the spirit of laws-第57节

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In　the　taxing　of　lands　it　is　customary　to　make　lists　or　registers；　in　which　the　different　classes　of　estates　are　ranged。　But　it　is　very　difficult　to　know　these　differences；　and　still　more　so　to　find　people　that　are　not　interested　in　mistaking　them。　Here；　therefore；　are　two　sorts　of　injustice；　that　of　the　man　and　that　of　the　thing。　But　if　in　general　the　tax　be　not　exorbitant；　and　the　people　continue　to　have　plenty　of　necessaries；　these　particular　acts　of　injustice　will　do　no　harm。　On　the　contrary；　if　the　people　are　permitted　to　enjoy　only　just　what　is　necessary　for　subsistence；　the　least　disproportion　will　be　of　the　greatest　consequence。

If　some　subjects　do　not　pay　enough；　the　mischief　is　not　so　great；　their　convenience　and　ease　turn　always　to　the　public　advantage；　if　some　private　people　pay　too　much；　their　ruin　redounds　to　the　public　detriment。　If　the　government　proportions　its　fortune　to　that　of　individuals；　the　ease　and　convenience　of　the　latter　will　soon　make　its　fortune　rise。　The　whole　depends　upon　a　critical　moment：　shall　the　state　begin　with　impoverishing　the　subjects　to　enrich　itself？　Or　had　it　better　wait　to　be　enriched　by　its　subjects？　Is　it　more　advisable　for　it　to　have　the　former　or　the　latter　advantage？　Which　shall　it　choose　　to　begin　or　to　end　with　opulence？　

The　duties　felt　least　by　the　people　are　those　on　merchandise；　because　they　are　not　demanded　of　them　in　form。　They　may　be　so　prudently　managed　that　the　people　themselves　shall　hardly　know　they　pay　them。　For　this　purpose　it　is　of　the　utmost　consequence　that　the　person　who　sells　the　merchandise　should　pay　the　duty。　He　is　very　sensible　that　he　does　not　pay　it　for　himself；　and　the　consumer；　who　pays　it　in　the　main；　confounds　it　with　the　price。　Some　authors　have　observed　that　Nero　had　abolished　the　duty　of　the　five…and…twentieth　part　arising　from　the　sale　of　slaves；＇6＇　and　yet　he　had　only　ordained　that　it　should　be　paid　by　the　seller　instead　of　the　purchaser；　this　regulation；　which　left　the　impost　entire；　seemed　nevertheless　to　suppress　it。

There　are　two　states　in　Europe　where　the　imposts　are　very　heavy　upon　liquors：　in　one　the　brewer　alone　pays　the　duty；　in　the　other　it　is　levied　indiscriminately　upon　all　the　consumers；　in　the　first　nobody　feels　the　rigour　of　the　impost；　in　the　second　it　is　looked　upon　as　a　grievance；　in　the　former　the　subject　is　sensible　only　of　the　liberty　he　has　of　not　paying；　in　the　latter　he　feels　only　the　necessity　that　compels　him　to　pay。

Further；　the　obliging　the　consumers　to　pay　requires　a　perpetual　rummaging　and　searching　into　their　houses。　Now　nothing　is　more　contrary　than　this　to　liberty；　and　those　who　establish　these　sorts　of　duties　have　not　surely　been　so　happy　as　to　hit　upon　the　best　method　of　collecting　the　revenue。

8。　In　what　Manner　the　Deception　is　preserved。　In　order　to　make　the　purchaser　confound　the　price　of　the　commodity　with　the　impost；　there　must　be　some　proportion　between　the　impost　and　the　value　of　the　commodity：　for　which　reason　there　ought　not　to　be　an　excessive　duty　upon　merchandise　of　little　value。　There　are　countries　in　which　the　duty　exceeds　seventeen　or　eighteen　times　the　value　of　the　commodity。　In　this　case　the　prince　removes　the　disguise：　his　subjects　plainly　see　they　are　dealt　with　in　an　unreasonable　manner；　which　renders　them　most　exquisitely　sensible　of　their　servile　condition。

Besides；　the　prince；　to　be　able　to　levy　a　duty　so　disproportioned　to　the　value　of　the　commodity；　must　be　himself　the　vendor；　and　the　people　must　not　have　it　in　their　power　to　purchase　it　elsewhere：　a　practice　subject　to　a　thousand　inconveniences。

Smuggling　being　in　this　case　extremely　lucrative；　the　natural　and　most　reasonable　penalty；　namely；　the　confiscation　of　the　merchandise；　becomes　incapable　of　putting　a　stop　to　it；　especially　as　this　very　merchandise　is　intrinsically　of　inconsiderable　value。　Recourse　must　therefore　be　had　to　extravagant　punishments；　such　as　those　inflicted　for　capital　crimes。

All　proportion　then　of　penalties　is　at　an　end。　Persons　that　cannot　really　be　considered　as　vicious　are　punished　like　the　most　infamous　criminals；　which　of　all　things　in　the　world　is　the　most　contrary　to　the　spirit　of　a　moderate　government。

Again；　in　proportion　as　people　are　tempted　to　cheat　the　farmer　of　the　revenues；　the　more　the　latter　is　enriched；　and　the　former　impoverished。　To　put　a　stop　to　smuggling；　the　farmer　must　be　invested　with　extraordinary　means　of　oppressing；　and　then　the　country　is　ruined。

