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on sense and the sensible-第7节

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be the case 'that there are magnitudes; physically real; but without



sensible quality'; it seems to tell in favour of the atomistic



hypothesis; for thus; indeed; 'by accepting this hypothesis'; the



question 'with which this chapter begins' might be solved



'negatively'。 But it is impossible 'to accept this hypothesis'。 Our



views on the subject of atoms are to be found in our treatise on



Movement。



  The solution of these questions will bring with it also the answer



to the question why the species of Colour; Taste; Sound; and other



sensible qualities are limited。 For in all classes of things lying



between extremes the intermediates must be limited。 But contraries are



extremes; and every object of sense…perception involves contrariety:



e。g。 in Colour; White x Black; in Savour; Sweet x Bitter; and in all



the other sensibles also the contraries are extremes。 Now; that



which is continuous is divisible into an infinite number of unequal



parts; but into a finite number of equal parts; while that which is



not per se continuous is divisible into species which are finite in



number。 Since then; the several sensible qualities of things are to be



reckoned as species; while continuity always subsists in these; we



must take account of the difference between the Potential and the



Actual。 It is owing to this difference that we do not 'actually' see



its ten…thousandth part in a grain of millet; although sight has



embraced the whole grain within its scope; and it is owing to this;



too; that the sound contained in a quarter…tone escapes notice; and



yet one hears the whole strain; inasmuch as it is a continuum; but the



interval between the extreme sounds 'that bound the quarter…tone'



escapes the ear 'being only potentially audible; not actually'。 So; in



the case of other objects of sense; extremely small constituents are



unnoticed; because they are only potentially not actually 'perceptible



e。g。' visible; unless when they have been parted from the wholes。 So



the footlength too exists potentially in the two…foot length; but



actually only when it has been separated from the whole。 But objective



increments so small as those above might well; if separated from their



totals; 'instead of achieving 'actual' exisistence' be dissolved in



their environments; like a drop of sapid moisture poured out into



the sea。 But even if this were not so 'sc。 with the objective



magnitude'; still; since the 'subjective' of sense…perception is not



perceptible in itself; nor capable of separate existence (since it



exists only potentially in the more distinctly perceivable whole of



sense…perception); so neither will it be possible to perceive



'actually' its correlatively small object 'sc。 its quantum of



pathema or sensible quality' when separated from the object…total。 But



yet this 'small object' is to be considered as perceptible: for it



is both potentially so already 'i。e。 even when alone'; and destined to



be actually so when it has become part of an aggregate。 Thus;



therefore; we have shown that some magnitudes and their sensible



qualities escape notice; and the reason why they do so; as well as the



manner in which they are still perceptible or not perceptible in



such cases。 Accordingly then when these 'minutely subdivided'



sensibles have once again become aggregated in a whole in such a



manner; relatively to one another; as to be perceptible actually;



and not merely because they are in the whole; but even apart from



it; it follows necessarily 'from what has been already stated' that



their sensible qualities; whether colours or tastes or sounds; are



limited in number。



  One might ask:… do the objects of sense…perception; or the



movements proceeding from them ('since movements there are;' in



whichever of the two ways 'viz。 by emanations or by stimulatory



kinesis' sense…perception takes place); when these are actualized



for perception; always arrive first at a spatial middle point 'between



the sense…organ and its object'; as Odour evidently does; and also



Sound? For he who is nearer 'to the odorous object' perceives the



Odour sooner 'than who is farther away'; and the Sound of a stroke



reaches us some time after it has been struck。 Is it thus also with an



object seen; and with Light? Empedocles; for example; says that the



Light from the Sun arrives first in the intervening space before it



comes to the eye; or reaches the Earth。 This might plausibly seem to



be the case。 For whatever is moved 'in space'; is moved from one place



to another; hence there must be a corresponding interval of time



also in which it is moved from the one place to the other。 But any



given time is divisible into parts; so that we should assume a time



when the sun's ray was not as yet seen; but was still travelling in



the middle space。



  Now; even if it be true that the acts of 'hearing' and 'having



heard'; and; generally; those of 'perceiving' and 'having



perceived'; form co…instantaneous wholes; in other words; that acts of



sense…perception do not involve a process of becoming; but have



their being none the less without involving such a process; yet;



just as; 'in the case of sound'; though the stroke which causes the



Sound has been already struck; the Sound is not yet at the ear (and



that this last is a fact is further proved by the transformation which



the letters 'viz。 the consonants as heard' undergo 'in the case of



words spoken from a distance'; implying that the local movement



'involved in Sound' takes place in the space between 'us and the



speaker'; for the reason why 'persons addressed from a distance' do



not succeed in catching the sense of what is said is evidently that



the air 'sound wave' in moving towards them has its form changed)



'granting this; then; the question arises': is the same also true in



the case of Colour and Light? For certainly it is not true that the



beholder sees; and the object is seen; in virtue of some merely



abstract relationship between them; such as that between equals。 For



if it were so; there would be no need 'as there is' that either 'the



beholder or the thing beheld' should occupy some particular place;



since to the equalization of things their being near to; or far



from; one another makes no difference。



  Now this 'travelling through successive positions in the medium' may



with good reason take place as regards Sound and Odour; for these;



like 'their media' Air and Water; are continuous; but the movement



of both is divided into parts。 This too is the ground of the fact that



the object which the person first in order of proximity hears or



smells is the same as that which each subsequent person perceives;



while yet it is not the same。



  Some; indeed; raise a question also on these very points; they



declare it impossible that one person should hear; or see; or smell;



the same object as another; urging the impossibility of several



persons in different places hearing or smelling 'the same object'; for



the one same thing would 'thus' be divided from itself。 The answer



is that; in perceiving the object which first set up the motion… e。g。



a bell; or frankincense; or fire… all perceive an object numerically



one and the same; while; of course; in the special object perceived



they perceive an object numerically different for each; though



specifically the same for all; and this; accordingly; explains how it



is that many persons together see; or smell; or hear 'the same



object'。 These things 'the odour or sound proper' are not bodies; but



an affection or process of some kind (otherwise this 'viz。



simultaneous perception of the one object by many' would not have



been; as it is; a fact of experience) though; on the other hand; they



each imply a body 'as their cause'。



  But 'though sound and odour may travel;' with regard to Light the



case is different。 For Light has its raison d'etre in the being 'not



becoming' of something; but it is not a movement。 And in general; even



in qualitative change the case is different from what it is in local



movement 'both being different species of kinesis'。 Local movements;



of course; arrive first at a point midway before reaching their goal



(and Sound; it is currently believed; is a movement of something



locally moved); but we cannot go on to assert this 'arrival at a point



midway' like manner of things which undergo qualitative change。 For



this kind of change may conceivably take place in a thing all at once;



without one half of it being changed before the other; e。g。 it is



conceivable that water should be frozen simultaneously in every



part。 But still; for all that; if the body which is heated or frozen



is extensive; each part of it successively is affected by the part



contiguous; while the part first cha

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