an enquiry concerning human understanding-第20节

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earthquake　arise；　and　shake　and　tumble　my　house　about　my
ears。　I　shall　therefore　change　the　suppositions。　I　shall　say
that　I　know　with　certainty　that　he　is　not　to　put　his　hand
into　the　fire　and　hold　it　there　till　it　be　consumed：　And
this　event；　I　think　I　can　foretell　with　the　same　assurance；
as　that；　if　he　throw　himself　out　at　the　window；　and　meet
with　no　obstruction；　he　will　not　remain　a　moment　suspended
in　the　air。　No　suspicion　of　an　unknown　frenzy　can　give　the
least　possibility　to　the　former　event；　which　is　so　contrary
to　all　the　known　principles　of　human　nature。　A　man　who　at
noon　leaves　his　purse　full　of　gold　on　the　pavement　at
Charing…Cross；　may　as　well　expect　that　it　will　fly　away　like
a　feather；　as　that　he　will　find　it　untouched　an　hour　after。
Above　one　half　of　human　reasonings　contain　inferences　of　a
similar　nature；　attended　with　more　or　less　degrees　of
certainty　proportioned　to　our　experience　of　the　usual
conduct　of　mankind　in　such　particular　situations。

　　　　　I　have　frequently　considered；　what　could　possibly　be
the　reason　why　all　mankind；　though　they　have　ever；　without
hesitation；　acknowledged　the　doctrine　of　necessity　in　their
whole　practice　and　reasoning；　have　yet　discovered　such　a
reluctance　to　acknowledge　it　in　words；　and　have　rather　shown
a　propensity；　in　all　ages；　to　profess　the　contrary　opinion。
The　matter；　I　think；　may　be　accounted　for　after　the
following　manner。　If　we　examine　the　operations　of　body；　and
the　production　of　effects　from　their　causes；　we　shall　find
that　all　our　faculties　can　never　carry　us　farther　in　our
knowledge　of　this　relation　than　barely　to　observe　that
particular　objects　are　　together；　and
that　the　mind　is　carried；　by　a　；　from
the　appearance　of　one　to　the　belief　of　the　other。　But　though
this　conclusion　concerning　human　ignorance　be　the　result　of
the　strictest　scrutiny　of　this　subject；　men　still　entertain
a　strong　propensity　to　believe　that　they　penetrate　farther
into　the　powers　of　nature；　and　perceive　something　like　a
necessary　connexion　between　the　cause　and　the　effect。　When
again　they　turn　their　reflections　towards　the　operations　of
their　own　minds；　and　　no　such　connexion　of　the　motive
and　the　action；　they　are　thence　apt　to　suppose；　that　there
is　a　difference　between　the　effects　which　result　from
material　force；　and　those　which　arise　from　thought　and
intelligence。　But　being　once　convinced　that　we　know　nothing
farther　of　causation　of　any　kind　than　merely　the　　of　objects；　and　the　consequent　　of
the　mind　from　one　to　another；　and　finding　that　these　two
circumstances　are　universally　allowed　to　have　place　in
voluntary　actions；　we　may　be　more　easily　led　to　own　the　same
necessity　common　to　all　causes。　And　though　this　reasoning
may　contradict　the　systems　of　many　philosophers；　in
ascribing　necessity　to　the　determinations　of　the　will；　we
shall　find；　upon　reflection；　that　they　dissent　from　it　in
words　only；　not　in　their　real　sentiment。　Necessity；
according　to　the　sense　in　which　it　is　here　taken；　has　never
yet　been　rejected；　nor　can　ever；　I　think；　be　rejected　by　any
philosopher。　It　may　only；　perhaps；　be　pretended　that　the
mind　can　perceive；　in　the　operations　of　matter；　some　farther
connexion　between　the　cause　and　effect；　and　connexion　that
has　not　place　in　voluntary　actions　of　intelligent　beings。
Now　whether　it　be　so　or　not；　can　only　appear　upon
examination；　and　it　is　incumbent　on　these　philosophers　to
make　good　their　assertion；　by　defining　or　describing　that
necessity；　and　pointing　it　out　to　us　in　the　operations　of
material　causes。