9。　Of　a　bad　Kind　of　Impost。　We　shall　here；　by　the　way；　take　notice　of　an　impost　laid　in　particular　countries　on　the　different　articles　of　civil　contracts。　As　these　are　things　subject　to　very　nice　disquisitions；　a　vast　deal　of　knowledge　is　necessary　to　make　any　tolerable　defence　against　the　farmer　of　the　revenues；　who　interprets；　in　that　case；　the　regulations　of　the　prince；　and　exercises　an　arbitrary　power　over　people's　fortunes。　Experience　has　demonstrated　that　a　duty　on　the　paper　on　which　the　deeds　are　drawn　would　be　of　far　greater　service。

10。　That　the　Greatness　of　Taxes　depends　on　the　Nature　of　the　Government。　Taxes　ought　to　be　very　light　in　despotic　governments：　otherwise　who　would　be　at　the　trouble　of　tilling　the　land？　Besides；　how　is　it　possible　to　pay　heavy　duties　in　a　government　that　makes　no　manner　of　return　to　the　different　contributions　of　the　subject？

The　exorbitant　power　of　the　prince；　and　the　extreme　depression　of　the　people；　require　that　there　should　not　be　even　a　possibility　of　the　least　mistake　between　them。　The　taxes　ought　to　be　so　easy　to　collect；　and　so　clearly　settled；　as　to　leave　no　opportunity　for　the　collectors　to　increase　or　diminish　them。　A　portion　of　the　fruits　of　the　earth；　a　capitation；　a　duty　of　so　much　per　cent　on　merchandise；　are　the　only　taxes　suitable　to　that　government。

Merchants　in　despotic　countries　ought　to　have　a　personal　safeguard；　to　which　all　due　respect　should　be　paid。　Without　this　they　would　be　too　weak　to　dispute　with　the　custom…house　officers。

11。　Of　Confiscations。　With　respect　to　confiscations；　there　is　one　thing　very　particular　that；　contrary　to　the　general　custom；　they　are　more　severe　in　Europe　than　in　Asia。　In　Europe　not　only　the　merchandise；　but　even　sometimes　the　ships　and　carriages；　are　confiscated；　which　is　never　practised　in　Asia。　This　is　because　in　Europe　the　merchant　can　have　recourse　to　magistrates；　who　are　able　to　shelter　him　from　oppression；　in　Asia　the　magistrates　themselves　would　be　the　greatest　oppressors。　What　remedy　could　a　merchant　have　against　a　pasha　who　was　determined　to　confiscate　his　goods？

The　prince；　therefore；　checks　his　own　power；　finding　himself　under　the　necessity　of　acting　with　some　kind　of　lenity。　In　Turkey　they　raise　only　a　single　duty　for　the　importation　of　goods；　and　afterwards　the　whole　country　is　open　to　the　merchant。　Smuggling　is　not　attended　with　confiscation　or　increase　of　duty。　In　China＇7＇　they　never　look　into　the　baggage　of　those　who　are　not　merchants。　Defrauding　the　customs　in　the　territory　of　the　Mogul　is　not　punished　with　confiscation；　but　with　doubling　the　duty。　The　princes　of　Tartary；　who　reside　in　towns；　impose　scarcely　any　duty　at　all　on　the　goods　that　pass　through　their　country。＇8＇　In　Japan；　it　is　true；　to　cheat　the　customs　is　a　capital　crime；　but　this　is　because　they　have　particular　reasons　for　prohibiting　all　communication　with　foreigners；　hence　the　fraud＇9＇　is　rather　a　contravention　of　the　laws　made　for　the　security　of　the　government　than　of　those　of　commerce。

12。　Relation　between　the　Weight　of　Taxes　and　Liberty。　It　is　a　general　rule　that　taxes　may　be　heavier　in　proportion　to　the　liberty　of　the　subject；　and　that　there　is　a　necessity　for　reducing　them　in　proportion　to　the　increase　of　slavery。　This　has　always　been　and　always　will　be　the　case。　It　is　a　rule　derived　from　nature　that　never　varies。　We　find　it　in　all　parts　　in　England；　in　Holland；　and　in　every　state　where　liberty　gradually　declines；　till　we　come　to　Turkey。　Switzerland　seems　to　be　an　exception　to　this　rule；　because　they　pay　no　taxes；　but　the　particular　reason　for　that　exemption　is　well　known；　and　even　confirms　what　I　have　advanced。　In　those　barren　mountains　provisions　are　so　dear；　and　the　country　is　so　populous；　that　a　Swiss　pays　four　times　more　to　nature　than　a　Turk　does　to　the　sultan。

A　conquering　people；　such　as　were　formerly　the　Athenians　and　the　Romans；　may　rid　themselves　of　all　taxes　as　they　reign　over　vanquished　nations。　Then　indeed　they　do　not　pay　in　proportion　to　their　liberty；　because　in　this　respect　they　are　no　longer　a　people；　but　a　monarch。

But　the　general　rule　still　holds　good。　In　moderate　governments　there　is　an　indemnity　for　the　weight　of　the　taxes；　which　is　liberty。　In　despotic　countries＇10＇　there　is　an　equivalent　for　liberty；　which　is　the　lightness　of　the　taxes。

In　some　monarchies　in　Europe　there　are　particular　provinces＇11＇　which　from　the　very　nature　of　their　civil　government　are　in　a　more　flourishing　condition　than　the　rest。　It　is　pretended　that　these　provinces　are　not　sufficiently　taxed；　because　through　the　goodness　of　their　government　they　are　able　to　be　taxed　higher；　hence　the　ministers　seem　constantly　to　aim　at　depriving　them　of　this　very　government；　whence　a　diffusive　blessing　is　derived；　which　redounds　even　to　the