on sense and the sensible-第9节

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the　current　opinion　that　one　sees　and　hears　coinstantaneously　is　due



merely　to　the　fact　that　the　intervals　of　time　＇between　the　really



successive　perceptions　of　sight　and　hearing＇　escape　observation。　But



this　can　scarcely　be　true；　nor　is　it　conceivable　that　any　portion　of



time　should　be　＇absolutely＇　imperceptible；　or　that　any　should　be



absolutely　unnoticeable；　the　truth　being　that　it　is　possible　to



perceive　every　instant　of　time。　＇This　is　so＇；　because；　if　it　is



inconceivable　that　a　person　should；　while　perceiving　himself　or



aught　else　in　a　continuous　time；　be　at　any　instant　unaware　of　his



own　existence；　while；　obviously；　the　assumption；　that　there　is　in



the　time…continuum　a　time　so　small　as　to　be　absolutely



imperceptible；　carries　the　implication　that　a　person　would；　during



such　time；　be　unaware　of　his　own　existence；　as　well　as　of　his　seeing



and　perceiving；　＇this　assumption　must　be　false＇。



　　Again；　if　there　is　any　magnitude；　whether　time　or　thing；



absolutely　imperceptible　owing　to　its　smallness；　it　follows　that　there



would　not　be　either　a　thing　which　one　perceives；　or　a　time　in　which



one　perceives　it；　unless　in　the　sense　that　in　some　part　of　the　given



time　he　sees　some　part　of　the　given　thing。　For　＇let　there　be　a　line



ab；　divided　into　two　parts　at　g；　and　let　this　line　represent　a　whole



object　and　a　corresponding　whole　time。　Now；＇　if　one　sees　the　whole



line；　and　perceives　it　during　a　time　which　forms　one　and　the　same



continuum；　only　in　the　sense　that　he　does　so　in　some　portion　of　this



time；　let　us　suppose　the　part　gb；　representing　a　time　in　which　by



supposition　he　was　perceiving　nothing；　cut　off　from　the　whole。　Well；



then；　he　perceives　in　a　certain　part　＇viz。　in　the　remainder＇　of　the



time；　or　perceives　a　part　＇viz。　the　remainder＇　of　the　line；　after



the　fashion　in　which　one　sees　the　whole　earth　by　seeing　some　given



part　of　it；　or　walks　in　a　year　by　walking　in　some　given　part　of　the



year。　But　＇by　hypothesis＇　in　the　part　bg　he　perceives　nothing：



therefore；　in　fact；　he　is　said　to　perceive　the　whole　object　and　during



the　whole　time　simply　because　he　perceives　＇some　part　of　the　object＇



in　some　part　of　the　time　ab。　But　the　same　argument　holds　also　in　the



case　of　ag　＇the　remainder；　regarded　in　its　turn　as　a　whole＇；　for　it



will　be　found　＇on　this　theory　of　vacant　times　and　imperceptible



magnitudes＇　that　one　always　perceives　only　in　some　part　of　a　given



whole　time；　and　perceives　only　some　part　of　a　whole　magnitude；　and



that　it　is　impossible　to　perceive　any　＇really＇　whole　＇object　in　a



really　whole　time；　a　conclusion　which　is　absurd；　as　it　would　logically



annihilate　the　perception　of　both　Objects　and　Time＇。



　　Therefore　we　must　conclude　that　all　magnitudes　are　perceptible；



but　their　actual　dimensions　do　not　present　themselves　immediately　in



their　presentation　as　objects。　One　sees　the　sun；　or　a　four…cubit　rod



at　a　distance；　as　a　magnitude；　but　their　exact　dimensions　are　not



given　in　their　visual　presentation：　nay；　at　times　an　object　of　sight



appears　indivisible；　but　＇vision　like　other　special　senses；　is



fallible　respecting　'common　sensibles'；　e。g。　magnitude；　and＇　nothing



that　one　sees　is　really　indivisible。　The　reason　of　this　has　been



previously　explained。　It　is　clear　then；　from　the　above　arguments；　that



no　portion　of　time　is　imperceptible。



　　But　we　must　here　return　to　the　question　proposed　above　for



discussion；　whether　it　is　possible　or　impossible　to　perceive　several



objects　coinstantaneously；　by　'coinstantaneously'　I　mean　perceiving



the　several　objects　in　a　time　one　and　indivisible　relatively　to　one



another；　i。e。　indivisible　in　a　sense　consistent　with　its　being　all　a



continuum。



　　First；　then；　is　it　conceivable　that　one　should　perceive　the



different　things　coinstantaneously；　but　each　with　a　different　part



of　the　Soul？　Or　＇must　we　object＇　that；　in　the　first　place；　to　begin



with　the　objects　of　one　and　the　same　sense；　e。g。　Sight；　if　we　assume



it　＇the　Soul　qua　exercising　Sight＇　to　perceive　one　colour　with　one



part；　and　another　colour　with　a　different　part；　it　will　have　a



plurality　of　parts　the　same　in　species；　＇as　they　must　be；＇　since　the



objects　which　it　thus　perceives　fall　within　the　same　genus？



　　Should　any　one　＇to　illustrate　how　the　Soul　might　have　in　it　two



different　parts　specifically　identical；　each　directed　to　a　set　of



