history of philosophy-第7节

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what　was　previously　known；　but　by　far　the　greatest　part　remains　stationary　and　by　means　of　fresh
matter　is　merely　added　to　without　itself　being　affected　by　the　addition。　With　a　science　like
Mathematics；　history　has；　in　the　main；　only　the　pleasing　task　of　recording　further　additions。　Thus　to
take　an　example；　elementary　geometry　in　so　far　as　it　was　created　by　Euclid；　may　from　his　time　on
be　regarded　as　having　no　further　history。　

The　history　of　Philosophy；　on　the　other　hand；　shows　neither　the　motionlessness　of　a　complete；
simple　content；　nor　altogether　the　onward　movement　of　a　peaceful　addition　of　new　treasures　to
those　already　acquired。　It　seems　merely　to　afford　the　spectacle　of　ever…recurring　changes　in　the
whole；　such　as　finally　are　no　longer　even　connected　by　the　common　aim。　

1。　COMMON　IDEAS　REGARDING　THE　HISTORY　OF　PHILOSOPHY。

At　this　point　appear　these　ordinary　superficial　ideas　regarding　the　history　of　Philosophy　which　have
to　be　referred　to　and　corrected。　As　regards　these　very　current　views；　which　are　doubtless　known
to　you；　gentlemen；　for　indeed　they　are　the　reflections　most　likely　to　occur　in　one's　first　crude
thoughts　on　a　history　of　Philosophy；　I　will　shortly　explain　what　requires　explanation；　and　the
explanation　of　the　differences　in　philosophies　will　lead　us　further　into　the　matter　itself。　

a。　The　History　of　Philosophy　as　an　accumulation　of　Opinions。

History；　at　the　first　glance；　includes　in　its　aim　the　narration　of　the　accidental　circumstances　of　times；
of　races；　and　of　individuals；　treated　impartially　partly　as　regards　their　relation　in　time；　and　partly　as
to　their　content。　The　appearance　of　contingency　in　time…succession　is　to　be　dealt　with　later　on。　It　is
contingency　of　content　which　is　the　idea　with　which　we　have　first　to　deal…the　idea　of　contingent
actions。　But　thoughts　and　not　external　actions；　or　griefs；　or　joys；　form　the　content　of　Philosophy。
Contingent　thoughts；　however；　are　nothing　but　opinions；　and　philosophical　opinions　are　opinions
relating　to　the　more　special　content　of　Philosophy；　regarding　God；　Nature　and　Spirit。　

Thus　we　now　meet　the　view　very　usually　taken　of　the　history　of　Philosophy　which　ascribes　to　it　the
narration　of　a　number　of　philosophical　opinions　as　they　have　arisen　and　manifested　themselves　in
time。　This　kind　of　matter　is　in　courtesy　called　opinions；　those　who　think　themselves　more　capable
of　judging　rightly；　call　such　a　history　a　display　of　senseless　follies；　or　at　least　of　errors　made　by
men　engrossed　in　thought　and　in　mere　ideas。　This　view　is　not　only　held　by　those　who　recognize
their　ignorance　of　Philosophy。　Those　who　do　this；　acknowledge　it；　because　that　ignorance　is；　in
common　estimation；　held　to　be　no　obstacle　to　giving　judgment　upon　what　has　to　do　with　the
subject；　for　it　is　thought　that　anybody　can　form　a　judgment　on　its　character　and　value　without　any
comprehension　of　it　whatever。　But　the　same　view　is　even　held　by　those　who　write　or　have　written
on　the　history　of　Philosophy。　This　history；　considered　only　as　the　enumeration　of　various　opinions；
thus　becomes　an　idle　tale；　or；　if　you　will；　an　erudite　investigation。　For　erudition　is；　in　the　main；
acquaintance　with　a　number　of　useless　things；　that　is　to　say；　with　that　which　has　no　intrinsic　interest
or　value　further　than　being　known。　Yet　it　is　thought　that　profit　is　to　be　derived　from　learning　the
various　opinions　and　reflections　of　other　men。　It　stimulates　the　powers　of　thought　and　also　leads　to
many　excellent　reflections；　this　signifies　that　now　and　then　it　occasions　an　idea　and　its　art　thus
consists　in　the　spinning　one　opinion　out　of　the　other。　

If　the　history　of　Philosophy　merely　represented　various　opinions　in　array；　whether　they　be　of　God
or　of　natural　and　spiritual　things　existent；　it　would　be　a　most　superfluous　and　tiresome　science；　no
matter　what　advantage　might　be　brought　forward　as　derived　from　such　thought…activity　and
learning。　What　can　be　more　useless　than　to　learn　a　string　of　bald　opinions；　and　what　more
unimportant？　Literary　works；　being　histories　of　Philosophy　in　the　sense　that　they　produce　and　treat
the　ideas　of　Philosophy　as　if　they　were　opinions；　need　be　only　superficially　glanced　at　to　find　how
dry　and　destitute　of　interest　everything　about　them　is。　

An　opinion　is　a　subjective　conception；　an　uncontrolled　thought；　an　idea　which　may　occur　to　me　in
one　direction　or　in　another：　an　opinion　is　mine；　（3）　it　is　in　itself　a　universal　thought　which　is　existent
in　and　for　itself。　But　Philosophy　possesses　no　opinions；　for　there　is　no　such　thing　as　philosophical
opinions。　When　we　hear　a　man　speaking　of　philosophical　opinions；　even　though　he　be　an　historian
of　philosophy　itself；　we　detect　at　once　this　want　of　fundamental　education。　Philosophy　is　the
objective　science　of　truth；　it　is　science　of　necessity；　conceiving　knowledge；　and　neither　opinion　nor
the　spinning　out　of　opinions。　

