an enquiry concerning human understanding-第3节

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understanding。　There　are　many　obvious　distinctions　of　this
kind；　such　as　those　between　the　will　and　understanding；　the
imagination　and　passions；　which　fall　within　the
comprehension　of　every　human　creature；　and　the　finer　and
more　philosophical　distinctions　are　no　less　real　and
certain；　though　more　difficult　to　be　comprehended。　Some
instances；　especially　late　ones；　of　success　in　these
enquiries；　may　give　us　a　juster　notion　of　the　certainty　and
solidity　of　this　branch　of　learning。　And　shall　we　esteem　it
worthy　the　labour　of　a　philosopher　to　give　us　a　true　system
of　the　planets；　and　adjust　the　position　and　order　of　those
remote　bodies；　while　we　affect　to　overlook　those；　who；　with
so　much　success；　delineate　the　parts　of　the　mind；　in　which
we　are　so　intimately　concerned？＇3＇

　　　　　But　may　we　not　hope；　that　philosophy；　cultivated　with
care；　and　encouraged　by　the　attention　of　the　public；　may
carry　its　researches　still　farther；　and　discover；　at　least
in　some　degree；　the　secret　springs　and　principles；　by　which
the　human　mind　is　actuated　in　its　operations？　Astronomers
had　long　contented　themselves　with　proving；　from　the
phaenomena；　the　true　motions；　order；　and　magnitude　of　the
heavenly　bodies：　Till　a　philosopher；　at　last；　arose；　who
seems；　from　the　happiest　reasoning；　to　have　also　determined
the　laws　and　forces；　by　which　the　revolutions　of　the　planets
are　governed　and　directed。　The　like　has　been　performed　with
regard　to　other　parts　of　nature。　And　there　is　no　reason　to
despair　of　equal　success　in　our　enquiries　concerning　the
mental　powers　and　economy；　if　prosecuted　with　equal　capacity
and　caution。　It　is　probable；　that　one　operation　and
principle　of　the　mind　depends　on　another；　which；　again；　may
be　resolved　into　one　more　general　and　universal：　And　how　far
these　researches　may　possibly　be　carried；　it　will　be
difficult　for　us；　before；　or　even　after；　a　careful　trial；
exactly　to　determine。　This　is　certain；　that　attempts　of　this
kind　are　every　day　made　even　by　those　who　philosophize　the
most　negligently：　And　nothing　can　be　more　requisite　than　to
enter　upon　the　enterprize　with　thorough　care　and　attention；
that；　if　it　lie　within　the　compass　of　human　understanding；
it　may　at　last　be　happily　achieved；　if　not；　it　may；　however；
be　rejected　with　some　confidence　and　security。　This　last
conclusion；　surely；　is　not　desirable；　nor　ought　it　to　be
embraced　too　rashly。　For　how　much　must　we　diminish　from　the
beauty　and　value　of　this　species　of　philosophy；　upon　such　a
supposition？　Moralists　have　hitherto　been　accustomed；　when
they　considered　the　vast　multitude　and　diversity　of　those
actions　that　excite　our　approbation　or　dislike；　to　search
for　some　common　principle；　on　which　this　variety　of
sentiments　might　depend。　And　though　they　have　sometimes
carried　the　matter　too　far；　by　their　passion　for　some　one
general　principle；　it　must；　however；　be　confessed；　that　they
are　excusable　in　expecting　to　find　some　general　principles；
into　which　all　the　vices　and　virtues　were　justly　to　be
resolved。　The　like　has　been　the　endeavour　of　critics；
logicians；　and　even　politicians：　Nor　have　their　attempts
been　wholly　unsuccessful；　though　perhaps　longer　time；
greater　accuracy；　and　more　ardent　application　may　bring
these　sciences　still　nearer　their　perfection。　To　throw　up　at
once　all　pretensions　of　this　kind　may　justly　be　deemed　more
rash；　precipitate；　and　dogmatical；　than　even　the　boldest　and
most　affirmative　philosophy；that　has　ever　attempted　to
impose　its　crude　dictates　and　principles　on　mankind。

　　　　　What　though　these　reasonings　concerning　human　nature
seem　abstract；　and　of　difficult　comprehension？　This　affords
no　presumption　of　their　falsehood。　On　the　contrary；　it　seems
impossible；　that　what　has　hitherto　escaped　so　many　wise　and
profound　philosophers　can　be　very　obvious　and　easy。　And
whatever　pains　these　researches　may　cost　us；　we　may　think
ourselves　sufficiently　rewarded；　not　only　in　point　of　profit
but　of　pleasure；　if；　by　that　means；　we　can　make　any　addition
to　our　stock　of　knowledge；　in　subjects　of　such　unspeakable
importance。

　　　　　But　as；　after　all；　the　abstractedness　of　these
speculations　is　no　recommendation；　but　rather　a　disadvantage
to　them；　and　as　this　difficulty　may　perhaps　be　surmounted　by
care　and　art；　and　the　avoiding　of　all　unnecessary　detail；　we
have；　in　the　following　enquiry；　attempted　to　throw　some
light　upon　subjects；　from　which　uncertainty　has　hitherto
deterred　the　wise；　and　obscurity　the　ignorant。　Happy；　if　we
can　unite　the　boundaries　of　the　different　species　of
philosophy；　by　reconciling　profound　enquiry　with　clearness；
and　truth　with　novelty！　And　still　more　happy；　if；　reasoning
in　this　easy　manner；　we　can　undermine　the　foundations　of　an
abstruse　philosophy；　which　seems　to　have　hitherto　served
only　as　a　shelter　to　superstition；　and　a　cover　to　absurdity
and　error！

