the critique of judgement-第34节

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im　to　be　not　merely　a　man；　but　a　man　refined　after　the　manner　of　his　kind　（the　beginning　of　civilization）…for　that　is　the　estimate　formed　of　one　who　has　the　bent　and　turn　for　communicating　his　pleasure　to　others；　and　who　is　not　quite　satisfied　with　an　object　unless　his　feeling　of　delight　in　it　can　be　shared　in　communion　with　others。　Further；　a　regard　to　universal　communicability　is　a　thing　which　every　one　expects　and　requires　from　every　one　else；　just　as　if　it　were　part　of　an　original　compact　dictated　by　humanity　itself。　And　thus；　no　doubt；　at　first　only　charms；　e。g。；　colours　for　painting　oneself　（roucou　among　the　Caribs　and　cinnabar　among　the　Iroquois）；　or　flowers；　sea…shells；　beautifully　coloured　feathers；　then；　in　the　course　of　time；　also　beautiful　forms　（as　in　canoes；　wearing…apparel；　etc。）　which　convey　no　gratification；　i。e。；　delight　of　enjoyment；　become　of　moment　in　society　and　attract　a　considerable　interest。　Eventually；　when　civilization　has　reached　its　height　it　makes　this　work　of　communication　almost　the　main　business　of　refined　inclination；　and　the　entire　value　of　sensations　is　placed　in　the　degree　to　which　they　permit　of　universal　communication。　At　this　stage；　then；　even　where　the　pleasure　which　each　one　has　in　an　object　is　but　insignificant　and　possesses　of　itself　no　conspicuous　interest；　still　the　idea　of　its　universal　communicability　almost　indefinitely　augments　its　value。　　　This　interest；　indirectly　attached　to　the　beautiful　by　the　inclination　towards　society；　and；　consequently；　empirical；　is；　however；　of　no　importance　for　us　here。　For　that　to　which　we　have　alone　to　look　is　what　can　have　a　bearing　a　priori；　even　though　indirect；　upon　the　judgement　of　taste。　For；　if　even　in　this　form　an　associated　interest　should　betray　itself；　taste　would　then　reveal　a　transition　on　the　part　of　our　critical　faculty。　from　the　enjoyment　of　sense　to　the　moral　feeling。　This　would　not　merely　mean　that　we　should　be　supplied　with　a　more　effectual　guide　for　the　final　employment　of　taste；　but　taste　would　further　be　presented　as　a　link　in　the　chain'　of　the　human　faculties　a　priori　upon　which　all　legislation；　depend。　This　much　may　certainly　be　said　of　the　empirical　interest　in　objects　of　taste；　and　in　taste　itself；　that　as　taste　thus　pays　homage　to　inclination；　however　refined；　such　interest　will　nevertheless　readily　fuse　also　with　all　inclinations　and　passions；　which　in　society　attain　to　their　greatest　variety　and　highest　degree；　and　the　interest　in　the　beautiful；　if　this　is　made　its　ground；　can　but　afford　a　very　ambiguous　transition　from　the　agreeable　to　the　good。　We　have　reason；　however；　to　inquire　whether　this　transition　may　not　still　in　some　way　be　furthered　by　means　of　taste　when　taken　in　its　purity。

