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from　the　dead？



　　That　is　clear；　he　replied。



　　Then　the　inference　is；　that　our　souls　are　in　the　world　below？



　　That　is　true。



　　And　one　of　the　two　processes　or　generations　is　visible…for　surely



the　act　of　dying　is　visible？



　　Surely；　he　said。



　　And　may　not　the　other　be　inferred　as　the　complement　of　nature；　who



is　not　to　be　supposed　to　go　on　one　leg　only？　And　if　not；　a



corresponding　process　of　generation　in　death　must　also　be　assigned



to　her？



　　Certainly；　he　replied。



　　And　what　is　that　process？



　　Revival。



　　And　revival；　if　there　be　such　a　thing；　is　the　birth　of　the　dead　into



the　world　of　the　living？



　　Quite　true。



　　Then　there　is　a　new　way　in　which　we　arrive　at　the　inference　that　the



living　come　from　the　dead；　just　as　the　dead　come　from　the　living；



and　if　this　is　true；　then　the　souls　of　the　dead　must　be　in　some



place　out　of　which　they　come　again。　And　this；　as　I　think；　has　been



satisfactorily　proved。



　　Yes；　Socrates；　he　said；　all　this　seems　to　flow　necessarily　out　of



our　previous　admissions。



　　And　that　these　admissions　are　not　unfair；　Cebes；　he　said；　may　be



shown；　as　I　think；　in　this　way：　If　generation　were　in　a　straight



line　only；　and　there　were　no　compensation　or　circle　in　nature；　no　turn



or　return　into　one　another；　then　you　know　that　all　things　would　at



last　have　the　same　form　and　pass　into　the　same　state；　and　there



would　be　no　more　generation　of　them。



　　What　do　you　mean？　he　said。



　　A　simple　thing　enough；　which　I　will　illustrate　by　the　case　of　sleep；



he　replied。　You　know　that　if　there　were　no　compensation　of　sleeping



and　waking；　the　story　of　the　sleeping　Endymion　would　in　the　end　have



no　meaning；　because　all　other　things　would　be　asleep；　too；　and　he



would　not　be　thought　of。　Or　if　there　were　composition　only；　and　no



division　of　substances；　then　the　chaos　of　Anaxagoras　would　come　again。



And　in　like　manner；　my　dear　Cebes；　if　all　things　which　partook　of　life



were　to　die；　and　after　they　were　dead　remained　in　the　form　of　death；



and　did　not　come　to　life　again；　all　would　at　last　die；　and　nothing



would　be　alive…how　could　this　be　otherwise？　For　if　the　living　spring



from　any　others　who　are　not　the　dead；　and　they　die；　must　not　all



things　at　last　be　swallowed　up　in　death？



　　There　is　no　escape　from　that；　Socrates；　said　Cebes；　and　I　think　that



what　you　say　is　entirely　true。



　　Yes；　he　said；　Cebes；　I　entirely　think　so；　too；　and　we　are　not



walking　in　a　vain　imagination；　but　I　am　confident　in　the　belief　that



there　truly　is　such　a　thing　as　living　again；　and　that　the　living



spring　from　the　dead；　and　that　the　souls　of　the　dead　are　in　existence；



and　that　the　good　souls　have　a　better　portion　than　the　evil。



　　Cebes　added：　Your　favorite　doctrine；　Socrates；　that　knowledge　is



simply　recollection；　if　true；　also　necessarily　implies　a　previous　time



in　which　we　learned　that　which　we　now　recollect。　But　this　would　be



impossible　unless　our　soul　was　in　some　place　before　existing　in　the



human　form；　here；　then；　is　another　argument　of　the　soul's　immortality。



　　But　tell　me；　Cebes；　said　Simmias；　interposing；　what　proofs　are　given



of　this　doctrine　of　recollection？　I　am　not　very　sure　at　this　moment



that　I　remember　them。



　　One　excellent　proof；　said　Cebes；　is　afforded　by　questions。　If　you



put　a　question　to　a　person　in　a　right　way；　he　will　give　a　true



answer　of　himself；　but　how　could　he　do　this　unless　there　were



knowledge　and　right　reason　already　in　him？　And　this　is　most　clearly



shown　when　he　is　taken　to　a　diagram　or　to　anything　of　that　sort。



　　But　if；　said　Socrates；　you　are　still　incredulous；　Simmias；　I　would



ask　you　whether　you　may　not　agree　with　me　when　you　look　at　the



matter　in　another　way；　I　mean；　if　you　are　still　incredulous　as　to



whether　knowledge　is　recollection。



　　Incredulous；　I　am　not；　said　Simmias；　but　I　want　to　have　this



doctrine　of　recollection　brought　to　my　own　recollection；　and；　from



what　Cebes　has　said；　I　am　beginning　to　recollect　and　be　convinced；　but



I　should　still　like　to　hear　what　more　you　have　to　say。



　　This　is　what　I　would　say；　he　replied：　We　should　agree；　if　I　am　not



mistaken；　that　what　a　man　recollects　he　must　have　known　at　some



previous　time。



　　Very　true。



　　And　what　is　the　nature　of　this　recollection？　And；　in　asking　this；



I　mean　to　ask　whether；　when　a　person　has　already　seen　or　heard　or　in



