the critique of pure reason-第44节

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must　then　have　a　point　of　time　in　which　it　was　not。　But　how　and　by

what　can　we　fix　and　determine　this　point　of　time；　unless　by　that　which

already　exists？　For　a　void　time…　preceding…　is　not　an　object　of

perception；　but　if　we　connect　this　beginning　with　objects　which

existed　previously；　and　which　continue　to　exist　till　the　object　in

question　in　question　begins　to　be；　then　the　latter　can　only　be　a

determination　of　the　former　as　the　permanent。　The　same　holds　good　of

the　notion　of　extinction；　for　this　presupposes　the　empirical

representation　of　a　time；　in　which　a　phenomenon　no　longer　exists。

　　Substances　（in　the　world　of　phenomena）　are　the　substratum　of　all

determinations　of　time。　The　beginning　of　some；　and　the　ceasing　to　be

of　other　substances；　would　utterly　do　away　with　the　only　condition

of　the　empirical　unity　of　time；　and　in　that　case　phenomena　would

relate　to　two　different　times；　in　which；　side　by　side；　existence　would

pass；　which　is　absurd。　For　there　is　only　one　time　in　which　all

different　times　must　be　placed；　not　as　coexistent；　but　as　successive。

　　Accordingly；　permanence　is　a　necessary　condition　under　which　alone

phenomena；　as　things　or　objects；　are　determinable　in　a　possible

experience。　But　as　regards　the　empirical　criterion　of　this　necessary

permanence；　and　with　it　of　the　substantiality　of　phenomena；　we　shall

find　sufficient　opportunity　to　speak　in　the　sequel。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　B。　SECOND　ANALOGY。



　　　　　　Principle　of　the　Succession　of　Time　According

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　to　the　Law　of　Causality。



　　　　　All　changes　take　place　according　to　the　law　of　the

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　connection　of　Cause　and　Effect。