　　　　　It　would　seem；　indeed；　that　men　begin　at　the　wrong　end
of　this　question　concerning　liberty　and　necessity；　when　they
enter　upon　it　by　examining　the　faculties　of　the　soul；　the
influence　of　the　understanding；　and　the　operations　of　the
will。　Let　them　first　discuss　a　more　simple　question；　namely；
the　operations　of　body　and　of　brute　unintelligent　matter；
and　try　whether　they　can　there　form　any　idea　of　causation
and　necessity；　except　that　of　a　constant　conjunction　of
objects；　and　subsequent　inference　of　the　mind　from　one　to
another。　If　these　circumstances　form；　in　reality；　the　whole
of　that　necessity；　which　we　conceive　in　matter；　and　if　these
circumstances　be　also　universally　acknowledged　to　take　place
in　the　operations　of　the　mind；　the　dispute　is　at　an　end；　at
least；　must　be　owned　to　be　thenceforth　merely　verbal。　But　as
long　as　we　will　rashly　suppose；　that　we　have　some　farther
idea　of　necessity　and　causation　in　the　operations　of
external　objects；　at　the　same　time；　that　we　can　find　nothing
farther　in　the　voluntary　actions　of　the　mind；　there　is　no
possibility　of　bringing　the　question　to　any　determinate
issue；　while　we　proceed　upon　so　erroneous　a　supposition。　The
only　method　of　undeceiving　us　is　to　mount　up　higher；　to
examine　the　narrow　extent　of　science　when　applied　to
material　causes；　and　to　convince　ourselves　that　all　we　know
of　them　is　the　constant　conjunction　and　inference　above
mentioned。　We　may；　perhaps；　find　that　it　is　with　difficulty
we　are　induced　to　fix　such　narrow　limits　to　human
understanding：　But　we　can　afterwards　find　no　difficulty　when
we　come　to　apply　this　doctrine　to　the　actions　of　the　will。
For　as　it　is　evident　that　these　have　a　regular　conjunction
with　motives　and　circumstances　and　characters；　and　as　we
always　draw　inferences　from　one　to　the　other；　we　must　be
obliged　to　acknowledge　in　words　that　necessity；　which　we
have　already　avowed；　in　every　deliberation　of　our　lives；　and
in　every　step　of　our　conduct　and　behaviour。＇22＇

　　　　　But　to　proceed　in　this　reconciling　project　with　regard
to　the　question　of　liberty　and　necessity；　the　most
contentious　question　of　metaphysics；　the　most　contentious
science；　it　will　not　require　many　words　to　prove；　that　all
mankind　have　ever　agreed　in　the　doctrine　of　liberty　as　well
as　in　that　of　necessity；　and　that　the　whole　dispute；　in　this
respect　also；　has　been　hitherto　merely　verbal。　For　what　is
meant　by　liberty；　when　applied　to　voluntary　actions？　We
cannot　surely　mean　that　actions　have　so　little　connexion
with　motives；　inclinations；　and　circumstances；　that　one　does
not　follow　with　a　certain　degree　of　uniformity　from　the
other；　and　that　one　affords　no　inference　by　which　we　can
conclude　the　existence　of　the　other。　For　these　are　plain　and
acknowledged　matters　of　fact。　By　liberty；　then；　we　can　only
mean　；　this　is；　if　we　choose　to　remain
at　rest；　we　may；　if　we　choose　to　move；　we　also　may。　Now　this
hypothetical　liberty　is　universally　allowed　to　belong　to
every　one　who　is　not　a　prisoner　and　in　chains。　Here；　then；
is　no　subject　of　dispute。

　　　　　Whatever　definition　we　may　give　of　liberty；　we　should
be　careful　to　observe　two　requisite　circumstances；　；
that　it　be　consistent　with　plain　matter　of　fact；　；
that　it　be　consistent　with　itself。　If　we　observe　these
circumstances；　and　render　our　definition　intelligible；　I　am
persuaded　that　all　mankind　will　be　found　of　one　opinion　with
regard　to　it。

　　　　　It　is　universally　allowed　that　nothing　exists　without　a
cause　of　its　existence；　and　that　chance；　when　strictly
examined；　is　a　mere　negative　word；　and　means　not　any　real
power　which　has　anywhere　a　being　in　nature。　But　it　is
pretended　that　some　causes　are　necessary；　some　not
necessary。　Here　then　is　the　advantage　of　definitions。　Let
any　one　　a　cause；　without　comprehending；　as　a　part
of　the　definition；　a　　with　its　effect；
and　let　him　show　distinctly　the　origin　of　the　idea；
expressed　by　the　definition；　and　I　shall　readily　give　up　the
whole　controversy。　But　if　the　foregoing　explication　of　the
matter　be　received；　this　must　be　absolutely　impracticable。
Had　not　objects　a　regular　conjunction　with　each　other；　we
should　never　have　entertained　any　notion　of　cause　and
effect；　and　this　regular　conjunction　produces　that　inference
of　the　understanding；　which　is　the　only　connexion；　that　we
can　have　any　comprehension　of。　Whoever　attempts　a　definition
of　cause；　exclusive　of　these　circumstances；　will　be　obliged
either　to　employ　unintelligible　terms　or　such　as　are
synonymous　to　the　term　which　he　endeavours　to　define。＇23＇
And　if　the　definition　above　mentioned　be　admitted；　liberty；
when　opposed　to　necessity；　not　to　constraint；　is　the　same
thing　with　chance；　which　is　universally　allowed　to　have　no
existence。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　*　*　*　*
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PART　II。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　T/HERE　is　no　method　of　reasoning　more　common；　and　yet
none　more　blameable；　than；　in　philosophical　disputes；　to
endeavour　the　refutation　of　any　hypothesis；　by　a　pretence　of
its　dangerous　consequences　to　religion　and　morality。　When
any　opinion　leads　to　absurdities；　it　is　certainly　false；　but
it　is　not　certain　that　an　opinion　is　false；　because　it　is　of
dangerous　consequence。　Such　topics；　therefore；　ought
entirely　to　be　forborne；　as　serving　nothing　to　the　discovery
of　truth；　but　only　to　make　the　person　of　an　antagonist
odious。　This　I　observe　in　genera