history of philosophy-第83节

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Now　we　have　come　so　far　that　this　unity　is　a　unity　simply　in　thought；　and　pertaining　to
consciousness；　so　that　the　objectivity　of　thought　…　reason　…　comes　forth　as　One　and　All。　This　is
dimly　conceived　by　the　French。　Whether　the　highest　Being；　this　Being　divested　of　all
determination；　is　elevated　above　nature；　or　whether　nature　or　matter　is　the　highest　unity；　there　is
always　present　the　establishing　of　something　concrete；　which　at　the　same　time　belongs　to　thought。
Since　the　liberty　of　man　has　been　set　up　as　an　absolutely　ultimate　principle；　thought　itself　has　been
set　up　as　a　principle。　The　principle　of　liberty　is　not　only　in　thought　but　the　root　of　thought；　this
principle　of　liberty　is　also　something　in　itself　concrete；　at　least　in　principle　it　is　implicitly　concrete。
Thus　far　have　general　culture　and　philosophic　culture　advanced。　Since　what　is　knowable　has　now
been　placed　entirely　within　the　sphere　of　consciousness；　and　since　the　liberty　of　the　spirit　has　been
apprehended　as　absolute；　this　may　be　understood　to　mean　that　knowledge　has　entered　altogether
into　the　realm　of　the　finite。　The　standpoint　of　the　finite　was　at　the　same　time　taken　as　ultimate；　and
God　as　a　Beyond　outside　consciousness；　duties；　rights；　knowledge　of　nature；　are　finite。　Man　has
thereby　formed　for　himself　a　kingdom　of　truth；　from　which　God　is　excluded；　it　is　the　kingdom　of
finite　truth。　The　form　of　finitude　may　here　be　termed　the　subjective　form；　liberty；
self…consciousness　＇Ichheit＇　of　the　mind；　known　as　the　absolute；　is　essentially　subjective　…　in　fact　it
is　the　subjectivity　of　thought。　The　more　the　human　reason　has　grasped　itself　in　itself；　the　more　has　it
come　down　from　God　and　the　more　has　it　increased　the　field　of　the　finite。　Reason　is　One　and　All；
which　is　at　the　same　time　the　totality　of　the　finite；　reason　under　these　conditions　is　finite　knowledge
and　knowledge　of　the　finite。　The　question　is；　since　it　is　this　concrete　that　is　established　（and　not
metaphysical　abstractions）；　how　it　constitutes　itself　in　itself；　and　then；　how　it　returns　to　objectivity；
or　abrogates　its　subjectivity；　i。e。；　how　by　means　of　thought　God　is　to　be　again　brought　about；　who
at　an　earlier　time　and　at　the　beginning　of　this　period　was　recognized　as　alone　the　true。　This　is　what
we　have　to　consider　in　the　last　period；　in　dealing　with　Kant；　Fichte；　and　Schelling。




1。　S？mmtliche　Schriften；　Vol。　XXXIX。　（Berlin　u。　Stettin；　1828）；　pp。　111；　112。
2。　Lessing's　S？mmtliche　Schriften；　Vol。　XXIX。　pp。　122；　123。




Section　Three：　Recent　German　Philosophy
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　A。　Jacobi。

In　connection　with　Kant　we　must　here　begin　by　speaking　of　Jacobi；　whose　philosophy　is
contemporaneous　with　that　of　Kant；　in　both　of　these　the　advance　beyond　the　preceding　period　is
very　evident。　The　result　in　the　two　cases　is　much　the　same；　although　both　the　starting　point　and　the
method　of　progression　are　somewhat　different。　In　Jacobi's　case　the　stimulus　was　given　mainly　by
French　philosophy；　with　which　he　was　very　conversant；　and　also　by　German　metaphysics；　while
Kant　began　rather　from　the　English　side；　that　is；　from　the　scepticism　of　Hume。　Jacobi；　in　that
negative　attitude　which　he　preserved　as　well　as　Kant；　kept　before　him　the　objective　aspect　of　the
method　of　knowledge；　and　specially　considered　it；　for　he　declared　knowledge　to　be　in　its　content
incapable　of　recognizing　the　Absolute：　the　truth　must　be　concrete；　present；　but　not　finite。　Kant
does　not　consider　the　content；　but　took　the　view　of　knowledge　being　subjective；　and　for　this
reason　he　declared　it　to　be　incapable　of　recognizing　absolute　existence。　To　Kant　knowledge　is
thus　a　knowledge　of　phenomena　only；　not　because　the　categories　are　merely　limited　and　finite；　but
because　they　are　subjective。　To　Jacobi；　on　the　other　hand；　the　chief　point　is　that　the　categories　are
not　merely　subjective；　but　that　they　themselves　are　conditioned。　This　is　an　essential　difference
between　the　two　points　of　view；　even　if　they　both　arrive　at　the　same　result。

Friedrich　Heinrich　Jacobi；　born　at　Düsseldorf　in　1743；　held　office　first　in　the　Duchy　of　Berg；　and
then　in　Bavaria。　He　studied　in　Geneva　and　Paris；　associating　in　the　former　place　with　Bonnet　and
in　the　latter　with　Diderot。　Jacobi　was　a　man　of　the　highest　character　and　culture。　He　was　long
occupied　with　State　affairs；　and　in　Düsseldorf　he　held　a　public　office　which　was　connected　with
the　administration　of　the　finance　department　in　the　State。　At　the　time　of　the　French　Revolution　he
was　obliged　to　retire。　As　a　Bavarian　official　he　went　to　Munich；　there　became　President　of　the
Academy　of　Sciences　in　1804；　which　office　he；　however；　resigned　in　1812；　for　in　the　Napoleonic
period　Protestants　were　decried　as　demagogues。　He　lived　at　Munich　till　the　end　of　his　life；　and
died　at　the　same　place　on　the　10th　of　March；　1819。（1）