　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PROOF。



　　（That　all　phenomena　in　the　succession　of　time　are　only　changes；　that

is；　a　successive　being　and　non…being　of　the　determinations　of

substance；　which　is　permanent；　consequently　that　a　being　of

substance　itself　which　follows　on　the　non…being　thereof；　or　a

non…being　of　substance　which　follows　on　the　being　thereof；　in　other

words；　that　the　origin　or　extinction　of　substance　itself；　is

impossible…　all　this　has　been　fully　established　in　treating　of　the

foregoing　principle。　This　principle　might　have　been　expressed　as

follows：　〃All　alteration　（succession）　of　phenomena　is　merely

change〃；　for　the　changes　of　substance　are　not　origin　or　extinction；

because　the　conception　of　change　presupposes　the　same　subject　as

existing　with　two　opposite　determinations；　and　consequently　as

permanent。　After　this　premonition；　we　shall　proceed　to　the　proof。）

　　I　perceive　that　phenomena　succeed　one　another；　that　is　to　say；　a

state　of　things　exists　at　one　time；　the　opposite　of　which　existed　in　a

former　state。　In　this　case；　then；　I　really　connect　together　two

perceptions　in　time。　Now　connection　is　not　an　operation　of　mere

sense　and　intuition；　but　is　the　product　of　a　synthetical　faculty　of

imagination；　which　determines　the　internal　sense　in　respect　of　a

relation　of　time。　But　imagination　can　connect　these　two　states　in

two　ways；　so　that　either　the　one　or　the　other　may　antecede　in　time；

for　time　in　itself　cannot　be　an　object　of　perception；　and　what　in　an

object　precedes　and　what　follows　cannot　be　empirically　determined　in

relation　to　it。　I　am　only　conscious；　then；　that　my　imagination

places　one　state　before　and　the　other　after；　not　that　the　one　state

antecedes　the　other　in　the　object。　In　other　words；　the　objective

relation　of　the　successive　phenomena　remains　quite　undetermined　by

means　of　mere　perception。　Now　in　order　that　this　relation　may　be

cognized　as　determined；　the　relation　between　the　two　states　must　be　so

cogitated　that　it　is　thereby　determined　as　necessary；　which　of　them

must　be　placed　before　and　which　after；　and　not　conversely。　But　the

conception　which　carries　with　it　a　necessity　of　synthetical　unity；　can

be　none　other　than　a　pure　conception　of　the　understanding　which　does

not　lie　in　mere　perception；　and　in　this　case　it　is　the　conception　of

〃the　relation　of　cause　and　effect；〃　the　former　of　which　determines　the

latter　in　time；　as　its　necessary　consequence；　and　not　as　something

which　might　possibly　antecede　（or　which　might　in　some　cases　not　be

perceived　to　follow）。　It　follows　that　it　is　only　because　we　subject

the　sequence　of　phenomena；　and　consequently　all　change；　to　the　law

of　causality；　that　experience　itself；　that　is；　empirical　cognition

of　phenomena；　becomes　possible；　and　consequently；　that　phenomena

themselves；　as　objects　of　experience；　are　possible　only　by　virtue　of

this　law。

　　Our　apprehension　of　the　manifold　of　phenomena　is　always

successive。　The　representations　of　parts　succeed　one　another。

Whether　they　succeed　one　another　in　the　object　also；　is　a　second　point

for　reflection；　which　was　not　contained　in　the　former。　Now　we　may

certainly　give　the　name　of　object　to　everything；　even　to　every

representation；　so　far　as　we　are　conscious　thereof；　but　what　this　word

may　mean　in　the　case　of　phenomena；　not　merely　in　so　far　as　they　（as

representations）　are　objects；　but　only　in　so　far　as　they　indicate　an

object；　is　a　question　requiring　deeper　consideration。　In　so　far　as

they；　regarded　merely　as　representations；　are　at　the　same　time　objects

of　consciousness；　they　are　not　to　be　distinguished　from

apprehension；　that　is；　reception　into　the　synthesis　of　imagination；

and　we　must　therefore　say：　〃The　manifold　of　phenomena　is　always

produced　successively　in　the　mind。〃　If　phenomena　were　things　in

themselves；　no　man　would　be　able　to　conjecture　from　the　succession

of　our　representations　how　this　manifold　is　connected　in　the　object；

for　we　have　to　do　only　with　our　representations。　How　things　may　be

in　themselves；　without　regard　to　the　representations　through　which

they　affect　us；　is　utterly　beyond　the　sphere　of　our　cognition。　Now

although　phenomena　are　not　things　in　themselves；　and　are

nevertheless　the　only　thing　given　to　us　to　be　cognized；　it　is　my

duty　to　show　what　sort　of　connection　in　time　belongs　to　the　manifold

in　phenomena　themselves；　while　the　representation　of　this　manifold

in　apprehension　is　always　successive。　For　example；　the　apprehension　of

the　manifold　in　the　phenomenon　of　a　house　which　stands　before　me；　is

successive。　Now　comes　the　question　whether　the　manifold　of　this

house　is　in　itself　successive…　which　no　one　will　be　at　all　willing

to　grant。　But；　so　soon　as　I　raise　my　conception　of　an　object　to　the

transcendental　signification　thereof；　I　find　that　the　house　is　not　a

thing　in　itself；　but　only　a　phenomenon；　that　is；　a　representation；　the

transcendental　object　of　which　remains　utterly　unknown。　What　then　am　I

to　understand　by　the　question：　〃How　can　the　manifold　be　connected　in

the　phenomenon　itself…　not　considered　as　a　thing　in　itself；　but　merely

as　a　phenomenon？〃　Here　that　which　lies　in　my　successive　apprehension

is　regarded　as　representation；　whilst　the　phenomenon　which　is　given

me；　notwithstanding　that　it　is　nothing　more　than　a　complex　of　these

representations；　is　regarded　as　the　object　thereof；　with　which　my

conception；　drawn　from　the　representations　of　apprehension；　must

harmonize。　It　is　very　soon　seen　that；　as　accordance　of　the　cognition

with　its　object　constitutes　truth；　the　question　now　before　us　can　only

relate　to　the　formal　conditions　of　empirical　truth；　and　that　the

phenomenon；　in　opposition　to　the　representations　of　apprehension；

can　only　be　distinguished　therefrom　as　the　object　of　them；　if　it　is

subject　to　a　rule　which　distinguishes　it　from　every　other

apprehension；　and　which　renders　necessary　a　mode　of　connection　of

the　manifold。　That　in　the　phenomenon　which　contains　the　condition　of

this　necessary　rule　of　apprehension；　is　the　object。

　　Let　us　now　proceed　to　our　task。　That　something　happens；　that　is　to

say；　that　something　or　some　state　exists　which　before　was　not；

cannot　be　empirically　perceived；　unless　a　phenomenon　precedes；　which

does　not　contain　in　itself　this　state。　For　a　reality　which　should

follow　upon　a　void　time；　in　other　words；　a　beginning；　which　no　state

of　things　precedes；　can　just　as　little　be　apprehended　as　the　void　time

itself。　Every　apprehension　of　an　event　is　therefore　a　perception　which

follows　upon　another　perception。　But　as　this　is　the　case　with　all

synthesis　of　apprehension；　as　I　have　shown　above　in　the　example　of　a

house；　my　apprehension　of　an　event　is　not　yet　sufficiently

distinguished　from　other　apprehensions。　But　I　remark　also　that　if　in　a

phenomenon　which　contains　an　occurrence；　I　call　the　antecedent　state

of　my　perception；　A；　and　the　following　state；　B；　the　perception　B

can　only　follow　A　in　apprehension；　and　the　perception　A　cannot

follow　B；　but　only　precede　it。　For　example；　I　see　a　ship　float　down

the　stream　of　a　river。　My　perception　of　its　place　lower　down　follows

upon　my　perception　of　its　place　higher　up　the　course　of　the　river；　and

it　is　impossible　that；　in　the　apprehension　of　this　phenomenon；　the

vessel　should　be　perceived　first　below　and　afterwards　higher　up　the

stream。　Here；　theref