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笛卡尔+第一哲学沉思录+英文版-第16节

小说: 笛卡尔+第一哲学沉思录+英文版 字数: 每页4000字

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But if the question turns upon a pentagon; it is quite true
that I can conceive its figure as well as that of a chiliagon
without the help of my imagination; but I can also imagine it
by applying the attention of my mind to each of its five
sides; and at the same time to the space which they enclose。
And thus I clearly recognise that I have need of a particular
effort of mind in order to effect the act of imagination; such
as I do not require in order to understand; and this
particular effort of mind clearly manifests the difference
which exists between imagination and pure intellection。26
     I remark besides that this power of imagination which is
in one; inasmuch as it differs from the power of
understanding; is in no wise a necessary element in my nature;
or in 'my essence; that is to say; in' the essence of my mind;
for although I did not possess it I should doubtless ever
remain the same as I now am; from which it appears that we
might conclude that it depends on something which differs from
me。  And I easily conceive that if some body exists with which
my mind is conjoined and united in such a way that it can
apply itself to consider it when it pleases; it may be that by
this means it can imagine corporeal objects; so that this mode
of thinking differs from pure intellection only inasmuch as
mind in its intellectual activity in some manner turns on
itself; and considers some of the ideas which it possesses in
itself; while in imagining it turns towards the body; and
there beholds in it something conformable to the idea which it
has either conceived of itself or perceived by the senses。  I
easily understand; I say; that the imagination could be thus
constituted if it is true that body exists; and because I can
discover no other convenient mode of explaining it; I
conjecture with probability that body does exist; but this is
only with probability; and although I examine all things with
care; I nevertheless do not find that from this distinct idea
of corporeal nature; which I have in my imagination; I can
derive any argument from which there will necessarily be
deduced the existence of body。
     But I am in the habit of imagining many other things
besides this corporeal nature which is the object of pure
mathematics; to wit; the colours; sounds; scents; pain; and
other such things; although less distinctly。  And inasmuch as
I perceive these things much better through the senses; by the
medium of which; and by the memory; they seem to have reached
my imagination; I believe that; in order to examine them more
conveniently; it is right that I should at the same time
investigate the nature of sense perception; and that I should
see if from the ideas which I apprehend by this mode of
thought; which I call feeling; I cannot derive some certain
proof of the existence of corporeal objects。
     And first of all I shall recall to my memory those
matters which I hitherto held to be true; as having perceived
them through the senses; and the foundations on which my
belief has rested; in the next place I shall examine the
reasons which have since obliged me to place them in doubt; in
the last place I shall consider which of them I must now
believe。
     First of all; then; I perceived that I had a head; hands;
feet; and all other members of which this body¥which I
considered as a part; or possibly even as the whole; of
myself¥is posed。  Further I was sensible that this body was
placed amidst many others; from which it was capable of being
affected in many different ways; beneficial and hurtful; and I
remarked that a certain feeling of pleasure acpanied those
that were beneficial; and pain those which were harmful。  And
in addition to this pleasure and pain; I also experienced
hunger; thirst; and other similar appetites; as also certain
corporeal inclinations towards joy; sadness; anger; and other
similar passions。  And outside myself; in addition to
extension; figure; and motions of bodies; I remarked in them
hardness; heat; and all other tactice qualities; and; further;
light and colour; and scents and sounds; the variety of which
gave me the means of distinguishing the sky; the earth; the
sea; and generally all the other bodies; one from the other。
And certainly; considering the ideas of all these qualities
which presented themselves to my mind; and which alone I
perceived properly or immediately; it was not without reason
that I believed myself to perceive objects quite different
from my thought; to wit; bodies from which those ideas
proceeded; for I found by experience that these ideas
presented themselves to me without my consent being requisite;
so that I could not perceive any object; however desirous I
might be; unless it were present to the organs of sense; and
it was not in my power not to perceive it; when it was
present。  And because the ideas which I received through the
senses were much more lively; more clear; and even; in their
own way; more distinct than any of those which I could of
myself frame in meditation; or than those I found impressed on
my memory; it appeared as though they could not have proceeded
from my mind; so that they must necessarily have been produced
in me by some other things。  And having no knowledge of those
objects excepting the knowledge which the ideas themselves
gave me; nothing was more likely to occur to my mind than that
the objects were similar to the ideas which were caused。  And
because I likewise remembered that I had formerly made use of
my senses rather than my reason; and recognised that the ideas
which I formed of myself were not so distinct as those which I
perceived through the senses; and that they were most
frequently even posed of portions of these last; I
persuaded myself easily that I had no idea in my mind which
had not formerly e to me through the senses。  Nor was it
without some reason that I believed that this body (which be a
certain special right I call my own) belonged to me more
properly and more strictly than any other; for in fact I could
never be separated from it as from other bodies; I experienced
in it and on account of it all my appetites and affections;
and finally I was touched by the feeling of pain and the
titillation of pleasure in its parts; and not in the parts of
other bodies which were separated from it。  But when I
inquired; why; from some; I know not what; painful sensation;
there follows sadness of mind; and from the pleasurable
sensation there arises joy; or why this mysterious pinching of
the stomach which I call hunger causes me to desire to eat;
and dryness of throat causes a desire to drink; and so on; I
could give no reason excepting that nature taught me so; for
there is certainly no affinity (that I at least can
understand) between the craving of the stomach and the desire
to eat; any more than between the perception of whatever
causes pain and the thought of sadness which arises from this
perception。  And in the same way it appeared to me that I had
learned from nature all the other judgments which I formed
regarding the objects of my senses; since I remarked that
these judgments were formed in me before I had the leisure to
weigh and consider any reasons which might oblige me to make
them。
     But afterwards many experiences little by little
destroyed all the faith which I had rested in my senses; for I
from time to time observed that those towers which from afar
appeared to me to be round; more closely observed seemed
square; and that colossal statues raised on the summit of
these towers; appeared as quite tiny statues when viewed from
the bottom; and so in an infinitude of other cases I found
error in judgments founded on the external senses。  And not
only in those founded on the external senses; but even in
those founded on the internal as well; for is there anything
more intimate or more internal than pain?  And yet I have
learned from some persons whose arms or legs have been cut
off; that they sometimes seemed to feel pain in the part which
had been amputated; which made me think that I could not be
quite certain that it was a certain member which pained me;
even although I felt pain in it。  And to those grounds of
doubt I have lately added two others; which are very general;
the first is that I never have believed myself to feel
anything in waking moments which I cannot also sometimes
believe myself to feel when I sleep; and as I do not think
that these things which I seem to feel in sleep; proceed from
objects outside of me; I do not see any reason why I should
have this belief regarding objects which I seem to perceive
while awake。  The other was that being still ignorant; or
rather supposing myself to be ignorant; of the author of my
being; I saw nothing to prevent me from having been so
constituted by nature that I might be deceived even in matters
which seemed to me to be most certain。  And as to the grounds
on which I was formerly persuaded of the truth of sensible
objects; I had not much trouble in replying to them。  For
since nature seemed to cause me to lean towards many things
from which reason repelled me; I did not believe that I should
trust much to the teachings of nature。 

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