lect02-第4节

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Hindoo　supposes　that　some　supernatural　penalty　would　follow；






indeed；　he　generally　gives　definiteness　to　it　by　retaining　a






Brahmin　to　starve　himself　vicariously；　and　no　Hindoo　doubts　what






would　come　of　causing　a　Brahmin's　death。　We　cannot　but　suppose






that　the　Brehon　rule　of　fasting　was　once　thought　to　have　been






enforced　in　some　similar　way。　Caesar　states　that　the　Druids






believed　in　the　immortality　and　transmigration　of　the　soul；　and






considered　it　the　key　of　their　system。　A　Druid　may　thus　very　well






have　taught　that　penal　consequences　in　another　world　would　follow






the　creditor's　death　by　starvation；　and　there　is　perhaps　a　pale






reflection　of　this　doctrine　in　the　language　of　the　Senchus　Mor：






'He　who　does　not　give　a　pledge　to　fasting　is　an　evader　of　all；　he






who　disregards　all　things　shall　not　be　paid　by　God　or　man。'　But






an　Irish　Brehon　could　scarcely　make　any　distinct　assertion　on　the






subject；　since　fasting　had　now　become　a　specific　ordinance　of　the






Christian　Church；　and　its　condition　and　spiritual　effects　were






expressly　defined　by　the　Christian　priesthood。　Theoretically；　I






should　state；　a　person　who　refused　unjustly　to　yield　to　fasting






had　his　legal　liabilities　considerably　increased；　at　least；






according　to　the　dicta　of　the　Brehon　commentators；　but　such






provisions　only　bring　us　to　the　difficulty　of　which　I　first






spoke；　and　raise　anew　the　question　of　the　exact　value　of　legal






rules　at　a　period　when　Courts　of　Justice　are　not　as　yet　armed






with　resistless　powers　of　compelling　attendance　and　submission。






　　　　If　we　are　justified　in　tracing　the　pedigree　of　the　Brehon






Code　to　a　system　enforced　by　supernatural　sanctions；　we　are　able






to　contrast　it　in　various　ways　with　other　bodies　of　law　in






respect　of　its　mode　of　development。　It　closely　resembles　the






Hindoo　law；　inasmuch　as　it　consists　of　what　was　in　all






probability　an　original　basis　of　Aryan　usage　vastly　enlarged　by　a






superstructure　of　interpretation　which　a　long　succession　of






professional　commentators　have　elected；　but　it　cannot　have　had






any　such　sacredness；　and　consequently　any　such　authority；　as　the






Brahminical　jurisprudence。　Both　the　Brahmins　and　the　Brehons






assume　that　Kings　and　Judges　will　enforce　their　law；　and






emphatically　enjoin　on　them　its　enforcement；　but；　while　the






Brahmin　could　declare　that　neglect　or　disobedience　would　be






followed　by　endless　degradation　and　torment；　the　Brehon　could






only　assert　that　the　unlearned　brother　who　pronounced　a　false






judgment　would　find　blotches　come　on　his　cheeks；　and　that　the






Chief　who　allowed　sound　usage　to　be　departed　from　would　bring　bad






weather　on　his　country。　The　development　of　the　Brehon　law　was






again　parallel　to　that　which　there　is　strong　reason　for　supposing






the　Roman　law　to　have　allowed　in　early　times。　The　writer　of　the






Preface　to　the　Third　Volume；　from　which　I　have　more　than　once






quoted；　cites　some　observations　which　I　published　several　years






ago　on　the　subject　of　the　extension　of　the　Roman　jurisprudence　by






the　agency　known　as　the　Responsa　Prudentum；　the　accumulated






answers　（or；　as　the　Brehon　phrase　is；　the　judgments）　of　many






successive　generations　of　famous　Roman　lawyers；　and　he　adopts　my






account　as　giving　the　most　probable　explanation　of　the　growth　of






the　Brehon　law。　But　in　the　Roman　State　a　test　was　always　applied






to　the　'answers　of　the　learned；'　which　was　not　applied；　or　not






systematically　applied；　to　the　judgments　of　the　Brehons。　We　never






know　the　Romans　except　as　subject　to　one　of　the　strongest　of






central　governments；　which　armed　the　law　courts　with　the　force　at






its　command。　Although　the　Roman　system　did　not　work　exactly　in






the　way　to　which　our　English　experience　has　accustomed　us；　there






can；　of　course；　be　no　doubt　that　the　ultimate　criterion　of　the






validity　of　professional　legal　opinion　at　Rome；　as　elsewhere；　was






the　action　of　Courts　of　Justice　enforcing　rights　and　duties　in