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　*　*　*　*

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SECTION　II。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　the　Origin　of　Ideas。

　　　　　E/VERY　one　will　readily　allow；　that　there　is　a
considerable　difference　between　the　perceptions　of　the　mind；
when　a　man　feels　the　pain　of　excessive　heat；　or　the　pleasure
of　moderate　warmth；　and　when　he　afterwards　recalls　to　his
memory　this　sensation；　or　anticipates　it　by　his　imagination。
These　faculties　may　mimic　or　copy　the　perceptions　of　the
senses；　but　they　never　can　entirely　reach　the　force　and
vivacity　of　the　original　sentiment。　The　utmost　we　say　of
them；　even　when　they　operate　with　greatest　vigour；　is；　that
they　represent　their　object　in　so　lively　a　manner；　that　we
could　　say　we　feel　or　see　it：　But；　except　the　mind
be　disordered　by　disease　or　madness；　they　never　can　arrive
at　such　a　pitch　of　vivacity；　as　to　render　these　perceptions
altogether　undistinguishable。　All　the　colours　of　poetry；
however　splendid；　can　never　paint　natural　objects　in　such　a
manner　as　to　make　the　description　be　taken　for　a　real
landskip。　The　most　lively　thought　is　still　inferior　to　the
dullest　sensation。

　　　　　We　may　observe　a　like　distinction　to　run　through　all
the　other　perceptions　of　the　mind。　A　man　in　a　fit　of　anger；
is　actuated　in　a　very　different　manner　from　one　who　only
thinks　of　that　emotion。　If　you　tell　me；　that　any　person　is
in　love；　I　easily　understand　your　meaning；　and　from　a　just
conception　of　his　situation；　but　never　can　mistake　that
conception　for　the　real　disorders　and　agitations　of　the
passion。　When　we　reflect　on　our　past　sentiments　and
affections；　our　thought　is　a　faithful　mirror；　and　copies　its
objects　truly；　but　the　colours　which　it　employs　are　faint
and　dull；　in　comparison　of　those　in　which　our　original
perceptions　were　clothed。　It　requires　no　nice　discernment　or
metaphysical　head　to　mark　the　distinction　between　them。

　　　　　Here　therefore　we　may　divide　all　the　perceptions　of　the
mind　into　two　classes　or　species；　which　are　distinguished　by
their　different　degrees　of　force　and　vivacity。　The　less
forcible　and　lively　are　commonly　denominated　T/HOUGHTS　or
I/DEAS。　The　other　species　want　a　name　in　our　language；　and
in　most　others；　I　suppose；　because　it　was　not　requisite　for
any；　but　philosophical　purposes；　to　rank　them　under　a
general　term　or　appellation。　Let　us；　therefore；　use　a　little
freedom；　and　call　them　I/MPRESSIONS；　employing　that　word　in
a　sense　somewhat　different　from　the　usual。　By　the　term
；　then；　I　mean　all　our　more　lively　perceptions；
when　we　hear；　or　see；　or　feel；　or　love；　or　hate；　or　desire；
or　will。　And　impressions　are　distinguished　from　ideas；　which
are　the　less　lively　perceptions；　of　which　we　are　conscious；
when　we　reflect　on　any　of　those　sensations　or　movements
above　mentioned。

　　　　　Nothing；　at　first　view；　may　seem　more　unbounded　than
the　thought　of　man；　which　not　only　escapes　all　human　power
and　authority；　but　is　not　even　restrained　within　the　limits
of　nature　and　reality。　To　form　monsters；　and　join
incongruous　shapes　and　appearances；　costs　the　imagination　no
more　trouble　than　to　conceive　the　most　natural　and　familiar
objects。　And　while　the　body　is　confined　to　one　planet；　along
which　it　creeps　with　pain　and　difficulty；　the　thought　can　in
an　instant　transport　us　into　the　most　distant　regions　of　the
universe；　or　even　beyond　the　universe；　into　the　unbounded
chaos；　where　nature　is　supposed　to　lie　in　total　confusion。
What　never　was　seen；　or　heard　of；　may　yet　be　conceived；　nor
is　any　thing　beyond　the　power　of　thought；　except　what
implies　an　absolute　contradiction。

　　　　　But　though　our　thought　seems　to　possess　this　unbounded
liberty；　we　shall　find；　upon　a　nearer　examination；　that　it
is　really　confined　within　very　narrow　limits；　and　that　all
this　creative　power　of　the　mind　amounts　to　no　more　than　the
faculty　of　compounding；　transposing；　augmenting；　or
diminishing　the　materials　afforded　us　by　the　senses　and
experience。　When　we　think　of　a　golden　mountain；　we　only　join
two　consistent　ideas；　；　and　；　with　which　we
were　formerly　acquainted。　A　virtuous　horse　we　can　conceive；
because；　from　our　own　feeling；　we　can　conceive　virtue；　and
this　we　may　unite　to　the　figure　and　shape　of　a　horse；　which
is　an　animal　familiar　to　us。　In　short；　all　the　materials　of
thinking　are　derived　either　from　our　outw