the spirit of laws-第25节

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y　give　their　verdict　whether　the　fact　brought　under　their　cognisance　be　proved　or　not；　if　it　be　proved；　the　judge　pronounces　the　punishment　inflicted　by　the　law；　and　for　this　he　needs　only　to　open　his　eyes。

4。　Of　the　Manner　of　passing　Judgment。　Hence　arise　the　different　modes　of　passing　judgment。　In　monarchies　the　judges　choose　the　method　of　arbitration；　they　deliberate　together；　they　communicate　their　sentiments　for　the　sake　of　unanimity；　they　moderate　their　opinions；　in　order　to　render　them　conformable　to　those　of　others：　and　the　lesser　number　are　obliged　to　give　way　to　the　majority。　But　this　is　not　agreeable　to　the　nature　of　a　republic。　At　Rome；　and　in　the　cities　of　Greece；　the　judges　never　entered　into　a　consultation；　each　gave　his　opinion　in　one　of　these　three　ways：　〃I　absolve；〃　〃I　condemn；〃　〃It　does　not　appear　clear　to　me〃；＇3＇　this　was　because　the　people　judged；　or　were　supposed　to　judge。　But　the　people　are　far　from　being　civilians；　all　these　restrictions　and　methods　of　arbitration　are　above　their　reach；　they　must　have　only　one　object　and　one　single　fact　set　before　them；　and　then　they　have　only　to　see　whether　they　ought　to　condemn；　to　acquit；　or　to　suspend　their　judgment。

The　Romans　introduced　set　forms　of　actions；＇4＇　after　the　example　of　the　Greeks；　and　established　a　rule　that　each　cause　should　be　directed　by　its　proper　action。　This　was　necessary　in　their　manner　of　judging；　it　was　necessary　to　fix　the　state　of　the　question；　that　the　people　might　have　it　always　before　their　eyes。　Otherwise；　in　a　long　process；　this　state　of　the　question　would　continually　change；　and　be　no　longer　distinguished。

Hence　it　followed　that　the　Roman　judges　granted　only　the　simple　demand；　without　making　any　addition；　deduction；　or　limitation。　But　the　pr？tors　devised　other　forms　of　actions；　which　were　called　ex　bona　fide；　in　which　the　method　of　pronouncing　sentence　was　left　to　the　disposition　of　the　judge。　This　was　more　agreeable　to　the　spirit　of　monarchy。　Hence　it　is　a　saying　among　the　French　lawyers；　that　in　France＇5＇　all　actions　are　ex　bona　fide。

5。　In　what　Governments　the　Sovereign　may　be　Judge。　Machiavel＇6＇　attributes　the　loss　of　the　liberty　of　Florence　to　the　people's　not　judging　in　a　body　in　cases　of　high　treason　against　themselves；　as　was　customary　at　Rome。　For　this　purpose　they　had　eight　judges：　〃but　the　few；〃　says　Machiavel；　〃are　corrupted　by　a　few。〃　I　should　willingly　adopt　the　maxim　of　this　great　man。　But　as　in　those　cases　the　political　interest　prevails　in　some　measure　over　the　civil　（for　it　is　always　an　inconvenience　that　the　people　should　be　judges　in　their　own　cause）；　in　order　to　remedy　this　evil；　the　laws　must　provide　as　much　as　possible　for　the　security　of　individuals。

With　this　view　the　Roman　legislators　did　two　things：　they　gave　the　persons　accused　permission　to　banish　themselves＇7＇　before　sentence　was　pronounced；＇8＇　and　they　ordained　that　the　goods　of　those　who　were　condemned　should　be　sacred；　to　prevent　their　being　confiscated　to　the　people。　We　shall　see　in　Book　XI　the　other　limitations　that　were　set　to　the　judicatory　power　residing　in　the　people。

Solon　knew　how　to　prevent　the　abuse　which　the　people　might　make　of　their　power　in　criminal　judgments。　He　ordained　that　the　Court　of　Areopagus　should　re…examine　the　affair；　that　if　they　believed　the　party　accused　was　unjustly　acquitted＇9＇　they　should　impeach　him　again　before　the　people；　that　if　they　believed　him　unjustly　condemned＇10＇　they　should　prevent　the　execution　of　the　sentence；　and　make　them　rejudge　the　proceeding　　an　admirable　law；　that　subjected　the　people　to　the　censure　of　the　magistracy　which　they　most　revered；　and　even　to　their　own！

In　affairs　of　this　kind　it　is　always　proper　to　throw　in　some　delays；　especially　when　the　party　accused　is　under　confinement；　to　the　end　that　the　people　may　grow　calm　and　give　their　judgment　coolly。

In　despotic　governments；　the　prince　himself　may　be　judge。　But　in　monarchies　this　cannot　be；　the　constitution　by　such　means　would　be　subverted；　and　the　dependent　intermediate　powers　annihilated；　all　set　forms　of　judgment　would　cease；　fear　would　take　possession　of　the　people's　minds；　and　paleness　spread　itself　over　every　countenance：　the　more　confidence；　honour；　affection；　and　security　in　the　subject；　the　more　extended　is　the　power　of　the　monarch。

We　shall　give　here　a　few　more　reflections　on　this　point。　In　monarchies；　the　prince　is　the　party　that　prosecutes　the　person　accused；　and　causes　him　to　be　punished　or　acquitted。　Now；　were　he　himself　to　sit　upon　the　trial；　he　would　be　both　judge　and　party。

In　this　government　the　prince　has　frequently　the　benefit　of　confiscation；　so　that　here　again；　by　determining　criminal　causes；　he　would　be　both　judge　and　party。