conformity　with　such　opinion。　But　in　ancient　Ireland　it　is　at






least　doubtful　whether　there　was　ever；　in　our　sense　of　the　words；






a　central　government；　it　is　also　doubtful　whether　the　public






force　at　the　command　of　any　ruler　or　rulers　was　ever






systematically　exerted　through　the　mechanism　of　Courts　of






Justice；　and　it　is　at　least　a　tenable　view　that　the　institutions






which　stood　in　the　place　of　Courts　of　Justice　only　exercised






jurisdiction　through　the　voluntary　submission　of　intending






litigants。






　　　　Perhaps；　however；　from　our　present　point　of　view；　the






strongest　contrast　is　between　the　ancient　law　of　Ireland　and　the






law　of　England　at　a　period　which　an　English　lawyer　would　not　call






recent。　The　administration　of　justice　in　England；　from






comparatively　early　times；　has　been　more　strongly　centralised






than　in　any　other　European　country；　but　in　Ireland　there　was　no






central　government　to　nerve　the　arm　of　the　law。　The　process　of






the　English　Courts　has　for　centuries　past　been　practically






irresistible；　the　process　of　the　Irish　Courts；　even　if　it　was






compulsory；　was　at　the　utmost　extremely　weak。　The　Irish　law　was






developed　by　hereditary　commentators；　but　we　in　England　have






always　attributed　far　less　authority　than　does　any　European






Continental　community　to　the　unofficial　commentaries　of　the　most






learned　writers　of　textbooks。　We　obtain　our　law；　and　adjust　it　to






the　needs　of　each　successive　generation；　either　through






legislative　enactment　or　through　the　decisions　of　our　judges　on






isolated　groups　of　facts　established　by　the　most　laborious






methods。　But；　as　I　have　already　stated；　the　opinion　to　which　I






incline　is；　that　no　part　of　the　Brehon　law　had　its　origin　in






legislation。　The　author　of　innovation　and　improvement　was　the






learned　Brehon；　and　the　Brehon　appears　to　have　invented　at






pleasure　the　facts　which　he　used　as　the　framework　for　his　legal






doctrine。　His　invention　was　necessarily　limited　by　his






experience；　and　hence　the　cases　suggested　in　the　law…tracts






possess　great　interest；　as　throwing　light　on　the　society　amid






which　they　were　composed；　but　these　cases　seem　to　be　purely






hypothetical；　and　only　intended　to　illustrate　the　rule　which






happens　to　be　under　discussion。






　　　　In　the　volume　of　my　own　to　which　I　referred　a　few　moments　ago






I　said　of　the　early　Roman　law　that　'great　influence　must　have






been　exercised　（over　it）　by　the　want　of　any　distinct　check　on　the






suggestion　or　invention　of　possible　questions。　When　the　data　can






be　multiplied　at　pleasure；　the　facilities　for　evolving　a　general






rule　are　immensely　increased。　As　the　law　is　administered　among






ourselves　（in　England）　the　judge　cannot　travel　out　of　the　sets　of






facts　exhibited　before　him　or　before　his　predecessors。






Accordingly；　each　group　of　circumstances　which　is　adjudicated






upon　receives；　to　employ　a　Gallicism；　a　sort　of　consecration。　It






acquires　certain　qualities　which　distinguish　it　from　every　other






case；　genuine　or　hypothetical。'　I　do　not　think　it　can　be　doubted






that　this　English　practice　of　never　declaring　a　legal　rule






authoritatively　until　a　state　of　facts　arises　to　which　it　can　be






fitted；　is　the　secret　of　the　apparent　backwardness　and　barrenness






of　English　law　at　particular　epochs；　as　contrasted　with　the






richness　and　reasonableness　of　other　systems　which　it　more　than






rivals　in　its　present　condition。　It　is　true；　as　I　said　before；






even　of　the　Brehon　law；　that　it　does　not　wholly　disappoint　the






patriotic　expectations　entertained　of　it。　When　they　are






disencumbered　of　archaic　phrase　and　form；　there　are　some　things






remarkably　modern　in　it。　I　quite　agree　with　one　of　the　Editors






that；　in　the　ancient　Irish　Law　of　Civil　Wrong；　there　is　a






singularly　close　approach　to　modern　doctrines　on　the　subject　of






Contributory　Negligence；　and　I　have　found　it　possible　to　extract






from　the　quaint　texts　of　the　Book　of　Aicill　some　extremely






sensible　rulings　on　the　difficult