the critique of judgement-第17节

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　perception；　can　still　compare　them　with　essential　and　universal　ends；　and　then　further　pronounce　aesthetically　upon　their　accord　with　such　ends；　only　he；　among　all　objects　in　the　world；　admits；　therefore；　of　an　ideal　of　beauty；　just　as　humanity　in　his　person；　as　intelligence；　alone　admits　of　the　ideal　of　perfection。　　　Two　factors　are　here　involved。　First；　there　is　the　aesthetic　normal　idea；　which　is　an　individual　intuition　（of　the　imagination）。　This　represents　the　norm　by　which　we　judge　of　a　man　as　a　member　of　a　particular　animal　species。　Secondly；　there　is　the　rational　idea。　This　deals　with　the　ends　of　humanity　so　far　as　capable　of　sensuous　representation；　and　converts　them　into　a　principle　for　estimating　his　outward　form；　through　which　these　ends　are　revealed　in　their　phenomenal　effect。　The　normal　idea　must　draw　from　experience　the　constituents　which　it　requires　for　the　form　of　an　animal　of　a　particular　kind。　But　the　greatest　finality　in　the　construction　of　this　form…that　which　would　serve　as　a　universal　norm　for　forming　an　estimate　of　each　individual　of　the　species　in　question…the　image　that；　as　it　were；　forms　an　intentional　basis　underlying　the　technic　of　nature；　to　which　no　separate　individual；　but　only　the　race　as　a　whole；　is　adequate；　has　its　seat　merely　in　the　idea　of　the　judging　subject。　Yet　it　is；　with　all　its　proportions；　an　aesthetic　idea；　and；　as　such；　capable　of　being　fully　presented　in　concreto　in　a　model　image。　Now；　how　is　this　effected？　In　order　to　render　the　process　to　some　extent　intelligible　（for　who　can　wrest　nature's　whole　secret　from　her？）；　let　us　attempt　a　psychological　explanation。　　　It　is　of　note　that　the　imagination；　in　a　manner　quite　incomprehensible　to　us；　is　able　on　occasion；　even　after　a　long　lapse　of　time；　not　alone　to　recall　the　signs　for　concepts；　but　also　to　reproduce　the　image　and　shape　of　an　object　out　of　a　countless　number　of　others　of　a　different；　or　even　of　the　very　same；　kind。　And；　further；　if　the　mind　is　engaged　upon　comparisons；　we　may　well　suppose　that　it　can　in　actual　fact；　though　the　process　is　unconscious；　superimpose　as　it　were　one　image　upon　another；　and　from　the　coincidence　of　a　number　of　the　same　kind　arrive　at　a　mean　contour　which　serves　as　a　common　standard　for　all。　Say；　for　instance；　a　person　has　seen　a　thousand　full…grown　men。　Now　if　he　wishes　to　judge　normal　size　determined　upon　a　comparative　estimate；　then　imagination　（to　my　mind）　allows　a　great　number　of　these　images　（perhaps　the　whole　thousand）　to　fall　one　upon　the　other；　and；　if　I　may　be　allowed　to　extend　to　the　case　the　analogy　of　optical　presentation；　in　the　space　where　they　come　most　together；　and　within　the　contour　where　the　place　is　illuminated　by　the　greatest　concentration　of　colour；　one　gets　a　perception　of　the　average　size；　which　alike　in　height　and　breadth　is　equally　removed　from　the　extreme　limits　of　the　greatest　and　smallest　statures；　and　this　is　the　stature　of　a　beautiful　man。　（The　same　result　could　be　obtained　in　a　mechanical　way；　by　taking　the　measures　of　all　the　thousand；　and　adding　together　their　heights；　and　their　breadths　＇and　thicknesses＇；　and　dividing　the　sum　in　each　case　by　a　thousand。）　But　the　power　of　imagination　does　all　this　by　means　of　a　dynamical　effect　upon　the　organ　of　internal　sense；　arising　from　the　frequent　apprehension　of　such　forms。　If；　again；　for　our　average　man　we　seek　on　similar　lines　for　the　average　head；　and　for　this　the　average　nose；　and　so　on；　then　we　get　the　figure　that　underlies　the　normal　idea　of　a　beautiful　man　in　the　country　where　the　comparison　is　instituted。　For　this　reason　a　Negro　must　necessarily　（under　these　empirical　conditions）　have　a　different　normal　idea　of　the　beauty　of　forms　from　what　a　white　man　has；　and　the　Chinaman　one　different　from　the　European。　And　the。　process　would　be　just　the　same　with　the　model　of　a　beautiful　horse　or　dog　（of　a　particular　breed）。　This　normal　idea　is　not　derived　from　proportions　taken　from　experience　as　definite　rules：　rather　is　it　according　to　this　idea　that　rules　forming　estimates　first　become　possible。　It　is　an　intermediate　between　all　singular　intuitions　of　individuals；　with　their　manifold　variations…a　floating　image　for　the　whole　genus；　which　nature　has　set　as　an　archetype　underlying　those　of　her　products　that　belong　to　the　same　species；　but　which　in　no　single　case　she　seems　to　have　completely　attained。　But　the　normal　idea　is　far　from　giving　the　complete　archetype　of　beauty　in　the　genus。　It　only　gives　the　form　that　constitutes　the　indispensable　condition　of　all　beauty；　and；　consequently；　only　correctness　in　the　presentation　of　the　genus。　It　is；　as　the　famous　〃Doryphorus〃　of　Polycletus　was　called；　the　rule　（and　Myron's　〃Cow〃　might　be　similarly　employed　for　its　kind）。　It　cannot；　for　that　very　reason；　contain　anything　specifically　characteristic；　for　otherwise　it　would　not　be　the　normal　idea　for　the　genus。　Further；　it　is　not　by　beauty　that　its　presentation　pleases；　but　merely　because　it　does　not　contradict　any　of　the　conditions　under　which　alone　a　thing　belonging　to　this　genus　can　be　beautiful。　The　presentation　is　merely　academically　correct。*