Further；　by　this　method　he　would　deprive　himself　of　the　most　glorious　attribute　of　sovereignty；　namely；　that　of　granting　pardon；＇11＇　for　it　would　be　quite　ridiculous　of　him　to　make　and　unmake　his　decisions；　surely　he　would　not　choose　to　contradict　himself。

Besides；　this　would　be　confounding　all　ideas；　it　would　be　impossible　to　tell　whether　a　man　was　acquitted；　or　received　his　pardon。

Louis　XIII　being　desirous　to　sit　in　judgment　upon　the　trial　of　the　Duke　de　la　Valette；＇12＇　sent　for　some　members　of　the　parliament　and　of　the　privy　council；　to　debate　the　matter；　upon　their　being　ordered　by　the　king　to　give　their　opinion　concerning　the　warrant　for　his　arrest；　the　president；　De　Believre；　said　〃that　he　found　it　very　strange　that　a　prince　should　pass　sentence　upon　a　subject；　that　kings　had　reserved　to　themselves　the　power　of　pardoning；　and　left　that　of　condemning　to　their　officers；　that　his　majesty　wanted　to　see　before　him　at　the　bar　a　person　who；　by　his　decision；　was　to　be　hurried　away　into　the　other　world！　That　the　prince's　countenance　should　inspire　with　hopes；　and　not　confound　with　fears；　that　his　presence　alone　removed　ecclesiastic　censures；　and　that　subjects　ought　not　to　go　away　dissatisfied　from　the　sovereign。〃　When　sentence　was　passed；　the　same　magistrate　declared；　〃This　is　an　unprecedented　judgment　to　see；　contrary　to　the　example　of　past　ages　　a　king　of　France；　in　the　quality　of　a　judge；　condemning　a　gentleman　to　death。〃＇13＇

Again；　sentences　passed　by　the　prince　would　be　an　inexhaustible　source　of　injustice　and　abuse；　the　courtiers　by　their　importunity　would　always　be　able　to　extort　his　decisions。　Some　Roman　emperors　were　so　mad　as　to　sit　as　judges　themselves；　the　consequence　was　that　no　reigns　ever　so　surprised　the　world　with　oppression　and　injustice。

〃Claudius；〃　says　Tacitus；＇14＇　〃having　appropriated　to　himself　the　determination　of　lawsuits；　and　the　function　of　magistrates；　gave　occasion　to　all　manner　of　rapine。〃　But　Nero；　upon　coming　to　the　empire　after　Claudius；　endeavoured　to　conciliate　the　minds　of　the　people　by　declaring　〃that　he　would　take　care　not　to　be　judge　himself　in　private　causes；　that　the　parties　might　not　be　exposed　within　the　walls　of　a　palace　to　the　iniquitous　influence　of　a　few　freedmen。〃＇15＇

〃Under　the　reign　of　Arcadius；〃　says　Zozimus；＇16＇　〃a　swarm　of　calumniators　spread　themselves　on　every　side；　and　infested　the　court。　Upon　a　person's　decease；　it　was　immediately　supposed　he　had　left　no　children；＇17＇　and；　in　consequence　of　this；　his　property　was　given　away　by　a　rescript。　For　as　the　prince　was　surprisingly　stupid；　and　the　empress　excessively　enterprising；　she　was　a　slave　to　the　insatiable　avarice　of　her　domestics　and　confidants；　insomuch　that　to　an　honest　man　nothing　could　be　more　desirable　than　death。〃

〃Formerly；〃　says　Procopius＇18＇　〃there　used　to　be　very　few　people　at　court；　but　in　Justinian's　reign；　as　the　judges　had　no　longer　the　liberty　of　administering　justice；　their　tribunals　were　deserted；　while　the　prince's　palace　resounded　with　the　litigious　clamours　of　the　several　parties。〃　Everybody　knows　what　a　prostitution　there　was　of　public　judgments；　and　even　of　the　very　laws　themselves；　at　that　emperor's　court。

The　laws　are　the　eye　of　the　prince；　by　them　he　sees　what　would　otherwise　escape　his　observation。　Should　he　attempt　the　function　of　a　judge；　he　would　not　then　labour　for　himself；　but　for　impostors；　whose　aim　is　to　deceive　him。

6。　That　in　Monarchies　Ministers　ought　not　to　sit　as　Judges。　It　is　likewise　a　very　great　inconvenience　in　monarchies　for　the　ministers　of　the　prince　to　sit　as　judges。　We　have　still　instances　of　states　where　there　are　a　great　number　of　judges　to　decide　exchequer　causes；　and　where　the　ministers　nevertheless　（a　thing　most　incredible！）　would　fain　determine　them。　Many　are　the　reflections　that　here　arise；　but　this　single　one　will　suffice　for　my　purpose。

There　is　in　the　very　nature　of　things　a　kind　of　contrast　between　a　prince's　council　and　his　courts　of　judicature。　The　king's　council　ought　to　be　composed　of　a　few　persons；　and　the　courts　of　judicature　of　a　great　many。　The　reason　is；　in　the　former；　things　should　be　undertaken　and　conducted　with　a　kind　of　warmth　and　passion；　which　can　hardly　be　expected　but　from　four　or　five　men　who　make　it　their　sole　business。　On　the　contrary；　in　courts　of　judicature　a　certain　coolness　in　requisite；　and　an　indifference；　in　some　measure；　to　all　manner　of　affairs。

7。　Of　a　single　Magistrate。　A　magistracy　of　this　kind　cannot　take　place　but　in　a　despotic　government。　We　have　an　insta