the spirit of laws-第37节

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23。　Book　i；　pref。

24。　Livy；　iii。　20。

25。　Ibid。；　32。

26。　About　a　hundred　years　after。

27。　See　xi；　12。

28。　See　Dio；　xxxviii；　Cicero　in　Plutarch；　Cicero　to　Atticus；　iv。　10；　15。　Asconius　on　Cicero；　De　Divinatione。

29。　As　when　a　petty　sovereign　supports　himself　between　two　great　powers　by　means　of　their　mutual　jealousy；　but　then　he　has　only　a　precarious　existence。

30。　See　M。　Le　Clerc；　the　History　of　the　United　Provinces。

31。　〃It　is　the　cudgel　that　governs　China；〃　says　Father　Du　Halde；　Disc。　de　la　Chine；　ii；　p。　134。

32。　Among　others；　De　Lange's　account。

33。　Of　the　Family　of　Sourniama；　Edifying　Letters；　coll。　xviii。

34。　See　in　Father　Du　Halde　how　the　missionaries　availed　themselves　of　the　authority　of　Canhi　to　silence　the　mandarins；　who　constantly　declared　that　by　the　laws　of　the　country　no　foreign　worship　could　be　established　in　the　empire。

35。　See　Lettres　persanes；　210。

36。　See　the　order　of　Tsongtou　for　tilling　the　land；　in　the　Edifying　Letters；　coll。　xxi。




Book　IX。　Of　Laws　in　the　Relation　They　Bear　to　a　Defensive　Force

1。　In　what　Manner　Republics　provide　for　their　Safety。　If　a　republic　be　small；　it　is　destroyed　by　a　foreign　force；　if　it　be　large；　it　is　ruined　by　an　internal　imperfection。

To　this　twofold　inconvenience　democracies　and　aristocracies　are　equally　liable；　whether　they　be　good　or　bad。　The　evil　is　in　the　very　thing　itself；　and　no　form　can　redress　it。

It　is；　therefore；　very　probable　that　mankind　would　have　been；　at　length；　obliged　to　live　constantly　under　the　government　of　a　single　person；　had　they　not　contrived　a　kind　of　constitution　that　has　all　the　internal　advantages　of　a　republican；　together　with　the　external　force　of　a　monarchical；　government。　I　mean　a　confederate　republic。

This　form　of　government　is　a　convention　by　which　several　petty　states　agree　to　become　members　of　a　larger　one；　which　they　intend　to　establish。　It　is　a　kind　of　assemblage　of　societies；　that　constitute　a　new　one；　capable　of　increasing　by　means　of　further　associations；　till　they　arrive　at　such　a　degree　of　power　as　to　be　able　to　provide　for　the　security　of　the　whole　body。

It　was　these　associations　that　so　long　contributed　to　the　prosperity　of　Greece。　By　these　the　Romans　attacked　the　whole　globe；　and　by　these　alone　the　whole　globe　withstood　them；　for　when　Rome　had　arrived　at　her　highest　pitch　of　grandeur；　it　was　the　associations　beyond　the　Danube　and　the　Rhine　　associations　formed　by　the　terror　of　her　arms　　that　enabled　the　barbarians　to　resist　her。

Hence　it　proceeds　that　Holland；＇1＇　Germany；　and　the　Swiss　cantons　are　considered　in　Europe　as　perpetual　republics。

The　associations　of　cities　were　formerly　more　necessary　than　in　our　times。　A　weak；　defenceless　town　was　exposed　to　greater　danger。　By　conquest　it　was　deprived　not　only　of　the　executive　and　legislative　power；　as　at　present；　but　moreover　of　all　human　property。＇2＇

A　republic　of　this　kind；　able　to　withstand　an　external　force；　may　support　itself　without　any　internal　corruption；　the　form　of　this　society　prevents　all　manner　of　inconveniences。

If　a　single　member　should　attempt　to　usurp　the　supreme　power；　he　could　not　be　supposed　to　have　an　equal　authority　and　credit　in　all　the　confederate　states。　Were　he　to　have　too　great　an　influence　over　one；　this　would　alarm　the　rest；　were　he　to　subdue　a　part；　that　which　would　still　remain　free　might　oppose　him　with　forces　independent　of　those　which　he　had　usurped；　and　overpower　him　before　he　could　be　settled　in　his　usurpation。

Should　a　popular　insurrection　happen　in　one　of　the　confederate　states；　the　others　are　able　to　quell　it。　Should　abuses　creep　into　one　part；　they　are　reformed　by　those　that　remain　sound。　The　state　may　be　destroyed　on　one　side；　and　not　on　the　other；　the　confederacy　may　be　dissolved；　and　the　confederates　preserve　their　sovereignty。

As　this　government　is　composed　of　petty　republics；　it　enjoys　the　internal　happiness　of　each；　and　with　regard　to　its　external　situation；　by　means　of　the　association；　it　possesses　all　the　advantages　of　large　monarchies。

2。　That　a　confederate　Government　ought　to　be　composed　of　States　of　the　same　Nature；　especially　of　the　republican　Kind。　The　Canaanites　were　destroyed　by　reason　that　they　were　petty　monarchies；　that　had　no　union　or　confederacy　for　their　common　defence；　and；　indeed；　a　confederacy　is　not　agreeable　to　the　nature　of　petty　monarchies。

As　the　confederate　republic　of　Germany　consists　of　free　cities；　and　of　petty　states　subject　to　different　princes；　experience　shows　us　that　it　is　much　more　imperfect　than　that　of　Holland　and　Switzerland。