　　*It　will　be　found　that　a　perfectly　regular　face　one　that　a　painter　might　fix　his　eye　on　for　a　model…ordinarily　conveys　nothing。　This　is　because　it　is　devoid　of　anything　characteristic；　and　so　the　idea　of　the　race　is　expressed　in　it　rather　than　the　specific　qualities　of　a　person。　The　exaggeration　of　what　is　characteristic　in　this　way；　i。e。；　exaggeration　violating　the　normal　idea　（the　finality　of　the　race）；　is　called　caricature。　Also　experience　shows　that　these　quite　regular　faces　indicate　as　a　rule　internally　only　a　mediocre　type　of　man；　presumably…if　one　may　assume　that　nature　in　its　external　form　expresses　the　proportions　of　the　internal　…because；　where　none　of　the　mental　qualities　exceed　the　proportion　requisite　to　constitute　a　man　free　from　faults；　nothing　can　be　expected　in　the　way　of　what　is　called　genius；　in　which　nature　seems　to　make　a　departure　from　its　wonted　relations　of　the　mental　powers　in　favour　of　some　special　one。

　　But　the　ideal　of　the　beautiful　is　still　something　different　from　its　normal　idea。　For　reasons　already　stated　it　is　only　to　be　sought　in　the　human　figure。　Here　the　ideal　consists　in　the　expression　of　the　moral；　apart　from　which　the　object　would　not　please　at　once　universally　and　positively　（not　merely　negatively　in　a　presentation　academically　correct）。　The　visible　expression　of　moral　ideas　that　govern　men　inwardly　can；　of　course；　only　be　drawn　from　experience；　but　their　combination　with　all　that　our　reason　connects　with　the　morally　good　in　the　idea　of　the　highest　finality…benevolence；　purity；　strength；　or　equanimity；　etc。…may　be　made；　as　it　were；　visible　in　bodily　manifestation　（as　effect　of　what　is　internal）；　and　this　embodiment　involves　a　union　of　pure　ideas　of　reason　and　great　imaginative　power；　in　one　who　would　even　form　an　estimate　of　it；　not　to　speak　of　being　the　author　of　its　presentation。　The　correctness　of　such　an　ideal　of　beauty　is　evidenced　by　its　not　permitting　any　sensuous　charm　to　mingle　with　the　delight　in　its　object；　in　which　it　still　allows　us　to　take　a　great　interest。　This　fact　in　turn　shows　that　an　estimate　formed　according　to　such　a　standard　can　never　be　purely　aesthetic；　and　that　one　formed　according　to　an　ideal　of　beauty　cannot　be　a　simple　judgement　of　taste。

　　　　Definition　of　the　Beautiful　Derived　from　this　Third　Moment。

　　Beauty　is　the　form　of　finality　in　an　object；　so　far　as　perceived　in　it　apart　from　the　representation　of　an　end。*

　　*As　telling　against　this　explanation；　the　instance　may　be　adduced　that　there　are　things　in　which　we　see　a　form　suggesting　adaptation　to　an　end；　without　any　end　being　cognized　in　them…as；　for　example；　the　stone　implements　frequently　obtained　from　sepulchral　tumuli　and　supplied　with　a　hole；　as　if　for　＇inserting＇　a　handle；　and　although　these　by　their　shape　manifestly　indicate　a　finality；　the　end　of　which　is　unknown；　they　are　not　on　that　account　described　as　beautiful。　But　the　very　fact　of　their　being　regarded　as　art…products　involves　an　immediate　recognition　that　their　shape　is　attributed　to　some　purpose　or　other　and　to　a　definite　end。　For　this　reason　there　is　no　immediate　delight　whatever　in　their　contemplation。　A　flower；　on　the　other　hand；　such　as　a　tulip；　is　regarded　as　beautiful；　because　we　meet　with　a　certain　finality　in　its　perception；　which；　in　our　estimate　of　it；　is　not　referred　to　any　end　whatever。

　　　　　　　FOURTH　MOMENT。　Of　the　Judgement　of　Taste：　Moment　of　　　　　　　　　　　　　the　Modality　of　the　Delight　in　the　Object。

　　　　　　SS　18。　Nature　of　the　modality　in　a　judgement　of　taste。

　　I　may　assert　in　the　case　of　every　representation　that　the　synthesis　of　a　pleasure　with　the　representation　（as　a　cognition）　is　at　least　possible。　Of　what　I　call　agreeable　I　assert　that　it　actually　causes　pleasure　in　me。　But　what　we　have　in　mind　in　the　case　of　the　beautiful　is　a　necessary　reference　on　its　part　to　delight。　However；　this　necessity　is　of　a　special　kind。　It　is　not　a　theoretical　objective　necessity…such　as　would　let　us　cognize　a　priori　that　every　one　will　feel　this　delight　in　the　object　that　is　called　beautiful　by　me。　Nor　yet　is　it　a　practical　necessity；　in　which　case；　thanks　to　concepts　of　a　pure　rational　will　in　whi