the critique of pure reason-第133节

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which；　as　a　necessary　condition；　all　sensibility；　and　consequently　all

thought；　relates　in　the　present　state　of　our　existence；　and　that　the

separation　of　soul　and　body　forms　the　conclusion　of　the　sensuous

exercise　of　our　power　of　cognition　and　the　beginning　of　the

intellectual。　The　body　would；　in　this　view　of　the　question；　be

regarded；　not　as　the　cause　of　thought；　but　merely　as　its　restrictive

condition；　as　promotive　of　the　sensuous　and　animal；　but　as　a　hindrance

to　the　pure　and　spiritual　life；　and　the　dependence　of　the　animal

life　on　the　constitution　of　the　body；　would　not　prove　that　the　whole

life　of　man　was　also　dependent　on　the　state　of　the　organism。　We

might　go　still　farther；　and　discover　new　objections；　or　carry　out　to

their　extreme　consequences　those　which　have　already　been　adduced。

　　Generation；　in　the　human　race　as　well　as　among　the　irrational

animals；　depends　on　so　many　accidents…　of　occasion；　of　proper

sustenance；　of　the　laws　enacted　by　the　government　of　a　country　of　vice

even；　that　it　is　difficult　to　believe　in　the　eternal　existence　of　a

being　whose　life　has　begun　under　circumstances　so　mean　and　trivial；

and　so　entirely　dependent　upon　our　own　control。　As　regards　the

continuance　of　the　existence　of　the　whole　race；　we　need　have　no

difficulties；　for　accident　in　single　cases　is　subject　to　general　laws；

but；　in　the　case　of　each　individual；　it　would　seem　as　if　we　could

hardly　expect　so　wonderful　an　effect　from　causes　so　insignificant。

But；　in　answer　to　these　objections；　we　may　adduce　the　transcendental

hypothesis　that　all　life　is　properly　intelligible；　and　not　subject

to　changes　of　time；　and　that　it　neither　began　in　birth；　nor　will　end

in　death。　We　may　assume　that　this　life　is　nothing　more　than　a　sensuous

representation　of　pure　spiritual　life；　that　the　whole　world　of　sense

is　but　an　image；　hovering　before　the　faculty　of　cognition　which　we

exercise　in　this　sphere；　and　with　no　more　objective　reality　than　a

dream；　and　that　if　we　could　intuite　ourselves　and　other　things　as　they

really　are；　we　should　see　ourselves　in　a　world　of　spiritual　natures；

our　connection　with　which　did　not　begin　at　our　birth　and　will　not

cease　with　the　destruction　of　the　body。　And　so　on。

　　We　cannot　be　said　to　know　what　has　been　above　asserted；　nor　do　we

seriously　maintain　the　truth　of　these　assertions；　and　the　notions

therein　indicated　are　not　even　ideas　of　reason；　they　are　purely

fictitious　conceptions。　But　this　hypothetical　procedure　is　in

perfect　conformity　with　the　laws　of　reason。　Our　opponent　mistakes

the　absence　of　empirical　conditions　for　a　proof　of　the　complete

impossibility　of　all　that　we　have　asserted；　and　we　have　to　show　him

that　be　has　not　exhausted　the　whole　sphere　of　possibility　and　that

he　can　as　little　compass　that　sphere　by　the　laws　of　experience　and

nature；　as　we　can　lay　a　secure　foundation　for　the　operations　of　reason

beyond　the　region　of　experience。　Such　hypothetical　defences　against

the　pretensions　of　an　opponent　must　not　be　regarded　as　declarations　of

opinion。　The　philosopher　abandons　them；　so　soon　as　the　opposite

party　renounces　its　dogmatical　conceit。　To　maintain　a　simply

negative　position　in　relation　to　propositions　which　rest　on　an

insecure　foundation；　well　befits　the　moderation　of　a　true　philosopher；

but　to　uphold　the　objections　urged　against　an　opponent　as　proofs　of

the　opposite　statement　is　a　proceeding　just　as　unwarrantable　and

arrogant　as　it　is　to　attack　the　position　of　a　philosopher　who　advances

affirmative　propositions　regarding　such　a　subject。

　　It　is　evident；　therefore；　that　hypotheses；　in　the　speculative

sphere；　are　valid；　not　as　independent　propositions；　but　only

relatively　to　opposite　transcendent　assumptions。　For；　to　make　the

principles　of　possible　experience　conditions　of　the　possibility　of

things　in　general　is　just　as　transcendent　a　procedure　as　to　maintain

the　objective　reality　of　ideas　which　can　be　applied　to　no　objects

except　such　as　lie　without　the　limits　of　possible　experience。　The

judgements　enounced　by　pure　reason　must　be　necessary；　or　they　must　not

be　enounced　at　all。　Reason　cannot　trouble　herself　with　opinions。　But

the　hypotheses　we　have　been　discussing　are　merely　problematical

judgements；　which　can　neither　be　confuted　nor　proved；　while；

therefore；　they　are　not　personal　opinions；　they　are　indispensable　as

answers　to　objections　which　are　liable　to　be　raised。　But　we　must

take　care　to　confine　them　to　this　function；　and　guard　against　any