aistheta　the　same　in　genus　with　that　to　which　the　other　is　directed＇



urge　that；　as　there　are　two　eyes；　so　there　may　be　in　the　Soul



something　analogous；　＇the　reply　is＇　that　of　the　eyes；　doubtless；



some　one　organ　is　formed；　and　hence　their　actualization　in



perception　is　one；　but　if　this　is　so　in　the　Soul；　then；　in　so　far　as



what　is　formed　of　both　＇i。e。　of　any　two　specifically　identical　parts



as　assumed＇　is　one；　the　true　perceiving　subject　also　will　be　one；　＇and



the　contradictory　of　the　above　hypothesis　（of　different　parts　of



Soul　remaining　engaged　in　simultaneous　perception　with　one　sense）　is



what　emerges　from　the　analogy＇；　while　if　the　two　parts　of　Soul



remain　separate；　the　analogy　of　the　eyes　will　fail；　＇for　of　these　some



one　is　really　formed＇。



　　Furthermore；　＇on　the　supposition　of　the　need　of　different　parts　of



Soul；　co…operating　in　each　sense；　to　discern　different　objects



coinstantaneously＇；　the　senses　will　be　each　at　the　same　time　one　and



many；　as　if　we　should　say　that　they　were　each　a　set　of　diverse



sciences；　for　neither　will　an　'activity'　exist　without　its　proper



faculty；　nor　without　activity　will　there　be　sensation。



　　But　if　the　Soul　does　not；　in　the　way　suggested　＇i。e。　with



different　parts　of　itself　acting　simultaneously＇；　perceive　in　one



and　the　same　individual　time　sensibles　of　the　same　sense；　a　fortiori



it　is　not　thus　that　it　perceives　sensibles　of　different　senses。　For　it



is；　as　already　stated；　more　conceivable　that　it　should　perceive　a



plurality　of　the　former　together　in　this　way　than　a　plurality　of



heterogeneous　objects。



　　If　then；　as　is　the　fact；　the　Soul　with　one　part　perceives　Sweet；



with　another；　White；　either　that　which　results　from　these　is　some



one　part；　or　else　there　is　no　such　one　resultant。　But　there　must　be



such　an　one；　inasmuch　as　the　general　faculty　of　sense…perception　is



one。　What　one　object；　then；　does　that　one　faculty　＇when　perceiving



an　object；　e。g。　as　both　White　and　Sweet＇　perceive？　＇None＇；　for



assuredly　no　one　object　arises　by　composition　of　these



＇heterogeneous　objects；　such　as　White　and　Sweet＇。　We　must　conclude；



therefore；　that　there　is；　as　has　been　stated　before；　some　one



faculty　in　the　soul　with　which　the　latter　perceives　all　its



percepts；　though　it　perceives　each　different　genus　of　sensibles



through　a　different　organ。



　　May　we　not；　then；　conceive　this　faculty　which　perceives　White　and



Sweet　to　be　one　qua　indivisible　＇sc。　qua　combining　its　different



simultaneous　objects＇　in　its　actualization；　but　different；　when　it　has



become　divisible　＇sc。　qua　distinguishing　its　different　simultaneous



objects＇　in　its　actualization？



　　Or　is　what　occurs　in　the　case　of　the　perceiving　Soul　conceivably



analogous　to　what　holds　true　in　that　of　the　things　themselves？　For　the



same　numerically　one　thing　is　white　and　sweet；　and　has　many　other



qualities；　＇while　its　numerical　oneness　is　not　thereby　prejudiced＇



if　the　fact　is　not　that　the　qualities　are　really　separable　in　the



object　from　one　another；　but　that　the　being　of　each　quality　is



different　＇from　that　of　every　other＇。　In　the　same　way　therefore　we



must　assume　also；　in　the　case　of　the　Soul；　that　the　faculty　of



perception　in　general　is　in　itself　numerically　one　and　the　same；　but



different　＇differentiated＇　in　its　being；　different；　that　is　to　say；　in



genus　as　regards　some　of　its　objects；　in　species　as　regards　others。



Hence　too；　we　may　conclude　that　one　can　perceive　＇numerically



different　objects＇　coinstantaneously　with　a　faculty　which　is



numerically　one　and　the　same；　but　not　the　same　in　its　relationship



＇sc。　according　as　the　objects　to　which　it　is　directed　are　not　the



same＇。



　　That　every　sensible　object　is　a　magnitude；　and　that　nothing　which　it



is　possible　to　perceive　is　indivisible；　may　be　thus　shown。　The



distance　whence　an　object　could　not　be　seen　is　indeterminate；　but　that



whence　it　is　visible　is　determinate。　We　may　say　the　same　of　the



objects　of　Smelling　and　Hearing；　and　of　all　sensibles　not　discerned　by



actual　contact。　Now；　there　is；　in　the　interval　of　distance；　some



extreme　place；　the　last　from　which　the　object　is　invisible；　and　the



first　from　which　it　is　visible。　This　place；　beyond　which　if　the　object



be　one　cannot　perceive　it；　while　if　the　object　be　on　the　hither　side



one　must　perceive　it；　is；　I　presume；　itself　necessarily　indivisible。



Therefore；　if　any　sensible　object　be　indivisible；　such　object；　if



set