cause and effect; but they are simultaneous; and still the law

holds good。 The greater part of operating causes in nature are

simultaneous with their effects; and the succession in time of the

latter is produced only because the cause cannot achieve the total

of its effect in one moment。 But at the moment when the effect first

arises; it is always simultaneous with the causality of its cause;

because; if the cause had but a moment before ceased to be; the effect

could not have arisen。 Here it must be specially remembered that we

must consider the order of time and not the lapse thereof。 The

relation remains; even though no time has elapsed。 The time between

the causality of the cause and its immediate effect may entirely

vanish; and the cause and effect be thus simultaneous; but the

relation of the one to the other remains always determinable according

to time。 If; for example; I consider a leaden ball; which lies upon

a cushion and makes a hollow in it; as a cause; then it is

simultaneous with the effect。 But I distinguish the two through the

relation of time of the dynamical connection of both。 For if I lay the

ball upon the cushion; then the hollow follows upon the before

smooth surface; but supposing the cushion has; from some cause or

another; a hollow; there does not thereupon follow a leaden ball。

  Thus; the law of succession of time is in all instances the only

empirical criterion of effect in relation to the causality of the

antecedent cause。 The glass is the cause of the rising of the water

above its horizontal surface; although the two phenomena are

contemporaneous。 For; as soon as I draw some water with the glass from

a larger vessel; an effect follows thereupon; namely; the change of

the horizontal state which the water had in the large vessel into a

concave; which it assumes in the glass。

  This conception of causality leads us to the conception of action;

that of action; to the conception of force; and through it; to the

conception of substance。 As I do not wish this critical essay; the

sole purpose of which is to treat of the sources of our synthetical

cognition a priori; to be crowded with analyses which merely

explain; but do not enlarge the sphere of our conceptions; I reserve

the detailed explanation of the above conceptions for a future

system of pure reason。 Such an analysis; indeed; executed with great

particularity; may already be found in well…known works on this

subject。 But I cannot at present refrain from making a few remarks

on the empirical criterion of a substance; in so far as it seems to be

more evident an

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