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smallest use in the sphere of concrete or physical investigation。 We

may find out that the will is free; but this knowledge only relates to

the intelligible cause of our volition。 As regards the phenomena or

expressions of this will; that is; our actions; we are bound; in

obedience to an inviolable maxim; without which reason cannot be

employed in the sphere of experience; to explain these in the same way

as we explain all the other phenomena of nature; that is to say;

according to its unchangeable laws。 We may have discovered the

spirituality and immortality of the soul; but we cannot employ this

knowledge to explain the phenomena of this life; nor the peculiar

nature of the future; because our conception of an incorporeal

nature is purely negative and does not add anything to our

knowledge; and the only inferences to be drawn from it are purely

fictitious。 If; again; we prove the existence of a supreme

intelligence; we should be able from it to make the conformity to aims

existing in the arrangement of the world comprehensible; but we should

not be justified in deducing from it any particular arrangement or

disposition; or inferring any where it is not perceived。 For it is a

necessary rule of the speculative use of reason that we must not

overlook natural causes; or refuse to listen to the teaching of

experience; for the sake of deducing what we know and perceive from

something that transcends all our knowledge。 In one word; these

three propositions are; for the speculative reason; always

transcendent; and cannot be employed as immanent principles in

relation to the objects of experience; they are; consequently; of no

use to us in this sphere; being but the valueless results of the

severe but unprofitable efforts of reason。

  If; then; the actual cognition of these three cardinal

propositions is perfectly useless; while Reason uses her utmost

endeavours to induce us to admit them; it is plain that their real

value and importance relate to our practical; and not to our

speculative interest。

  I term all that is possible through free will; practical。 But if the

conditions of the exercise of free volition are empirical; reason

can have only a regulative; and not a constitutive; influence upon it;

and is serviceable merely for the introduction of unity into its

empirical laws。 In the moral philosophy of prudence; for example;

the sole business of reason is to bring about a union of all the ends;

which are aimed at by our inclinations; into one ultimate end… that of

happiness… and to show the agreement which should exist among the

means of attaining that end。 In this sphere; accordingly; reason

cannot present to us any other than pragmatical laws of free action;

for our guidance towards the aims set up by the senses; and is

incompetent to give us laws which are pure and determined completely a

priori。 On the other hand; pure practical laws; the ends of which have

been given by reason entirely a priori; and which are not

empirically conditioned; but are; on the contrary; absolutely

imperative in their nature; would be products of pure reason。 Such are

the moral laws; and these alone belong to the sphere of the

practical exercise of reason; and admit of a canon。

  All the powers of reason; in the sphere of what may be termed pure

philosophy; are; in fact; directed to the three above…mentioned

problems alone。 These again have a still higher end… the answer to the

question; what we ought to do; if the will is free; if there is a

God and a future world。 Now; as this problem relates to our in

reference to the highest aim of humanity; it is evident that the

ultimate intention of nature; in the constitution of our reason; has

been directed to the moral alone。

  We must take care; however; in turning our attention to an object

which is foreign* to the sphere of transcendental philosophy; not to

injure the unity of our system by digressions; nor; on the other hand;

to fail in clearness; by saying too little on the new subject of

discussion。 I hope to avoid both extremes; by keeping as close as

possible to the transcendental; and excluding all psychological;

that is; empirical; elements。



  *All practical conceptions relate to objects of pleasure and pain;

and consequently… in an indirect manner; at least… to objects of

feeling。 But as feeling is not a faculty of representation; but lies

out of the sphere of our powers of cognition; the elements of our

judgements; in so far as they relate to pleasure or pain; that is; the

elements of our practical judgements; do not belong to

transcendental philosophy; which has to do with pure a priori

cognitions alone。



  I have to remark; in the first place; that at present I treat of the

conception of freedom in the practical sense only; and set aside the

corresponding transcendental conception; which cannot be employed as a

ground of explanation in the phenomenal world; but is itself a problem

for pure reason。 A will is purely animal (arbitrium brutum) when it is

determined by sensuous impulses or instincts only; that is; when it is

determined in a pathological manner。 A will; which can be determined

independently of sensuous impulses; consequently by motives

presented by reason alone; is called a free will (arbitrium

liberum); and everything which is connected with this free will;

either as principle or consequence; is termed practical。 The existence

of practical freedom can be proved from experience alone。 For the

human will is not determined by that alone which immediately affects

the senses; on the contrary; we have the power; by calling up the

notion of what is useful or hurtful in a more distant relation; of

overcoming the immediate impressions on our sensuous faculty of

desire。 But these considerations of what is desirable in relation to

our whole state; that is; is in the end good and useful; are based

entirely upon reason。 This faculty; accordingly; enounces laws;

which are imperative or objective laws of freedom and which tell us

what ought to take place; thus distinguishing themselves from the laws

of nature; which relate to that which does take place。 The laws of

freedom or of free will are hence termed practical laws。

  Whether reason is not itself; in the actual delivery of these

laws; determined in its turn by other influences; and whether the

action which; in relation to sensuous impulses; we call free; may not;

in relation to higher and more remote operative causes; really form

a part of nature… these are questions which do not here concern us。

They are purely speculative questions; and all we have to do; in the

practical sphere; is to inquire into the rule of conduct which

reason has to present。 Experience demonstrates to us the existence

of practical freedom as one of the causes which exist in nature;

that is; it shows the causal power of reason in the determination of

the will。 The idea of transcendental freedom; on the contrary;

requires that reason… in relation to its causal power of commencing

a series of phenomena… should be independent of all sensuous

determining causes; and thus it seems to be in opposition to the law

of nature and to all possible experience。 It therefore remains a

problem for the human mind。 But this problem does not concern reason

in its practical use; and we have; therefore; in a canon of pure

reason; to do with only two questions; which relate to the practical

interest of pure reason: Is there a God? and; Is there a future

life? The question of transcendental freedom is purely speculative;

and we may therefore set it entirely aside when we come to treat of

practical reason。 Besides; we have already discussed this subject in

the antinomy of pure reason。



   SECTION II。 Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a Determining

           Ground of the Ultimate End of Pure Reason。



  Reason conducted us; in its speculative use; through the field of

experience and; as it can never find complete satisfaction in that

sphere; from thence to speculative ideas… which; however; in the end

brought us back again to experience; and thus fulfilled the purpose of

reason; in a manner which; though useful; was not at all in accordance

with our expectations。 It now remains for us to consider whether

pure reason can be employed in a practical sphere; and whether it will

here conduct us to those ideas which attain the highest ends of pure

reason; as we have just stated them。 We shall thus ascertain

whether; from the point of view of its practical interest; reason

may not be able to supply us with that which; on the speculative side;

it wholly denies us。

  The whole interest of reason; speculative as well as practical; is

centred in the three following questions:



               1。 WHAT CAN I KNOW?

               2。 WHAT OUGHT I TO DO?

               3。 WHAT MAY I HOPE?



  The first question is purely speculative。 We have; as I flatter

myself; exhausted all the replie

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