history of philosophy-第44节

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


must　doubt　everything　（De　omnibus　dubitandum　est）；　and　that　is　an　absolute　beginning。　He　thus
makes　the　abolition　of　all　determinations　the　first　condition　of　Philosophy。　This　first　proposition　has
not；　however；　the　same　signification　as　Scepticism；　which　sets　before　it　no　other　aim　than　doubt
itself；　and　requires　that　we　should　remain　in　this　indecision　of　mind；　an　indecision　wherein　mind
finds　its　freedom。　It　rather　signifies　that　we　should　renounce　all　prepossessions　—　that　is；　all
hypotheses　which　are　accepted　as　true　in　their　immediacy　—　and　commence　from　thought；　so　that
from　it　we　should　in　the　first　place　attain　to　some　fixed　and　settled　basis；　and　make　a　true
beginning。　In　Scepticism　this　is　not　the　case　for　with　the　sceptics　doubt　is　the　end　at　which　they
rest。　（2）　But　the　doubting　of　Descartes；　his　making　no　hypotheses；　because　nothing　is　fixed　or
secure；　does　not　occur　in　the　interests　of　freedom　as　such；　in　order　that　nothing　should　have　value
except　freedom　itself；　and　nothing　exist　in　the　quality　of　an　external　objective。　To　him　everything　is
unstable　indeed；　in　so　far　as　the　Ego　can　abstract　from　it　or　can　think；　for　pure　thought　is
abstraction　from　everything。　But　in　consciousness　the　end　is　predominant；　and　it　is　to　arrive　at
something　fixed　and　objective　—　and　not　the　moment　of　subjectivity；　or　the　fact　of　being　set　forth；
known　and　proved　by　me。　Yet　this　last　comes　along　with　the　other；　for　it　is　from　the　starting　point
of　my　thought　that　I　would　attain　my　object；　the　impulse　of　freedom　is　thus　likewise　fundamental。

In　the　propositions　in　which　Descartes　gives　in　his　own　way　the　ground　of　this　great　and　most
important　principle；　there　is　found　a　na？ve　and　empirical　system　of　reasoning。　This　is　an　example：
“Because　we　were　born　as　children；　and　formed　all　manner　of　judgments　respecting　sensuous
things　before　we　had　the　perfect　use　of　our　reason；　we　are　through　many　preconceived　ideas
hindered　from　the　knowledge　of　the　truth。　From　these　we　appear　not　to　be　able　to　free　ourselves
in　any　other　way　but　by　once　in　our　lives　striving　to　doubt　that　respecting　which　we　have　the　very
slightest　suspicion　of　an　uncertainty。　Indeed　it　is　really　desirable　to　hold　as　false　everything　in
respect　to　which　we　have　any　doubt；　so　that　we　may　find　more　clearly　what　is　most　certain　and
most　knowable。　Yet　this　doubt　has　to　be　limited　to　the　contemplation　of　the　truth；　for　in　the
conduct　of　our　life　we　are　compelled　to　choose　the　probable；　since　there　the　opportunity　for
action　would　often　pass　away　before　we　could　solve　our　doubts。　But　here；　where　we　have　only　to
deal　with　the　search　for　truth；　we　may　very　reasonably　doubt　whether　any　thing　sensuous　and
perceptible　exists　—　in　the　first　place　because　we　find　that　the　senses　often　deceive　us　and　it　is
prudent　not　to　trust　in　what　has　even　once　deceived　us；　and　then　because　every　day　in　dreaming
we　think　we　feel　or　see　before　ourselves　innumerable　things　which　never　were；　and　to　the　doubter
no　signs　are　given　by　which　he　can　safely　distinguish　sleeping　from　waking。　We　shall　hereby
likewise　doubt　everything　else；　even　mathematical　propositions；　partly　because　we　have　seen　that
some　err　even　in　what　we　hold　most　certain；　and　ascribe　value　to　what　to　us　seems　false；　and
partly　because　we　have　heard　that　a　God　exists　who　has　created　us；　and　who　can　do　everything；
so　that　He　may　have　created　us　liable　to　err。　But　if　we　conceive　ourselves　not　to　derive　our
existence　from　God；　but　from　some　other　source；　perhaps　from　ourselves；　we　are　all　the　more
liable；　in　that　we　are　thus　imperfect；　to　err。　But　we　have　so　far　the　experience　of　freedom　within　us
that　we　can　always　refrain　from　what　is　not　perfectly　certain　and　well　founded。”　（3）　The　demand
which　rests　at　the　basis　of　Descartes’　reasonings　thus　is　that　what　is　recognized　as　true　should　be
able　to　maintain　the　position　of　having　the　thought　therein　at　home　with　itself。　The　so…called
immediate　intuition　and　inward　revelation；　which　in　modern　times　is　so　highly　regarded；　has　its
place　here。　But　because　in　the　Cartesian　form　the　principle　of　freedom　as　such　is　not　brought　into
view；　the　grounds　which　are　here　advanced　are　for　the　most　part　popular。