any　way　perceived　anything；　and　he　knows　not　only　that；　but



something　else　of　which　he　has　not　the　same；　but　another　knowledge；　we



may　not　fairly　say　that　he　recollects　that　which　comes　into　his



mind。　Are　we　agreed　about　that？



　　What　do　you　mean？



　　I　mean　what　I　may　illustrate　by　the　following　instance：　The



knowledge　of　a　lyre　is　not　the　same　as　the　knowledge　of　a　man？



　　True。



　　And　yet　what　is　the　feeling　of　lovers　when　they　recognize　a　lyre；　or



a　garment；　or　anything　else　which　the　beloved　has　been　in　the　habit　of



using？　Do　not　they；　from　knowing　the　lyre；　form　in　the　mind's　eye　an



image　of　the　youth　to　whom　the　lyre　belongs？　And　this　is　recollection：



and　in　the　same　way　anyone　who　sees　Simmias　may　remember　Cebes；　and



there　are　endless　other　things　of　the　same　nature。



　　Yes；　indeed；　there　are…endless；　replied　Simmias。



　　And　this　sort　of　thing；　he　said；　is　recollection；　and　is　most



commonly　a　process　of　recovering　that　which　has　been　forgotten　through



time　and　inattention。



　　Very　true；　he　said。



　　Well；　and　may　you　not　also　from　seeing　the　picture　of　a　horse　or　a



lyre　remember　a　man？　and　from　the　picture　of　Simmias；　you　may　be　led



to　remember　Cebes？



　　True。



　　Or　you　may　also　be　led　to　the　recollection　of　Simmias　himself？



　　True；　he　said。



　　And　in　all　these　cases；　the　recollection　may　be　derived　from



things　either　like　or　unlike？



　　That　is　true。



　　And　when　the　recollection　is　derived　from　like　things；　then　there　is



sure　to　be　another　question；　which　is；　whether　the　likeness　of　that



which　is　recollected　is　in　any　way　defective　or　not。



　　Very　true；　he　said。



　　And　shall　we　proceed　a　step　further；　and　affirm　that　there　is　such　a



thing　as　equality；　not　of　wood　with　wood；　or　of　stone　with　stone；



but　that；　over　and　above　this；　there　is　equality　in　the　abstract？



Shall　we　affirm　this？



　　Affirm；　yes；　and　swear　to　it；　replied　Simmias；　with　all　the



confidence　in　life。



　　And　do　we　know　the　nature　of　this　abstract　essence？



　　To　be　sure；　he　said。



　　And　whence　did　we　obtain　this　knowledge？　Did　we　not　see　equalities



of　material　things；　such　as　pieces　of　wood　and　stones；　and　gather　from



them　the　idea　of　an　equality　which　is　different　from　them？…you　will



admit　that？　Or　look　at　the　matter　again　in　this　way：　Do　not　the　same



pieces　of　wood　or　stone　appear　at　one　time　equal；　and　at　another



time　unequal？



　　That　is　certain。



　　But　are　real　equals　ever　unequal？　or　is　the　idea　of　equality　ever



inequality？



　　That　surely　was　never　yet　known；　Socrates。



　　Then　these　（so…called）　equals　are　not　the　same　with　the　idea　of



equality？



　　I　should　say；　clearly　not；　Socrates。



　　And　yet　from　these　equals；　although　differing　from　the　idea　of



equality；　you　conceived　and　attained　that　idea？



　　Very　true；　he　said。



　　Which　might　be　like；　or　might　be　unlike　them？



　　Yes。



　　But　that　makes　no　difference；　whenever　from　seeing　one　thing　you



conceived　another；　whether　like　or　unlike；　there　must　surely　have　been



an　act　of　recollection？



　　Very　true。



　　But　what　would　you　say　of　equal　portions　of　wood　and　stone；　or　other



material　equals？　and　what　is　the　impression　produced　by　them？　Are　they



equals　in　the　same　sense　as　absolute　equality？　or　do　they　fall　short



of　this　in　a　measure？



　　Yes；　he　said；　in　a　very　great　measure；　too。



　　And　must　we　not　allow　that　when　I　or　anyone　look　at　any　object；



and　perceive　that　the　object　aims　at　being　some　other　thing；　but　falls



short　of；　and　cannot　attain　to　it…he　who　makes　this　observation　must



have　had　previous　knowledge　of　that　to　which；　as　he　says；　the　other；



although　similar；　was　inferior？



　　Certainly。



　　And　has　not　this　been　our　case　in　the　matter　of　equals　and　of



absolute　equality？



　　Precisely。



　　Then　we　must　have　known　absolute　equality　previously　to　the　time



when　we　first　saw　the　material　equals；　and　reflected　that　all　these



apparent　equals　aim　at　this　absolute　equality；　but　fall　short　of　it？



　　That　is　true。



　　And　we　recognize　also　that　this　absolute　equality　has　only　been



known；　and　can　only　be　known；　through　the　medium　of　sight　or　touch；　or



of　some　other　sense。　And　this　I　would　affirm　of　all　such　conceptions。



　　Yes；　Socrates；　as　far　as　the　argument　is　concerned；　one　of　them　is



the　same　as　the　other。



　　And　from　the　senses；　then；　is　derived　the　knowledge　that　all



sensible　things　aim　at　an　idea