assumption　on　their　part　of　absolute　validity；　a　proceeding　which

would　involve　reason　in　inextricable　difficulties　and　contradictions。



　　　　　SECTION　IV。　The　Discipline　of　Pure　Reason　in　Relation

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　to　Proofs。



　　It　is　a　peculiarity；　which　distinguishes　the　proofs　of

transcendental　synthetical　propositions　from　those　of　all　other　a

priori　synthetical　cognitions；　that　reason；　in　the　case　of　the　former；

does　not　apply　its　conceptions　directly　to　an　object；　but　is　first

obliged　to　prove；　a　priori；　the　objective　validity　of　these

conceptions　and　the　possibility　of　their　syntheses。　This　is　not　merely

a　prudential　rule；　it　is　essential　to　the　very　possibility　of　the

proof　of　a　transcendental　proposition。　If　I　am　required　to　pass；　a

priori；　beyond　the　conception　of　an　object；　I　find　that　it　is

utterly　impossible　without　the　guidance　of　something　which　is　not

contained　in　the　conception。　In　mathematics；　it　is　a　priori

intuition　that　guides　my　synthesis；　and；　in　this　case；　all　our

conclusions　may　be　drawn　immediately　from　pure　intuition。　In

transcendental　cognition；　so　long　as　we　are　dealing　only　with

conceptions　of　the　understanding；　we　are　guided　by　possible

experience。　That　is　to　say；　a　proof　in　the　sphere　of　transcendental

cognition　does　not　show　that　the　given　conception　（that　of　an　event；

for　example）　leads　directly　to　another　conception　（that　of　a　cause）…

for　this　would　be　a　saltus　which　nothing　can　justify；　but　it　shows

that　experience　itself；　and　consequently　the　object　of　experience；

is　impossible　without　the　connection　indicated　by　these　conceptions。

It　follows　that　such　a　proof　must　demonstrate　the　possibility　of

arriving；　synthetically　and　a　priori；　at　a　certain　knowledge　of

things；　which　was　not　contained　in　our　conceptions　of　these　things。

Unless　we　pay　particular　attention　to　this　requirement；　our　proofs；

instead　of　pursuing　the　straight　path　indicated　by　reason；　follow

the　tortuous　road　of　mere　subjective　association。　The　illusory

conviction；　which　rests　upon　subjective　causes　of　association；　and

which　is　considered　as　resulting　from　the　perception　of　a　real　and

objective　natural　affinity；　is　always　open　to　doubt　and　suspicion。　For

this　reason；　all　the　attempts　which　have　been　made　to　prove　the

principle　of　sufficient　reason；　have；　according　to　the　universal

admission　of　philosophers；　been　quite　unsuccessful；　and；　before　the

appearance　of　transcendental　criticism；　it　was　considered　better；　as

this　principle　could　not　be　abandoned；　to　appeal　boldly　to　the

common　sense　of　mankind　（a　proceeding　which　always　proves　that　the

problem；　which　reason　ought　to　solve；　is　one　in　which　philosophers

find　great　difficulties）；　rather　than　attempt　to　discover　new

dogmatical　proofs。

　　But；　if　the　proposition　to　be　proved　is　a　proposition　of　pure

reason；　and　if　I　aim　at　passing　beyond　my　empirical　conceptions　by　the

aid　of　mere　ideas；　it　is　necessary　that　the　proof　should　first　show

that　such　a　step　in　synthesis　is　possible　（which　it　is　not）；　before　it

proceeds　to　prove　the　truth　of　the　proposition　itself。　The　so…called

proof　of　the　simple　nature　of　the　soul　from　the　unity　of　apperception；

is　a　very　plausible　one。　But　it　contains　no　answer　to　the　objection；

that；　as　the　notion　of　absolute　simplicity　is　not　a　conception　which

is　directly　applicable　to　a　perception；　but　is　an　idea　which　must　be

inferred…　if　at　all…　from　observation；　it　is　by　no　means　evident　how

the　mere　fact　of　consciousness；　which　is　contained　in　all　thought；

although　in　so　far　a　simple　representation；　can　conduct　me　to　the

consciousness　and　cognition　of　a　thing　which　is　purely　a　thinking

substance。　When　I　represent　to　my　mind　the　power　of　my　body　as　in

motion；　my　body　in　this　thought　is　so　far　absolute　unity；　and　my

representation　of　it　is　a　simple　one；　and　hence　I　can　indicate　this

representation　by　the　motion　of　a　point；　because　I　have　made

abstraction　of　the　size　or　volume　of　the　body。　But　I　cannot　hence

infer　that；　given　merely　the　moving　power　of　a　body；　the　body　may　be

cogitated　as　simple　substance；　merely　because　the　representation　in　my

mind　takes　no　account　of　its　content　in　space；　and　is　consequently

simple。　The　simple；　in　abstraction；　is　very　different　from　the

objectively　simple；　and　hence　the　Ego；　which　is　simple　in　the　first

sense；　may；　in　the　second　sense；　as　indicating　the　soul　itself；　be　a

very　complex　conception；　with　a　very　various　content。　Thus　it　is

evident　that　in　all　such　argument