The　more　precise　significance　of　this　idea　is　that　we　get　to　know　opinions　only；　thus　laying
emphasis　upon　the　word　Opinion。　Now　the　direct　opposite　of　opinion　is　the　Truth；　it　is　Truth
before　which　mere　opinion　pales。　Those　who　in　the　history　of　Philosophy　seek　mere　theories；　or
who　suppose　that　on　the　whole　only　such　are　to　be　found　within　it；　also　turn　aside　when　that　word
Truth　confronts　them。　Philosophy　here　encounters　opposition　from　two　different　sides。　On　the　one
hand　piety　openly　declares　Reason　or　Thought　to　be　incapable　of　apprehending　what　is　true；　and
to　lead　only　to　the　abyss　of　doubt；　it　declares　that　independent　thought　must　be　renounced；　and
reason　held　in　bounds　by　faith　in　blind　authority；　if　Truth　is　to　be　reached。　Of　the　relation　existing
between　Religion　and　Philosophy　and　of　its　history；　we　shall　deal　later　on。　On　the　other　hand；　it　is
known　just　as　well；　that　so…called　reason　has　maintained　its　rights；　abandoning　faith　in　mere
authority；　and　has　endeavoured　to　make　Christianity　rational；　so　that　throughout　it　is　only　my
personal　insight　and　conviction　which　obliges　me　to　make　any　admissions。　But　this　affirmation　of
the　right　of　reason　is　turned　round　in　an　astonishing　manner；　so　that　it　results　in　making　knowledge
of　the　truth　through　reason　an　impossibility。　This　so…called　reason　on　the　one　hand　has　combated
religious　faith　in　the　name　and　power　of　thinking　reason；　and　at　the　same　time　it　has　itself　turned
against　reason　and　is　true　reason's　adversary。　Instinct　and　feeling　are　maintained　by　it　against　the
true　reason；　thus　making　the　measure　of　true　value　the　merely　subjective…that　is　a　particular
conviction　such　as　each　can　form　in　and　for　himself　in　his　subjective　capacity。　A　personal
conviction　such　as　this　is　no　more　than　the　particular　opinion　that　has　become　final　for　men。　

If　we　begin　with　what　meets　us　in　our　very　first　conceptions；　we　cannot　neglect　to　make　mention
of　this　aspect　in　the　history　of　Philosophy。　In　its　results　it　permeates　culture　generally；　being　at　once
the　misconception　and　true　sign　of　our　times。　It　is　the　principle　through　which　men　mutually
understand　and　know　each　other；　an　hypothesis　whose　value　is　established　and　which　is　the
ground　of　all　the　other　sciences。　In　theology　it　is　not　so　much　the　creed　of　the　church　that　passes
for　Christianity；　as　that　every　one　to　a　greater　or　less　degree　makes　a　Christianity　of　his　own　to
tally　with　his　conviction。　And　in　history　we　often　see　theology　driven　into　acquiring　the　knowledge
of　various　opinions　in　order　that　an　interest　may　thus　be　furnished　to　the　science；　and　one　of　the
first　results　of　the　attention　paid　them　is　the　honour　awarded　to　all　convictions；　and　the　esteem
vouchsafed　to　what　has　been　constituted　merely　by　the　individual。　The　endeavour　to　know　the
Truth　is　then　of　course　relinquished。　It　is　true　that　personal　conviction　is　the　ultimate　and　absolute
essential　which　reason　and　its　philosophy；　from　a　subjective　point　of　view；　demand　in　knowledge。
But　there　is　a　distinction　between　conviction　when　it；　rests　on　subjective　grounds　such　as　feelings；
speculations　and　perceptions；　or；　speaking　generally；　on　the　particular　nature　of　the　subject；　and
when　it　rests　on　thought　proceeding　from　acquaintance　with　the　Notion　and　the　nature　of　the　thing。
In　the　former　case　conviction　is　opinion。　

This　opposition　between　mere　opinion　and　truth　now　sharply　defined；　we　already　recognize　in　the
culture　of　the　period　of　Socrates　and　Plato…a　period　of　corruption　in　Greek　life…as　the　Platonic
opposition　between　opinion　（doxa）　and　Science　（episteme）。　It　is　the　same　opposition　as　that
which　existed　in　the　decadence　of　Roman　public　and　political　life　under　Augustus；　and
subsequently　when　Epicureanism　and　indifference　set　themselves　up　against　Philosophy。　Under　this
influence；　when　Christ　said；　〃I　came　into　the　world　that　I　should　bear　witness　unto　the　Truth；〃
Pilate　answered；　〃What　is　Truth？〃　That　was　said　in　a　superior　way；　and　signifies　that　this　idea　of
truth　is　an　expedient　which　is　obsolete：　we　have　got　further；　we　know　that　there　is　no　longer　any
question　about　knowing　the　Truth；　seeing　that　we　have　gone　beyond　it。　Who　makes　this　statement
has　gone　beyond　it　indeed。　If　this　is　made　our　starting　point　in　the　history　of　Philosophy；　its　whole
significance