history of philosophy-第32节

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　　　　　contradiction　is　involved；　inasmuch　as　because　God's　knowledge　is　not　merely　subjective；
　　　　　that　which　God　knows　likewise　is。

　　　　　ii。　Further　still；　human　freedom　is　in　opposition　to　necessity　as　the　determinateness　of
　　　　　nature；　man　is　dependent　on　nature；　and　the　external　as　well　as　the　inward　nature　of　man　is
　　　　　his　necessity　as　against　his　freedom。

　　　　　iii。　Considered　objectively；　this　opposition　is　that　between　final　causes　and　efficient　causes；
　　　　　i。e。；　between　the　acts　of　freedom　and　the　acts　of　necessity。

　　　　　iv。　This　opposition　between　the　freedom　of　man　and　natural　necessity　has　finally　likewise
　　　　　the　further　form　of　community　of　soul　and　body；　of　commercium　animi　cum　corpore；　as　it
　　　　　has　been　called；　wherein　the　soul　appears　as　the　simple；　ideal；　and　free；　and　the　body　as　the
　　　　　manifold；　material　and　necessary。

These　matters　occupy　the　attention　of　science；　and　they　are　of　a　completely　different　nature　from
the　interests　of　ancient　philosophy。　The　difference　is　this；　that　here　there　is　a　consciousness　of　an
opposition；　which　is　certainly　likewise　contained　in　the　subjects　with　which　the　learning　of　the
ancients　was　occupied；　but　which　had　not　come　to　consciousness。　This　consciousness　of　the
opposition；　this　'Fall；'　is　the　main　point　of　interest　in　the　conception　of　the　Christian　religion。　The
bringing　about　in　thought　of　the　reconciliation　which　is　accepted　in　belief；　now　constitutes　the
whole　interest　of　knowledge。　Implicitly　it　has　come　to　pass；　for　knowledge　considers　itself
qualified　to　bring　about　in　itself　this　recognition　of　the　reconciliation。　The　philosophic　systems　are
therefore　no　more　than　modes　of　this　absolute　unity；　and　only　the　concrete　unity　of　those　opposites
is　the　truth。

3。　As　regards　the　stages　which　were　reached　in　the　progress　of　this　knowledge　we　have　to
mention　three　of　the　principal。

a。　First　of　all　we　find　the　union　of　those　opposites　stated；　and　to　prove　it　genuine　attempts　are
made；　though　not　yet　determined　in　purity。

b。　The　second　stage　is　the　metaphysical　union；　and　here；　with　Descartes；　the　philosophy　of
modern　times　as　abstract　thought　properly　speaking　begins。

　　　　　i。　Thinking　understanding　seeks　to　bring　to　pass　the　union；　inasmuch　as　it　investigates　with
　　　　　its　pure　thought…determinations；　this　is　in　the　first　place　the　standpoint　of　metaphysics　as
　　　　　such。

　　　　　ii。　In　the　second　place；　we　have　to　consider　negation；　the　destruction　of　this　metaphysics　…
　　　　　the　attempt　to　consider　knowledge　on　its　own　account；　and　the　determinations　which
　　　　　proceed　from　it。

c。　The　third　stage　is　that　this　union　itself　which　is　to　be　brought　about；　and　which　is　the　only
subject　of　interest；　comes　to　consciousness　and　becomes　an　object。　As　principle　the　union　has　the
form　of　the　relationship　of　knowledge　to　the　content；　and　thus　this　question　has　been　put：　'How　is；
and　how　can　thought　be　identical　with　the　objective？'　With　this　the　inward　element　which　lies　at　the
basis　of　this　metaphysic　is　raised　into　explicitude　and　made　an　object；　and　this　includes　all　modern
philosophy　in　its　range。

4。　In　respect　to　the　external　history　and　the　lives　of　the　philosophers；　it　will　strike　us　that　from　this
time　on；　these　appear　to　be　very　different　from　those　of　the　philosophers　of　ancient　times；　whom
we　regarded　as　self…sufficing　individualities。　It　is　required　that　a　philosopher　should　live　as　he
teaches；　that　he　should　despise　the　world　and　not　enter　into　connection　with　it；　this　the　ancients
have　accomplished；　and　they　are　such　plastic　individualities　just　because　the　inward　spiritual　aim　of
philosophy　has　likewise　frequently　determined　their　external　relations　and　conditions。　The　object　of
their　knowledge　was　to　take　a　thoughtful　view　of　the　universe；　they　kept　the　external　connection
with　the　world　all　the　further　removed　from　themselves　because　they　did　not　greatly　approve　of
much　therein　present；　or；　at　least；　it　ever　proceeds　on　its　way；　according　to　its　own　particular　laws；
on　which　the　individual　is　dependent。　The　individual　likewise　participates　in　the　present　interests　of
external　life；　in　order　to　satisfy　his　personal　ends；　and　through　them　to　attain　to　honour；　wealth；
respect；　and　distinction；　the　ancient　philosophers；　however；　because　they　remained　in　the　Idea；　did
not　concern　themselves　with　things　that　were　not　the　objects　of　their　thought。　Hence　with　the
Greeks　and　Romans　the　philosophers　lived　in　an　independent　fashion　peculiar　to　themselves；　and
in　an　external　mode　of　life　which　appeared　suitable　to　and　worthy　of　the　science　they　professed；
they　conducted　themselves　independently　as　private　persons；　unfettered　by　outside　trammels；　and
they　may　be　compared　to　the　monks　who　renounced　all　temporal　goods。