The　spirit　of　monarchy　is　war　and　enlargement　of　dominion：　peace　and　moderation　are　the　spirit　of　a　republic。　These　two　kinds　of　government　cannot　naturally　subsist　in　a　confederate　republic。

Thus　we　observe；　in　the　Roman　history；　that　when　the　Veientes　had　chosen　a　king；　they　were　immediately　abandoned　by　all　the　other　petty　republics　of　Tuscany。　Greece　was　undone　as　soon　as　the　kings　of　Macedon　obtained　a　seat　among　the　Amphyktyons。

The　confederate　republic　of　Germany；　composed　of　princes　and　free　towns；　subsists　by　means　of　a　chief；　who　is；　in　some　respects；　the　magistrate　of　the　union；　in　others；　the　monarch。

3。　Other　Requisites　in　a　confederate　Republic。　In　the　republic　of　Holland　one　province　cannot　conclude　an　alliance　without　the　consent　of　the　others。　This　law；　which　is　an　excellent　one；　and　even　necessary　in　a　confederate　republic；　is　wanting　in　the　Germanic　constitution；　where　it　would　prevent　the　misfortunes　that　may　happen　to　the　whole　confederacy；　through　the　imprudence；　ambition；　or　avarice　of　a　single　member。　A　republic　united　by　a　political　confederacy　has　given　itself　entirely　up；　and　has　nothing　more　to　resign。

It　is　difficult　for　the　united　states　to　be　all　of　equal　power　and　extent。　The　Lycian＇3＇　republic　was　an　association　of　twenty…three　towns；　the　large　ones　had　three　votes　in　the　common　council；　the　middling　ones　two；　and　the　small　towns　one。　The　Dutch　republic　consists　of　seven　provinces　of　different　extent　of　territory；　which　have　each　one　voice。

The　cities　of　Lycia＇4＇　contributed　to　the　expenses　of　the　state；　according　to　the　proportion　of　suffrages。　The　provinces　of　the　United　Netherlands　cannot　follow　this　proportion；　they　must　be　directed　by　that　of　their　power。

In　Lycia＇5＇　the　judges　and　town　magistrates　were　elected　by　the　common　council；　and　according　to　the　proportion　already　mentioned。　In　the　republic　of　Holland　they　are　not　chosen　by　the　common　council；　but　each　town　names　its　magistrates。　Were　I　to　give　a　model　of　an　excellent　confederate　republic；　I　should　pitch　upon　that　of　Lycia。

4。　In　what　Manner　despotic　Governments　provide　for　their　Security。　As　republics　provide　for　their　security　by　uniting；　despotic　governments　do　it　by　separating；　and　by　keeping　themselves；　as　it　were；　single。　They　sacrifice　a　part　of　the　country；　and　by　ravaging　and　desolating　the　frontiers　they　render　the　heart　of　the　empire　inaccessible。

It　is　a　received　axiom　in　geometry　that　the　greater　the　extent　of　bodies；　the　more　their　circumference　is　relatively　small。　This　practice；　therefore；　of　laying　the　frontiers　waste　is　more　tolerable　in　large　than　in　middling　states。

A　despotic　government　does　all　the　mischief　to　itself　that　could　be　committed　by　a　cruel　enemy；　whose　arms　it　were　unable　to　resist。

It　preserves　itself　likewise　by　another　kind　of　separation；　which　is　by　putting　the　most　distant　provinces　into　the　hands　of　a　great　vassal。　The　Mogul；　the　king　of　Persia；　and　the　emperors　of　China　have　their　feudatories；　and　the　Turks　have　found　their　account　in　putting　the　Tartars；　the　Moldavians；　the　Wallachians；　and　formerly　the　Transylvanians；　between　themselves　and　their　enemies。

5。　In　what　Manner　a　Monarchical　Government　provides　for　its　Security。　A　monarchy　never　destroys　itself　like　a　despotic　government。　But　a　kingdom　of　a　moderate　extent　is　liable　to　sudden　invasions：　it　must　therefore　have　fortresses　to　defend　its　frontiers；　and　troops　to　garrison　those　fortresses。　The　least　spot　of　ground　is　disputed　with　military　skill　and　resolution。　Despotic　states　make　incursions　against　one　another；　it　is　monarchies　only　that　wage　war。

Fortresses　are　proper　for　monarchies；　despotic　governments　are　afraid　of　them。　They　dare　not　entrust　their　officers　with　such　a　command；　as　none　of　them　have　any　affection　for　the　prince　or　his　government。

6。　Of　the　defensive　Force　of　States　in　general。　To　preserve　a　state　in　its　due　force；　it　must　have　such　an　extent　as　to　admit　of　a　proportion　between　the　celerity　with　which　it　may　be　invaded；　and　that　with　which　it　may　defeat　the　invasion。　As　an　invader　may　appear　on　every　side；　it　is　requisite　that　the　state　should　be　able　to　make　on　every　side　its　defence；　consequently　it　should　be　of　a　moderate　extent；　proportioned　to　the　degree　of　velocity　that　nature　has　given　to　man；　to　enable　him　to　move　from　one　place　to　another。

France　and　Spain　are　exactly　of　a　proper　extent。　They　have　so　easy　a　communication　for　their　forces　as　to　be　able　to　convey　them　immediately　to　what　part　they　have　a　mind；　the　armies　unite　and　pass　with　rapidity　from　one　frontier　to　another；　without　any　apprehension　of　such　difficulties　as　require　time　t