In　the　year　1785；　Jacobi　published　Letters　on　Spinoza；　which　were　written　in　1783；　on　the
occasion　of　the　dispute　with　Mendelssohn　above…mentioned　（p。　406）；　for　in　none　of　his　writings
did　Jacobi　develop　his　philosophy　systematically；　he　set　it　forth　in　letters　only。　When　Mendelssohn
wished　to　write　a　life　of　Lessing；　Jacobi　sent　to　ask　him　if　he　knew　that　“Lessing　was　a　Spinozist”
（Jacobi's　Werke；　Vol。　IV。　Sec。　1；　pp。　39；　40）。　Mendelssohn　was　displeased　at　this；　and　it　was　the
occasion　of　the　correspondence。　In　the　course　of　the　dispute　it　was　made　evident　that　those　who
held　themselves　to　be　professed　philosophers　and　possessed　of　a　monopoly　of　Lessing's
friendship；　such　as　Nicolai；　Mendelssohn；　&c。；　knew　nothing　about　Spinozism；　not　only　was　there
manifested　in　them　the　superficial　character　of　their　philosophic　insight；　but　ignorance　as　well；　with
Mendelssohn；　for　instance；　this　was　shown　respecting　even　the　outward　history　of　the　Spinozistic
philosophy；　and　much　more　regarding　the　inward　（Jacobi's　Werke；　Vol。　IV。　Sec。　1；　p。　91）。　That
Jacobi　asserted　Lessing　to　be　a　Spinozist；　and　gave　a　high　place　to　the　French　—　this　serious
statement　came　to　these　good　men　as　a　thunderbolt　from　the　blue。　They　—　the　self…satisfied；
self…possessed；　superior　persons　—　were　quite　surprised　that　he　also　made　pretensions　to
knowledge；　and　of　such　a　“dead　dog”　as　Spinoza　（ibidem；　p。　68）。　Explanations　followed　upon
this；　in　which　Jacobi　further　developed　his　philosophic　views。

Mendelssohn　is　directly　opposed　to　Jacobi；　for　Mendelssohn　took　his　stand　on　cognition；　placed
true　existence　immediately　in　thought　and　conception；　and　maintained：　“What　I　cannot　think　as　true
does　not　trouble　me　as　doubt。　A　question　which　I　do　not　understand；　I　cannot　answer；　it　is　for　me
as　good　as　no　question　at　all。〃（2）　He　continued　to　argue　on　these　same　lines。　His　proof　of　the
existence　of　God　thus　carries　with　it　this　necessity　of　thought；　viz。　that　actuality　must　plainly　be　in
thought；　and　a　thinker　must　be　pre…supposed；　or　the　possibility　of　the　actual　is　in　the　thinker。　“What
no　thinking　Being　conceives　as　possible　is　not　possible；　and　what　is　thought　by　no　thinking　creature
as　actual　cannot　be　actual　in　fact。　If　we　take　away　from　anything　whatsoever　the　conception
formed　by　a　thinking　Being　that　that　thing　is　possible　or　actual；　the　thing　itself　is　done　away　with。”
The　Notion　of　the　thing　is　thus　to　man　the　essence　of　the　same。　“No　finite　Being　can　think　the
actuality　of　a　thing　in　its　perfection　as　actual；　and　still　less　can　he　perceive　the　possibility　and
actuality　of　all　present　things。　There　must　thus　be　a　thinking　Being　or　an　understanding　which　in　the
most　perfect　way　thinks　the　content　of　all　possibilities　as　possible；　and　the　content　of　all　actualities
as　actual；　i。e。　there　must　be　an　infinite　understanding；　and　this　is　God。〃（3）　Here　on　the　one　hand
we　see　a　unity　of　thought　and　Being；　on　the　other　the　absolute　unity　as　infinite　understanding　—　the
former　is　the　self…consciousness　which　is　apprehended　as　finite　merely。　Actuality；　Being；　has　its
possibility　in　thought；　or　its　possibility　is　thought；　it　is　not　a　process　from　possibility　to　actuality；　for
the　possibility　remains　at　home　in　the　actuality。

Jacobi　maintains　against　these　demands　of　thought　—　and　this　in　one　view　is　the　chief　thought　in　his
philosophy　—　that　every　method　of　their　demonstration　leads　to　fatalism；　atheism；　and
Spinozism；（4）　and　presents　God　as　derived　and　founded　upon　something　else；　for　comprehending
Him　signifies　demonstrating　His　dependence。　Jacobi　thus　asserts　that　mediate　knowledge　consists
in　giving　a　cause　of　something　which　has　in　its　turn　a　finite　effect；　and　so　on；　so　that　a　knowledge
such　as　this　can　all　through　relate　to　the　finite　only。

Jacobi　further　states　upon　this　subject；　in　the　first　place；　that　〃Reason〃　—　later　on　when　he
distinguished　reason　and　understanding　（of　which　more　hereafter（5））；　he　altered　it　to
understanding（6）　…　〃can　never　bring　to　light　more　than　the　conditions　of　what　is　conditioned；
natural　laws　and　mechanism。　We　comprehend　a　thing　when　we　can　deduce　it　from　its　proximate
causes；”　and　not　from　the　remoter　causes；　the　most　remote　and　quite　universal　cause　is　always
God。　“Or”　we　know　the　thing　if　we　“perceive　its　immediate　conditions　as　they　come　in　due
succession。　Thus；　for　instance；　we　compr