b。　Descartes　sought　something　in　itself　certain　and　true；　which　should　neither　be　only　true　like　the
object　of　faith　without　knowledge；　nor　the　sensuous　and　also　sceptical　certainty　which　is　without
truth。　The　whole　of　Philosophy　as　it　had　been　carried　on　up　to　this　time　was　vitiated　by　the
constant　pre…supposition　of　something　as　true；　and　in　some　measure；　as　in　the　Neo…Platonic
philosophy；　by　not　giving　the　form　of　scientific　knowledge　to　its　matter；　or　by　not　separating　its
moments。　But　to　Descartes　nothing　is　true　which　does　not　possess　an　inward　evidence　in
consciousness；　or　which　reason　does　not　recognize　so　clearly　and　conclusively　that　any　doubt
regarding　it　is　absolutely　impossible。　“Because　we　thus　reject　or　declare　to　be　false　everything
regarding　which　we　can　have　any　doubt　at　all；　it　is　easy　for　us　to　suppose　that　there　is　no　God；　no
heaven；　no　body　—　but　we　cannot　therefore　say　that　we　do　not　exist；　who　think　this。　For　it　is
contradictory　to　say　that　what　thinks　does　not　exist。　Hence　the　knowledge　that　‘I　think；　therefore
I　am；’　is　what　we　arrive　at　first　of　all；　and　it　is　the　most　certain　fact　that　offers　itself　to　everyone
who　follows　after　philosophy　in　an　orderly　fashion。　This　is　the　best　way　of　becoming　acquainted
with　the　nature　of　spirit　and　its　diversity　from　body。　For　if　we　inquire　who　we　are　who　can　set
forth　as　untrue　everything　which　is　different　from　ourselves；　we　clearly　see　that　no　extension；
figure；　change　of　position；　nor　any　such　thing　which　can　be　ascribed　to　body；　constitutes　our
nature；　but　only　thought　alone；　which　is　thus　known　earlier　and　more　certainly　than　any　corporeal
thing。”　（4）　　‘I’　has　thus　significance　here　as　thought；　and　not　as　individuality　of
self…consciousness。　The　second　proposition　of　the　Cartesian　philosophy　is　hence　the　immediate
certainty　of　thought。　Certainty　is　only　knowledge　as　such　in　its　pure　form　as　self…relating；　and　this　is
thought；　thus　then　the　unwieldy　understanding　makes　its　way　on　to　the　necessity　of　thought。

Descartes　begins；　just　as　Fichte　did　later　on；　with　the　‘I’　as　indubitably　certain；　I　know　that
something　is　presented　in　me。　By　this　Philosophy　is　at　one　stroke　transplanted　to　quite　another
field　and　to　quite　another　standpoint；　namely　to　the　sphere　of　subjectivity。　Presuppositions　in
religion　are　given　up；　proof　alone　is　sought　for；　and　not　the　absolute　content　which　disappears
before　abstract　infinite　subjectivity。　There　is　in　Descartes　likewise　a　seething　desire　to　speak　from
strong　feeling；　from　the　ordinary　sensuous　point　of　view；　just　as　Bruno　and　so　many　others；　each　in
his　own　fashion；　express　as　individualities　their　particular　conceptions　of　the　world。　To　consider
the　content　in　itself　is　not　the　first　matter；　for　I　can　abstract　from　all　my　conceptions；　but　not　from
the　‘I。’　We　think　this　and　that；　and　hence　it　is　—　is　to　give　the　common　would…be…wise　argument
of　those　incapable　of　grasping　the　matter　in　point；　that　a　determinate　content　exists　is　exactly　what
we　are　forced　to　doubt　—　there　is　nothing　absolutely　fixed。　Thought　is　the　entirely　universal；　but
not　merely　because　I　can　abstract；　but　because　‘I’　is　thus　simple；　self…identical。　Thought
consequently　comes　first；　the　next　determination　arrived　at；　in　direct　connection　with　it；　is　the
determination　of　Being。　The　‘I　think’　directly　involves　my　Being；　this；　says　Descartes；　is　the
absolute　basis　of　all　Philosophy。　（5）　The　determination　of　Being　is　in　my　‘I’；　this　connection　is
itself　the　first　matter。　Thought　as　Being　and　Being　as　thought　—　that　is　my　certainty；　‘I’；　in　the
celebrated　Cogito；　ergo　sum　we　thus　have　Thought　and　Being　inseparably　bound　together。

On　the　one　hand　this　proposition　is　regarded　as　a　syllogism：　from　thought　Being　is　deduced。　Kant
more　especially　has　objected　to　this　that　Being　is　not　contained　in　thinking；　that　it　is　different　from
thinking。　This　is　true；　but　they　are　still　inseparable；　or　constitute　an　identity；　their　difference　is　not　to
the　prejudice　of　their　unity。　Yet　this　maxim　of　pure　abstract　certainty；　the　universal　totality　in　which
everything　implicitly　exists；　is　not　proved；　（6）　we　must　therefore　not　try　to　convert　this　proposition
into　a　syllogism。　Descartes　himself　says：　“There　is　no　syllogism　present　at　all。　For　in　order　that
there　should　be　such；　the　major　premise　must　have　been　‘all　that　thinks　exists’”　—　from　which　the
subsumption　would　have　followed　in　the　minor　premise；　‘now　I　am。’　By　this　the　immediacy
which　rests　in　the　proposition　would　be　removed。　“But　that　major　premise”　is　not　set　forth　at　all；
being　“really　in　the　first　instance　derived　from　the　original　‘I　think；　therefore；　I　am’”　（7）　For
arriving　at　a　conclusion　three　links　are　required　—　in　this　case　we　ought　to　have　a　third　through
which　thought　and　Being　should　have　been　mediated；　and　it　is　not　to　be　found　here。　The
‘Therefore’　which　binds　the　two　sides　together　is　not　the　‘Therefore’　of　a　syllogism；　the
connection　b