　　　　　　SS　42。　The　intellectual　interest　in　the　beautiful。

　　It　has　been　with　the　best　intentions　that　those　who　love　to　see　in　the　ultimate　end　of　humanity；　namely　the　morally　good；　the　goal　of　all　activities　to　which　men　are　impelled　by　the　inner　bent　of　their　nature；　have　regarded　it　as　a　mark　of　a　good　moral　character　to　take　an　interest　in　the　beautiful　generally。　But　they　have；　not　without　reason；　been　contradicted；　by　others；　who　appeal　to　the　fact　of　experience；　that　virtuosi　in　matters　of　taste　being　not　alone　often；　but　one　might　say　as　a　general　rule；　vain；　capricious；　and　addicted　to　injurious　passions；　could　perhaps　more　rarely　than　others　lay　claim　to　any　pre…eminent　attachment　to　moral　principles。　And　so　it　would　seem；　not　only　that　the　feeling　for　the　beautiful　is　specifically　different　from　the　moral　feeling　（which　as　a　matter　of　fact　is　the　case）；　but　also　that　the　interest　which　we　may　combine　with　it　will　hardly　consort　with　the　moral；　and　certainly　not　on　grounds　of　inner　affinity。　　　Now　I　willingly　admit　that　the　interest　in　the　beautiful　of　art　（including　under　this　heading　the　artificial　use　of　natural　beauties　for　personal　adornment；　and　so　from　vanity）　gives　no　evidence　at　all　of　a　habit　of　mind　attached　to　the　morally　good；　or　even　inclined　that　way。　But；　on　the　other　hand；　I　do　maintain　that　to　take　an　immediate　interest　in　the　beauty　of　nature　（not　merely　to　have　taste　in　estimating　it）　is　always　a　mark　of　a　good　soul；　and　that；　where　this　interest　is　habitual；　it　is　at　least　indicative　of　a　temper　of　mind　favourable　to　the　moral　feeling　that　it　should　readily　associate　itself　with　the　contemplation　of　nature。　It　must；　however；　be　borne　in　mind　that　I　mean　to　refer　strictly　to　the　beautiful　forms　of　nature；　and　to　put　to　one　side　the　charms　which　she　is　wont　so　lavishly　to　combine　with　them；　because；　though　the　interest　in　these　is　no　doubt　immediate；　it　is　nevertheless　empirical。　　　One　who　alone　（and　without　any　intention　of　communicating　his　observations　to　others）　regards　the　beautiful　form　of　a　wild　flower；　a　bird；　an　insect；　or　the　like；　out　of　admiration　and　love　of　them；　and　being　loath　to　let　them　escape　him　in　nature；　even　at　the　risk　of　some　misadventure　to　himself…so　far　from　there　being　any　prospect　of　advantage　to　him…such　a　one　takes　an　immediate；　and　in　fact　intellectual；　interest　in　the　beauty　of　nature。　This　means　that　he　is　not　alone　pleased　with　nature's　product　in　respect　of　its　form；　but　is　also　pleased　at　its　existence；　and　is　so　without　any　charm　of　sense　having　a　share　in　the　matter；　or　without　his　associating　with　it　any　end　whatsoever。　　　In　this　connection；　however；　it　is　of　note　that　were　we　to　play　a　trick　on　our　lover　of　the　beautiful；　and　plant　in　the　ground　artificial　flowers　（which　can　be　made　so　as　to　look　just　like　natural　ones）；　and　perch　artfully　carved　birds　on　the　branches　of　trees；　and　he　were　to　find　out　how　he　had　been　taken　in；　the　immediate　interest　which　these　things　previously　had　for　him　would　at　once　vanish…though；　perhaps；　a　different　interest　might　intervene　in　its　stead；　that；　namely；　of　vanity　in　decorating　his　room　with　them　for　the　eyes　of　others。　The　fact　is　that　our　intuition　and　reflection　must　have　as　their　concomitant　the　thought　that　the　beauty　in　question　is　nature's　handiwork；　and　this　is　the　sole　basis　of　the　immediate　interest　that　is　taken　in　it。　Failing　this；　we　are　either　left　with　a　bare　judgement　of　taste　void　of　all　interest　whatever；　or　else　only　with　one　that　is　combined　with　an　interest　that　is　mediate；　involving；　namely；　a　reference　to　society；　which　latter　affords　no　reliable　indication　of　morally　good　habits　of　thought。　　　The　superiority　which　natural　beauty　has　over　that　of　art；　even　where　it　is　excelled　by　the　latter　in　point　of　form；　in　yet　being　alone　able　to　awaken　an　immediate　interest；　accords　with　the　refined　and　well…grounded　habits　of　thought　of　all　men　who　have　cultivated　their　moral　feeling。　If　a　man　with　taste　enough　to　judge　of　works　of　fine　art　with　the　greatest　correctness　and　refinement　readily　quits　the　room　in　which　he　meets　with　those　beauties　that　minister　to　vanity　or；　at　least；　social　joys；　and　betakes　himself　to　the　beautiful　in　nature；　so　that　he　may　there　find　as　it　were　a　feast　for　his　soul　in　a　train　of　thought　which　he　can　never　completely　evolve；　we　will　then　regard　this　his　choice　even　with　veneration；　and　give　him　credit　for　a　beautiful　soul；　to　which　no　connoisseur　or　art　collector　can　lay　claim　on　the　score　of　the　interest　which　his　objects　have　for　him。　Here；　now；　are　two　kinds　of　objects　which　in　the　judgement　of　mere　taste　could　scarcely　contend　with　one　another　for　a　superiority。　What　then；　is　the　distinction　that　makes　us　hold　them　in　such　different　esteem？　　　We　have　a　faculty　of　judgement　which　is　merely　aesthetic…a　faculty　of　judging　of　forms　without　the　aid　of　concepts；　and　of　finding；　in　the　mere　estimate　of　them；　a　delight　that　we　at　the　same　time　make　into　a　rule　for　every　one；　without　this　judgement　being　founded　on　an　interest；　or　yet　producing　one。　On　the　other　hand；　we　have　also　a　faculty　of　intellectual　judgement　for　the　mere　forms　of　practical　maxims　（so　far　as　they　are　of　themselves　qualified　for　universal　legislation）…a　faculty　of　determining　an　a　priori　delight；　which　we　make　into　a　law　for　everyone；　without　our　judgement　being　founded　on　any　interest；　though　here　it　produces　one。　The　pleasure　or　displeasure　in　the　former　judgement　is　called　that　of　taste；　the　latter　is　called　that　of　the　moral　feeling。　　　But；　now；　reason　is　further　interested　in　ideas　（for　which　in　our　moral　feeling　it　brings　about　an　immediate　interest）；　having　also　objective　reality。　That　is　to　say；　it　is　of　interest　to　reason　that　nature　should　at　least　show　a　trace　or　give　a　hint　that　it　contains　in　itself　some　ground　or　other　for　assuming　a　uniform　accordance　of　its　products　with　our　wholly　disinterested　delight　（a　delight　which　we　cognize…a　priori　as　a　law　for　every　one　without　being　able　to　ground　it　upon　proofs）。　That　being　so；　reason　must　take　an　interest　in　every　manifestation　on　the　part　of　nature　of　some　such　accordance。　Hence　the　mind　cannot　reflect　on　the　beauty　of　nature　without　at　the　same　time　finding　its　interest　engaged。　But　this　interest　is　akin　to　the　moral。　One；　then；　who　takes　such　an　interest　in　the　beautiful　in　nature　can　only　do　so　in　so　far　as　he　has　previously　set　his　interest　deep　in　the　foundations　of　the　morally　good。　On　these　grounds　we　have　reason　for　presuming　the　presence　of　at　least　the