the day of the confederacy-第23节

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learned　the　truth　about　men　and　nations；　they　knew　that　life　is　a
grim　business；　they　knew　that　war　had　unloosed　passions　that　had
to　spend　themselves　and　that　could　not　be　talked　away。

But　there　was　scattered　over　the　Confederacy　a　population　which
lacked　experience　of　the　world　and　which　included　in　the　main
those　small　farmers　and　semi…peasants　who　under　the　old　regime
were　released　from　the　burden　of　taxation　and　at　the　same　time
excluded　from　the　benefits　of　education。　Among　these　people　the
illusions　of　the　higher　classes　were　reflected　without　the
ballast　of　mentality。　Ready　to　fight　on　any　provocation；　yet
circumscribed　by　their　own　natures；　not　understanding　life；
unable　to　picture　to　themselves　different　types　and　conditions；
these　people　were　as　prone　as　children　to　confuse　the　world　of
their　own　desire　with　the　world　of　fact。　When　hardship　came；　when
taxation　fell　upon　them　with　a　great　blow；　when　the　war　took　a
turn　that　necessitated　imagination　for　its　understanding　and
faith　for　its　pursuit；　these　people　with　childlike　simplicity
immediately　became　panic…stricken。　Like　the　similar　class　in　the
North；　they　had　measureless　faith　in　talk。　Hence　for　them；　as　for
Horace　Greeley　and　many　another；　sprang　up　the　notion　that　if
only　all　their　sort　could　be　brought　together　for　talk　and　talk
and　yet　more　talk；　the　Union　could　be　〃reconstructed〃　just　as　it
used　to　be；　and　the　cruel　war　would　end。　Before　their　eyes；　as
before　Greeley　in　1864；　danced　the　fata　morgana　of　a　convention
of　all　the　States；　talking；　talking；　talking。

The　peace　illusion　centered　in　North　Carolina；　where　the　people
were　as　enthusiastic　for　state　sovereignty　as　were　any
Southerners。　They　had　seceded　mainly　because　they　felt　that　this
principle　had　been　attacked。　Having　themselves　little　if　any
intention　to　promote　slavery；　they　nevertheless　were　prompt　to
resent　interference　with　the　system　or　with　any　other　Southern
institution。　Jonathan　Worth　said　that　they　looked　on　both
abolition　and　secession　as　children　of　the　devil；　and　he　put　the
responsibility　for　the　secession　of　his　State　wholly　upon　Lincoln
and　his　attempt　to　coerce　the　lower　South。　This　attitude　was
probably　characteristic　of　all　classes　in　North　Carolina。　There
also　an　unusually　large　percentage　of　men　lacked　education　and
knowledge　of　the　world。　We　have　seen　how　the　first　experience
with　taxation　produced　instant　and　violent　reaction。　The　peasant
farmers　of　the　western　counties　and　the　general　mass　of　the
people　began　to　distrust　the　planter　class。　They　began　asking　if
their　allies；　the　other　States；　were　controlled　by　that　same
class　which　seemed　to　be　crushing　them　by　the　exaction　of　tithes。
And　then　the　popular　cry　was　raised：　Was　there　after　all　anything
in　the　war　for　the　masses　in　North　Carolina？　Had　they　left　the
frying…pan　for　the　fire？　Could　they　better　things　by　withdrawing
from　association　with　their　present　allies　and　going　back　alone
into　the　Union？　The　delusion　that　they　could　do　so　whenever　they
pleased　and　on　the　old　footing　seems　to　have　been　widespread。　One
of　their　catch　phrases　was　〃the　Constitution　as　it　is　and　the
Union　as　it　was。〃　Throughout　1863；　when　the　agitation　against
tithes　was　growing　every　day；　the　〃conservatives〃　of　North
Carolina；　as　their　leaders　named　them；　were　drawing　together　in　a
definite　movement　for　peace。　This　project　came　to　a　head　during
the　next　year　in　those　grim　days　when　Sherman　was　before　Atlanta。
Holden；　that　champion　of　the　opposition　to　tithes；　became　a
candidate　for　Governor　against　Vance；　who　was　standing　for
reelection。　Holden　stated　his　platform　in　the　organ　of　his　party
〃If　the　people　of　North　Carolina　are　for　perpetual　conscriptions；
impressments　and　seizures　to　keep　up　a　perpetual；　devastating　and
exhausting　war；　let　them　vote　for　Governor　Vance；　for　he　is
for‘fighting　it　out　now；　but　if　they　believe；　from　the　bitter
experience　of　the　last　three　years；　that　the　sword　can　never　end
it；　and　are　in　favor　of　steps　being　taken　by　the　State　to　urge
negotiations　by　the　general　government　for　an　honorable　and
speedy　peace；　they　must　vote　for　Mr。　Holden。〃