In　the　Middle　Ages　it　was　chiefly　the　clergy；　doctors　of　theology；　who　occupied　themselves　with
philosophy。　In　the　transition　period　the　philosophers　showed　themselves　to　be　in　an　inward
warfare　with　themselves　and　in　an　external　warfare　with　their　surroundings；　and　their　lives　were
spent　in　a　wild；　unsettled　fashion。

In　modern　times　things　are　very　different；　now　we　no　longer　see　philosophic　individuals　who
constitute　a　class　by　themselves。　With　the　present　day　all　difference　has　disappeared；　philosophers
are　not　monks；　for　we　find　them　generally　in　connection　with　the　world；　participating　with　others　in
some　common　work　or　calling。　They　live；　not　independently；　but　in　the　relation　of　citizens；　or　they
occupy　public　offices　and　take　part　in　the　life　of　the　state。　Certainly　they　may　be　private　persons；
but　if　so；　their　position　as　such　does　not　in　any　way　isolate　them　from　their　other　relationship。　They
are　involved　in　present　conditions；　in　the　world　and　its　work　and　progress。　Thus　their　philosophy　is
only　by　the　way；　a　sort　of　luxury　and　superfluity。　This　difference　is　really　to　be　found　in　the　manner
in　which　outward　conditions　have　taken　shape　after　the　building　up　of　the　inward　world　of　religion。
In　modern　times；　namely；　on　account　of　the　reconciliation　of　the　worldly　principle　with　itself；　the
external　world　is　at　rest；　is　brought　into　order　…　worldly　relationships；　conditions；　modes　of　life；
have　become　constituted　and　organized　in　a　manner　which　is　conformable　to　nature　and　rational。
We　see　a　universal；　comprehensible　connection；　and　with　that　individuality　likewise　attains　another
character　and　nature；　for　it　is　no　longer　the　plastic　individuality　of　the　ancients。　This　connection　is
of　such　power　that　every　individuality　is　under　its　dominion；　and　yet　at　the　same　time　can　construct
for　itself　an　inward　world。　The　external　has　thus　been　reconciled　with　itself　in　such　a　way　that　both
inward　and　outward　may　be　self…sufficing　and　remain　independent　of　one　another；　and　the
individual　is　in　the　condition　of　being　able　to　leave　his　external　side　to　external　order；　while　in　the
case　of　those　plastic　forms　the　external　could　only　be　determined　entirely　from　within。　Now；　on　the
contrary；　with　the　higher　degree　of　strength　attained　by　the　inward　side　of　the　individual；　he　may
hand　the　external　over　to　chance；　just　as　he　leaves　clothing　to　the　contingencies　of　fashion；　not
considering　it　worth　while　to　exert　his　understanding　upon　it。　The　external　he　leaves　to　be
determined　by　the　order　which　is　present　in　the　particular　sphere　in　which　his　lot　is　cast。　The
circumstances　of　life　are；　in　the　true　sense；　private　affairs；　determined　by　outward　conditions；　and
do　not　contain　anything　worthy　of　our　notice。　Life　becomes　scholarly；　uniform；　commonplace；　it
connects　itself　with　outwardly　given　relationships　and　cannot　represent　or　set　itself　forth　as　a　form
pertaining　only　to　itself。　Man　must　not　take　up　the　character　of　showing　himself　an　independent
form；　and　giving　himself　a　position　in　the　world　created　by　himself。　Because　the　objective　power　of
external　relationships　is　infinitely　great；　and　for　that　reason　the　way　in　which　I　perforce　am　placed
in　them　has　become　a　matter　of　indifference　to　me；　personality　and　the　individual　life　generally　are
equally　indifferent。　A　philosopher；　it　is　said；　should　live　as　a　philosopher；　i。e。；　should　be
independent　of　the　external　relationships　of　the　world；　and　should　give　up　occupying　himself　with
and　troubling　himself　concerning　them。　But　thus　circumscribed　in　respect　of　all　necessities；　more
especially　of　culture；　no　one　can　suffice　for　himself；　he　must　seek　to　act　in　connection　with　others。
The　modern　world　is　this　essential　power　of　connection；　and　it　implies　the　fact　that　it　is　clearly
necessary　for　the　individual　to　enter　into　these　relations　of　external　existence；　only　a　common
mode　of　existence　is　possible　in　any　calling　or　condition；　and　to　this　Spinoza　forms　the　solitary
exception。　Thus　in　earlier　times　bravery　was　individual；　while　modern　bravery　consists　in　each　not
acting　after　his　own　fashion；　but　relying　on　his　connection　with　others　…　and　this　constitutes　his
whole　merit。　The　calling　of　philosopher　is　not；　like　that　of　the　monks；　an　organized　condition。
Members　of　academies　of　learning　are　no　doubt　organized　in　part；　but　even　a　special　calling　like
theirs　sinks　into　the　ordinary　commonplace　of　state　or　cla