As　Holden；　however；　was　beaten　by　a　vote　that　stood　about　three
to　one；　Governor　Vance　continued　in　power；　but　just　what　he　stood
for　and　just　what　his　supporters　understood　to　be　his　policy
would　be　hard　to　say。　A　year　earlier　he　was　for　attempting　to
negotiate　peace；　but　though　professing　to　have　come　over　to　the
war　party　he　was　never　a　cordial　supporter　of　the　Confederacy。　In
a　hundred　ways　he　played　upon　the　strong　local　distrust　of
Richmond；　and　upon　the　feeling　that　North　Carolina　was　being
exploited　in　the　interests　of　the　remainder　of　the　South。　To
cripple　the　efficiency　of　Confederate　conscription　was　one　of　his
constant　aims。　Whatever　his　views　of　the　struggle　in　which　he　was
engaged；　they　did　not　include　either　an　appreciation　of　Southern
nationalism　or　the　strategist's　conception　of　war。　Granted　that
the　other　States　were　merely　his　allies；　Vance　pursued　a　course
that　might　justly　have　aroused　their　suspicion；　for　so　far　as　he
was　able　he　devoted　the　resources　of　the　State　wholly　to　the　use
of　its　own　citizens。　The　food　and　the　manufactures　of　North
Carolina　were　to　be　used　solely　by　its　own　troops；　not　by　troops
of　the　Confederacy　raised　in　other　States。　And　yet；　subsequent　to
his　reelection；　he　was　not　a　figure　in　the　movement　to　negotiate
peace。

Meanwhile　in　Georgia；　where　secession　had　met　with　powerful
opposition；　the　policies　of　the　Government　had　produced
discontent　not　only　with　the　management　of　the　war　but　with　the
war　itself。　And　now　Alexander　H。　Stephens　becomes；　for　a　season；
very　nearly　the　central　figure　of　Confederate　history。　Early　in
1864　the　new　act　suspending　the　writ　of　habeas　corpus　had　aroused
the　wrath　of　Georgia；　and　Stephens　had　become　the　mouthpiece　of
the　opposition。　In　an　address　to　the　Legislature；　he　condemned　in
most　exaggerated　language　not　only　the　Habeas　Corpus　Act　but　also
the　new　Conscription　Act。　Soon　afterward　he　wrote　a　long　letter
to　Herschel　V。　Johnson；　who；　like　himself；　had　been　an　enemy　of
secession　in　1861。　He　said　that　if　Johnson　doubted　that　the
Habeas　Corpus　Act　was　a　blow　struck　at　the　very　〃vitals　of
liberty；〃　then　he　〃would　not　believe　though　one　were　to　rise　from
the　dead。〃　In　this　extraordinary　letter　Stephens　went　on　〃most
confidentially〃　to　state　his　attitude　toward　Davis　thus　〃While　I
do　not　and　never　have　regarded　him　as　a　great　man　or　statesman　on
a　large　scale；　or　a　man　of　any　marked　genius；　yet　I　have　regarded
him　as　a　man　of　good　intentions；　weak　and　vacillating；　timid；
petulant；　peevish；　obstinate；　but　not　firm。　Am　now　beginning　to
doubt　his　good　intentions。。。。　His　whole　policy　on　the
organization　and　discipline　of　the　army　is　perfectly　consistent
with　the　hypothesis　that　he　is　aiming　at　absolute　power。〃

That　a　man　of　Stephens's　ability　should　have　dealt　in　fustian
like　this　in　the　most　dreadful　moment　of　Confederate　history　is　a
psychological　problem　that　is　not　easily　solved。　To　be　sure；
Stephens　was　an　extreme　instance　of　the　martinet　of
constitutionalism。　He　reminds　us　of　those　old…fashioned　generals
of　whom　Macaulay　said　that　they　preferred　to　lose　a　battle
according　to　rule　than　win　it　by　an　exception。　Such　men　find　it
easy　to　transform　into　a　bugaboo　any　one　who　appears　to　them　to
be　acting　irregularly。　Stephens　in　his　own　mind　had　so
transformed　the　President。　The　enormous　difficulties　and　the
wholly　abnormal　circumstances　which　　surrounded　Davis　counted
with　Stephens　for　nothing　at　all；　and　he　reasoned　about　the
Administration　as　if　it　were　operating　in　a　vacuum。　Having　come
to　this　extraordinary　position；　Stephens　passed　easily　into　a
role　that　verged　upon　treason。*

*　There　can　be　no　question　that　Stephens　never　did　anything　which
in　his　own　mind　was　in　the　least　disloyal。　And　yet　it　was
Stephens　who；　in　the　autumn　of　1864；　was　singled　out　by　artful
men　as　a　possible　figurehead　in　the　conduct　of　a　separate　peace
negotiation　with　Sherman。　A　critic　very　hostile　to　Stephens　and
his　faction　might　here　raise　the　question　as　to　what　was　at
bottom　the　motive　of　Governor　Brown；　in　the　autumn　of　1864；　in
withdrawing　the　Georgia　militia　from　Hood's　command。　Was　there
something　afoot　that　has　never　quite　revealed　itself　on　the　broad
pages　of　history？　As　ordinarily　told；　the　story　is　simply　that
certain　desperate　Georgians　asked　Stephens　to　be　their　ambassador
to　Sherman　to　discuss　terms；　that　Sherman　had　given　them
encouragement；　but　that　Stephens　avoided　the　trap；　and　so　nothing
came　of　it。　The　recently　published　correspondence　of　Toombs；
Stephens；　and　Cobb；　however；　contains　one　passage　that　has　rather
a　startling　sound。　Brown；　writing　to　Stephens　regarding　his
letter　refusing　to　meet　Sherman；　says；　〃It　keeps　the　door　open
and　I　think　this　is　wise。〃　At　the　same　time　he　made　a　public
statement　that　〃Georgia　has　power　to　act　independently　but　her
faith　is　pledged　by　implication　to　her　Southern　sisters。。。
will　triumph　with　her　Southern　sisters　or　sink　with　them　in
common　ruin。〃　It　is　still　to　be　discovered　what　〃door〃　Stephens
was　supposed　to　have　kept　open。　　Peace　ta